And today we have a real treat because #DidYouNotice we got a masterclass from Pep Guardiola on how to cause problems for Andoni Iraola's famous press…?
In fact, all three of City’s goals came from them exploiting this press to some degree or another...
Let’s start by talking about Iraola’s press, then.
Since arriving in the Premier League, Andoni Iraola has used a form of hybrid pressing to prevent opponents from progressing the ball.
When we say ‘hybrid’ pressing, we mean that Bournemouth move between two different approaches to pressing: a zonal approach and a man-oriented approach.
Zonal approaches are especially effective when it comes to covering space.
The problem is that to cover the whole pitch zonally is unrealistic and so either you use big distances between your players and get played through or you use small distances and allow the opponent to possess the ball relatively unpressured in the first line of their build up.
To prevent this from becoming an issue, you might go for a more man-oriented approach which means you put the opposition under pressure in their build up. But when you go man-to-man it’s quite easy to be manipulated by your opponents so that your defensive structure collapses.
A hybrid approach tries to get the best out of both worlds: using a zonal system to defend around your own goal but then jumping into man-to-man phases when the opponent are in certain stages in their build up.
To do this, Bournemouth generally trigger a series of jumps in the midfield to make sure they’re man-to-man around the ball carrier.
But this means that, when their man-to-man press is triggered, they can allow space to open out between their midfield and defensive lines which, if accessed, can lead to them being played through.
This is exactly what Guardiola looked to target at the weekend.
There is a clear process here:
1) bait the press up 2) access the space that opens up 3) look to isolate Erling Haaland 4) try to find him in space behind
To do this, Guardiola got his wingers to come inside to access the space that opened out when the Bournemouth man-to-man press was triggered.
Which posed the Bournemouth full backs a question: should they track their players inside or not?
At first, they tried to stick with the City wingers but this meant that City could pin the Bournemouth wingers, keeping them away from the goal if the ball was turned over.
But very quickly, they switched things up with the full backs trying to stay in touch with City full backs which allowed the City wingers to find pockets of space between the lines.
To deal with this, Bournemouth would jump their centre backs up. But this would leave Haaland 1v1 against a centreback.
And whenever they did, a City player would be ready to attack the space left behind by the centre back.
By overloading this space between the lines, then, City were able to find free players between the lines who could then try to find a teammate (usually Haaland because obviously) in behind.
Here’s what this looked like in practice:
And here’s how this kind of situation led to the second goal:
As a result of these sorts of situations, City were able to completely rip through Bournemouth, generating most of their xG and all four of their big chances in the first half.
Unsurprisingly, Iraola changed things up in the second half, going back to using his full backs to track the winger more closely to prevent these central overloads and Haaland from being isolated.
But this created a very different problem. Because now, with Bournemouth’s wingers having to cover inside as well as wide, the City full backs were able to generate separation from their opponent with a lot of space to run into.
Which is exactly the sort of situation that City were able to exploit for their third goal…
Interestingly, there were shades of the fixture between these two sides in the knockout stages of the FA Cup last season, where Nico O’Reilly was also able to cause a lot of problems for Bournemouth from full back.
No doubt, Iraola’s reticence to track the wingers narrow in this game came precisely from that last fixture…
…which suggests that, at least in the current iteration, Guardiola has cracked Iraola’s famous press. Because either way - whether you track the full backs or not - he can find ways of creating tensions in the defensive structure.
Obviously, the system in the second half was much safer (even taking game state into consideration).
In allowing the weaknesses to exist in the wide areas around the full backs rather than centrally, Bournemouth were able to prevent City the opportunity to generate massive chances for Haaland.
And in the end, this is a good explanation for why a lot of teams now have their own full backs jumping massive distances in their hybrid presses: because they would rather allow weaknesses in wide areas rather than in the middle of their defensive structures.
So in the game between City and Bournemouth, we get a nice example of the way that modern hybrid presses have evolved in recent years.
But it does raise a question as to whether Iraola needs to evolve his own press with Bournemouth. Or whether we’ll start seeing other teams using these sorts of ideas that Guardiola has been using to render them a little less fearsome than they have been.
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There seems to be a bit of a debate going on about whether or not Guardiola/City specifically planned to play low block and counter vs Arsenal. Don't have any big opinions but these are some points I think are important:
* Guardiola post-match makes it sound like City intended to play with more control in and out of possession but suggests that Arsenal limited them on both fronts hence why they were reduced to transitions
One of the things that the Liverpool-Arsenal game got me thinking about was the gradual shift we're seeing in build-up intentions in the European game.
In the first half, Arsenal were able to press Liverpool well enough to prevent them from getting the sort of settled possession that they want to build their more direct attacks.
And at the other end of the pitch, Liverpool weren't able to stop Arsenal from being able to progress the ball down the field in the way that they want to: with controlled possession ending up forcing the opposition deep into their own half.
Guys, I have to get this off my chest because I'm analysing Brighton vs City and the City out of possession approach is blowing my mind...
This is the set up vs goal kick. Here's the thing. City are going m2m with their front 5 players. Nothing odd there on paper until you realise they're going m2m against the GOALKEEPER as well. So it's CF->GK, WFs->CBs, CMs->CMs...
Brighton are doing the thing where they want to abandon the last line with their forwards and leaving their wingers high and City are MARKING THE WINGERS WITH THEIR CBs...
#DidYouNotice how Arne Slot swung the game in Liverpool’s favour against Arsenal this weekend?
It’s pretty clear when you look at the per half data that @markrstats put out that this was a game of two halves…
In the first half, Arsenal were able to smother Liverpool’s build up but progress the ball relatively comfortably themselves. But in the second, the balance shifted so that Liverpool were more successful at building up than their opponent. So.. what happened?
In this week’s #DidYouNotice, I want us to have a think about Man United’s build up. You can catch the video at the end of this [thread]:
Because there has been a lot of criticism of their build up under Amorim and rightly so.
For example, last season according to @footovision despite the fact they were one of the most likely teams to build up in the league, they were below the league average for successful build ups and even worse when it came to navigating a high press.