Most maps of the war in Ukraine are showing the same perspective and the same informations. Here, you will see rivers, railways, fortifications, forests...
20 surprising maps on the war in Ukraine
🧵THREAD🧵1/23 ⬇️⬇️⬇️
1- The frontline in december 2022
Days after the end of the Kharkiv and Kherson counter-offensive, russian army was controling less than 50% of the Donetsk region. The battle for Bakhmut just started and Donetsk was still threatened.
This map may seem old or out of context, but it actually helps to better understand the evolution of the Russian offensives in the Donbas.
One must put oneself in the shoes of the political and military decision-makers in Moscow: they had failed to take Kyiv, Kharkiv, or Odessa, to force Ukraine to capitulate, they had been humiliated in Kharkiv, and had to retreat from Kherson. It was therefore the full force of Soviet firepower that was deployed in the east of the country and became ruthless in the ensuing battles, sometimes at the cost of very heavy losses, as at Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
2- Three years in Donbas
The last 3 years of war have mainly been fought in Donbass.
After very slow and costly advances for the Russian army in Bakhmut and Avdiivka in 2023, the offensive towards Pokrovsk accelerated in 2024, with the Ukrainian army surrendering the best fortifications in the Donetsk suburbs.
The main Russian victory took place in South Donetsk, now completely under Russian control, but many months of campaigning remain, at the current pace, between one and two years to capture the last strongholds in North Donetsk. These three years have seen a constant offensive, the gradual depletion of Ukrainian reserves, and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of soldiers in a relentless war of attrition. On paper, the Ukrainian army has held its ground and not yielded, despite local setbacks. It remains to be seen whether it will maintain its endurance.
Here is the progress of russian forces in Donbass since february 24th 2022. We can see how slow it has been and the acceleration in 2024 and 2025. There is still a long path to go for Russia.
4- One last stand
Seen from Kyiv perspective, the ukrainian Donbass is now much smaller than before, with Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad currently falling, the 4 remaining cities around Kramatorsk will be the last stand for Ukraine in Donbass.
This map may be disturbing isn't it ?
5- The last Donbas fortress
As you saw on the first picture of this thread, with the fortification overlay, we can clearly see how much has been built in front of the remaning cities and behind them.
Every additional month is Donbas is more fortifications behind.
6- The new Donbas line method
In 2025, Ukraine started digging new style of defenses, with :
-3 ditches filled with barbed wire
-1 dragon teeths with barbed wire on top
-2 barbed wire row
I've called these lines the "New Donbas Lines", because it started in the western part of Donetsk oblast.
Currently, we have two to three such lines of defense in the Donbas, some of which have already proven their worth. They are now being deployed throughout the country, for example, towards Kharkiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia.
Looking at this map, we also notice that almost all of the fortifications face east—curious, isn't it?
7- Old and new fortifications
In red, you can see the new fortifications on the "New Donbas Lin" style. In yellow, you can find old fortifications (some are obsolete) and new ones that are still very useful, especially in the case of anti-tank ditches and anti-infantry obstacles
8- Railway logistics
After for maps where the north was on the left, we are back at normal. With the end of Pokrovsk as the main Donbas railhub, new cities are being used for this purpose.
They became, thus, strategic cities and objectives for Russia. We have Lozova (the Kramatorsk railway station just closed, so it may become the terminus), Pavlohrad and Zaporizhia.
9- Road logistics
The road logistics have also changed a lot recently. Pokrovsk has been replaced by smaller cities playing as frontline logistics hubs. Pavlohrad and Lozova are again playing the role of main supply hubs, together with Zaporizhia.
10- Dnipro and Zaporizhia soon threatened ?
The Russian push towards the Dnipropetrovsk region and the initial advance towards Zaporizhzhia raise fears of a long-term threat to the two major cities in central Ukraine.
The immediate concern is not so much the fall of these cities, but rather the gradual neutralization of their capacity as logistics hubs, both rail and road, their strategic industries, and their few remaining bridges over the Dnipro River. Recently, the first modern fortifications have been erected east of Zaporizhzhia, along three lines currently under construction.
11- 23 bridges on the Dnipro river
Ukrainian logistics are severely hampered by the Dnieper River, a vast waterway, spanned between Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia (the Kherson bridges having been destroyed) by only 23 bridges (4 of which are solely railway bridges, and a dozen mixed-use bridges), 5 of which are dams and therefore difficult to destroy.
However, if the dozen or so bridges in Zaporizhzhia and the Dnieper River were partially or totally destroyed, Ukrainian logistics would be completely crippled. This is a crucial point to bear in mind.
12- Across the Dnipro
Ukrainian strategic reserves are thus positioned west of the Dnieper River and are not intended for deployment in the east. They are there to cover the rear, provide logistics, air defense, training, border security, and so on. In total, it is likely that hundreds of thousands of mobilized personnel (including, unfortunately, those with the highest social and intellectual standing) are being kept on this side of the Dnieper for various reasons.
They have, in particular, a colossal task: maintaining air defenses, guarding the borders with Belarus and Transnistria, and securing the coasts along the Dnieper River and the Black Sea.
13- An encircled Ukraine
De-zooming is also very important, on this map, you can see that Ukraine is encircled on all sides, it has to defend all these borders and frontlines...
It also gives us a snapshot of the potential future Ukraine...
14- Between Forest and river
The Oskil front is also quite active. When looking at a map, one doesn't necessarily notice two very important landscape features:
Two long, wide rivers (the Donets and the Oskil) and the dense surrounding forests. The Oskil River is a significant natural barrier (not impossible to cross, certainly, but it gives the defender an advantage, while also complicating their logistics). The Siverski Donets River, on the other hand, was the main Ukrainian line of defense in 2022.
The Ukrainian army initially withdrew along the main cities (Sievierodonetsk, Kreminna, Lyman, Izium, Balaklya, Chuihuiv, etc.) before counter-attacking. With the second battle of Lyman about to begin, we are right in the middle of this situation. The river also offers very large forests, which allow for the concealment of equipment and troops and provoke trench warfare, as in the Serebyanka Forest. From an ecological point of view, the fighting in this protected natural area is absolutely devastating for the flora and fauna.
15- Northern forests
Talking about forests, we should'nt forget about the large forests in northern Ukraine, where troops, fortifications, air defense an other assets can be easily hidden.
It would also complicate any offensive, but is allowing DRG infiltration.
16- 2024-2025
We didn't look that much into russian perspective, this time, we can see in green all the russian progress in 2024 and in 2025. Interesting right ?
17- Remaining fortifications
With the same point of view (and obviously, you need to click to zoom in), we can see in red all the remaining ukrainian fortifications in eastern, southern and north-eastern Ukraine.
18- Cities, fortifications and rivers east of the Dnipro
Another map, this one on the highest resoltion possible, showing the view from the Dnipro river
19- Diplomatic negociations :
On this map, you can see the borders of the 4 "annexed" oblasts, the black line⚫️ is what Putin official wants. The red line🔴 iw what he had before the war and the white line ⚪️ is what he currently has.
20- Ukrainian and Russian units
For the last map, I will show you the excellent work of @UAControlMap with all the deployed units of both sides.
Always remember more than 80% of the russian army is currently in Ukraine.
Here is the end of this thread. Tell me which maps do you prefer here with the 3 numbers (for example, i will say 5/3/14).
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Ukraine 🇺🇦 has now targeted around 500 russian 🇷🇺 trucks and vehicles during the last 48 days.
Mid-range strikes continue to expand across occupied territories, on roads, bridges and rear base. This continues to slow down russian offensive.
🧵THREAD🧵1/13 ⬇️
From tomorrow, I will be off for more than 1 week, which means there won't be any new map/airstrike/fortification/mid-range strikes update, apart from some small tweets.
I will however continue to follow the overall trends.
In total, I have 270 geolocated strikes on trucks and vehicles since january, most of those are from May to June.
The key Rostov-Crimea road remains the priority target, but roads in Donetsk, Luhansk and Kherson oblast have also been largely targeted.
La guerre en Ukraine 🇺🇦/🇷🇺 a désormais dépassé la durée de la Première Guerre mondiale et pourrait encore durer plusieurs années.
Voici ce qu’il faut savoir en juin 2026 de ce conflit généralisé aux portes de l’Europe 🇪🇺 qui n'en finit plus.
🧵THREAD🧵1/10 ⬇️
Quel est l’objectif de guerre de la Russie, pays agresseur ?
Les objectifs de guerre de la Fédération de Russie ont beaucoup évolué depuis quatre ans. Outre les déclarations officielles, le principal objectif russe est resté territorial et politique. Moscou cherchait, le 24 février, à vassaliser l’Ukraine tout en annexant une large région, la « Novorossia », entre Kharkiv, le Donbass et Odessa. Cet objectif a largement évolué, notamment après l’échec des offensives sur Kyiv, Kharkiv et Odessa.
Aujourd’hui, l’objectif territorial principal reste l’occupation de toute la région du Donbass, en particulier sa capitale de facto, Kramatorsk. Il est très probable que l’armée russe dispose de deux objectifs territoriaux secondaires : l’occupation complète des deux autres oblasts annexés, Kherson (ce qui est quasi impossible à l’heure actuelle) et Zaporijjia, et l’harmonisation de la ligne de front sur la rivière Oskil dans l’oblast de Kharkiv.
L’objectif politique initial — redonner à la Russie sa puissance d’antan, l’ancrer dans l’Eurasie, retrouver les populations, les industries, les mines et l’accès à la mer des deux voisins slaves (l’Ukraine et la Biélorussie) — reste inchangé. Sans l’Ukraine, la Russie est condamnée à être une puissance secondaire et plus largement asiatique, sa dimension d’empire s’effaçant avec la montée en parallèle de la démographie non slave.
Les autres objectifs qui ont pu jouer un rôle auparavant sont caduques aujourd’hui : la démilitarisation de l’Ukraine semble impossible, quatre ans de guerre d’attrition n’ayant pas conduit à un effondrement ukrainien. La dénazification, étendard pour parler de l’effacement du nationalisme ukrainien, est également un échec. Les nationalistes ukrainiens sont plus forts et décomplexés que jamais, représentant près de 100 000 hommes dans l’armée ukrainienne. Les figures antirusses controversées d’Europe centrale et orientale ont par ailleurs été réhabilitées. Empêcher l’OTAN et l’UE de s’étendre à l’Est était aussi un mirage. Bien que la considération eût été réelle, la Suède et la Finlande ont rejoint l’Alliance, tandis que la Moldavie, le Caucase du Sud, les Balkans occidentaux et l’Ukraine ont accéléré leur rapprochement avec l’Europe, tous brandissant la menace russe.
L’objectif russe est donc désormais d’installer la confrontation dans la durée, jusqu’à un effondrement hypothétique de l’aide à l’Ukraine (qui semble compromise par la dernière aide de l’UE), l’essoufflement de la population ukrainienne (une considération bien réelle mais qui n’impactera probablement pas la situation au front) ou une victoire à la Pyrrhus, que ce soit la prise du Donbass suivie d’un cessez-le-feu ou une capitulation de l’Ukraine comme la Finlande en 1940.
Quel est l’objectif de l’Ukraine, pays agressé ?
L’objectif de Kyiv a lui aussi beaucoup évolué. L’armée ukrainienne a été surprise par l’ampleur de l’offensive du 24 février, qui lui a fait perdre des territoires stratégiques, comme le sud du pays. L’objectif initial de survivre en tant qu’État a été largement assuré par les victoires à Kyiv, Kharkiv et Mykolaïv en 2022. Le second objectif, retrouver les frontières d’avant-guerre, a échoué en 2023 après l’échec des offensives ukrainiennes. Depuis cette date, les Ukrainiens ont pour objectif de tenir dans la durée, jusqu’à un essoufflement ou un retrait hypothétique des Russes.
Kyiv refuse de se retirer des territoires sous son contrôle, mais a déjà accepté l’idée de concessions territoriales, de manière non officielle, sur la Crimée, le sud et l’est du pays. Pour Kyiv, il est hors de question de capituler et de céder des territoires sans combat à Moscou, d’autant que les garanties de bonne foi de la Russie ont historiquement montré qu’elles n’étaient pas tenues. Dès lors, l’Ukraine a développé ses propres moyens pour que chaque km2 de territoire conquis coûte plus cher à Moscou, tout en essayant de toucher au maximum l’économie russe. Une contre-offensive hypothétique reste possible, mais il est encore tôt pour savoir si les Ukrainiens ont les moyens de la réaliser.
As a reminder, in February, the Ukrainian army conducted a discreet offensive for several weeks, clearing infiltrated areas, securing Pokrovsk'e and infiltrating areas that were previously under Russian control.
This counter-attack notably secured Ternuvat and prevented the use of Uspenivka to launch assaults on the Zaporizhzhia front.
This significantly slowed the Russian advance, reducing its length from 42 km to 25 km (west of Hulialpole).