Most maps of the war in Ukraine are showing the same perspective and the same informations. Here, you will see rivers, railways, fortifications, forests...
20 surprising maps on the war in Ukraine
🧵THREAD🧵1/23 ⬇️⬇️⬇️
1- The frontline in december 2022
Days after the end of the Kharkiv and Kherson counter-offensive, russian army was controling less than 50% of the Donetsk region. The battle for Bakhmut just started and Donetsk was still threatened.
This map may seem old or out of context, but it actually helps to better understand the evolution of the Russian offensives in the Donbas.
One must put oneself in the shoes of the political and military decision-makers in Moscow: they had failed to take Kyiv, Kharkiv, or Odessa, to force Ukraine to capitulate, they had been humiliated in Kharkiv, and had to retreat from Kherson. It was therefore the full force of Soviet firepower that was deployed in the east of the country and became ruthless in the ensuing battles, sometimes at the cost of very heavy losses, as at Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
2- Three years in Donbas
The last 3 years of war have mainly been fought in Donbass.
After very slow and costly advances for the Russian army in Bakhmut and Avdiivka in 2023, the offensive towards Pokrovsk accelerated in 2024, with the Ukrainian army surrendering the best fortifications in the Donetsk suburbs.
The main Russian victory took place in South Donetsk, now completely under Russian control, but many months of campaigning remain, at the current pace, between one and two years to capture the last strongholds in North Donetsk. These three years have seen a constant offensive, the gradual depletion of Ukrainian reserves, and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of soldiers in a relentless war of attrition. On paper, the Ukrainian army has held its ground and not yielded, despite local setbacks. It remains to be seen whether it will maintain its endurance.
Here is the progress of russian forces in Donbass since february 24th 2022. We can see how slow it has been and the acceleration in 2024 and 2025. There is still a long path to go for Russia.
4- One last stand
Seen from Kyiv perspective, the ukrainian Donbass is now much smaller than before, with Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad currently falling, the 4 remaining cities around Kramatorsk will be the last stand for Ukraine in Donbass.
This map may be disturbing isn't it ?
5- The last Donbas fortress
As you saw on the first picture of this thread, with the fortification overlay, we can clearly see how much has been built in front of the remaning cities and behind them.
Every additional month is Donbas is more fortifications behind.
6- The new Donbas line method
In 2025, Ukraine started digging new style of defenses, with :
-3 ditches filled with barbed wire
-1 dragon teeths with barbed wire on top
-2 barbed wire row
I've called these lines the "New Donbas Lines", because it started in the western part of Donetsk oblast.
Currently, we have two to three such lines of defense in the Donbas, some of which have already proven their worth. They are now being deployed throughout the country, for example, towards Kharkiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia.
Looking at this map, we also notice that almost all of the fortifications face east—curious, isn't it?
7- Old and new fortifications
In red, you can see the new fortifications on the "New Donbas Lin" style. In yellow, you can find old fortifications (some are obsolete) and new ones that are still very useful, especially in the case of anti-tank ditches and anti-infantry obstacles
8- Railway logistics
After for maps where the north was on the left, we are back at normal. With the end of Pokrovsk as the main Donbas railhub, new cities are being used for this purpose.
They became, thus, strategic cities and objectives for Russia. We have Lozova (the Kramatorsk railway station just closed, so it may become the terminus), Pavlohrad and Zaporizhia.
9- Road logistics
The road logistics have also changed a lot recently. Pokrovsk has been replaced by smaller cities playing as frontline logistics hubs. Pavlohrad and Lozova are again playing the role of main supply hubs, together with Zaporizhia.
10- Dnipro and Zaporizhia soon threatened ?
The Russian push towards the Dnipropetrovsk region and the initial advance towards Zaporizhzhia raise fears of a long-term threat to the two major cities in central Ukraine.
The immediate concern is not so much the fall of these cities, but rather the gradual neutralization of their capacity as logistics hubs, both rail and road, their strategic industries, and their few remaining bridges over the Dnipro River. Recently, the first modern fortifications have been erected east of Zaporizhzhia, along three lines currently under construction.
11- 23 bridges on the Dnipro river
Ukrainian logistics are severely hampered by the Dnieper River, a vast waterway, spanned between Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia (the Kherson bridges having been destroyed) by only 23 bridges (4 of which are solely railway bridges, and a dozen mixed-use bridges), 5 of which are dams and therefore difficult to destroy.
However, if the dozen or so bridges in Zaporizhzhia and the Dnieper River were partially or totally destroyed, Ukrainian logistics would be completely crippled. This is a crucial point to bear in mind.
12- Across the Dnipro
Ukrainian strategic reserves are thus positioned west of the Dnieper River and are not intended for deployment in the east. They are there to cover the rear, provide logistics, air defense, training, border security, and so on. In total, it is likely that hundreds of thousands of mobilized personnel (including, unfortunately, those with the highest social and intellectual standing) are being kept on this side of the Dnieper for various reasons.
They have, in particular, a colossal task: maintaining air defenses, guarding the borders with Belarus and Transnistria, and securing the coasts along the Dnieper River and the Black Sea.
13- An encircled Ukraine
De-zooming is also very important, on this map, you can see that Ukraine is encircled on all sides, it has to defend all these borders and frontlines...
It also gives us a snapshot of the potential future Ukraine...
14- Between Forest and river
The Oskil front is also quite active. When looking at a map, one doesn't necessarily notice two very important landscape features:
Two long, wide rivers (the Donets and the Oskil) and the dense surrounding forests. The Oskil River is a significant natural barrier (not impossible to cross, certainly, but it gives the defender an advantage, while also complicating their logistics). The Siverski Donets River, on the other hand, was the main Ukrainian line of defense in 2022.
The Ukrainian army initially withdrew along the main cities (Sievierodonetsk, Kreminna, Lyman, Izium, Balaklya, Chuihuiv, etc.) before counter-attacking. With the second battle of Lyman about to begin, we are right in the middle of this situation. The river also offers very large forests, which allow for the concealment of equipment and troops and provoke trench warfare, as in the Serebyanka Forest. From an ecological point of view, the fighting in this protected natural area is absolutely devastating for the flora and fauna.
15- Northern forests
Talking about forests, we should'nt forget about the large forests in northern Ukraine, where troops, fortifications, air defense an other assets can be easily hidden.
It would also complicate any offensive, but is allowing DRG infiltration.
16- 2024-2025
We didn't look that much into russian perspective, this time, we can see in green all the russian progress in 2024 and in 2025. Interesting right ?
17- Remaining fortifications
With the same point of view (and obviously, you need to click to zoom in), we can see in red all the remaining ukrainian fortifications in eastern, southern and north-eastern Ukraine.
18- Cities, fortifications and rivers east of the Dnipro
Another map, this one on the highest resoltion possible, showing the view from the Dnipro river
19- Diplomatic negociations :
On this map, you can see the borders of the 4 "annexed" oblasts, the black line⚫️ is what Putin official wants. The red line🔴 iw what he had before the war and the white line ⚪️ is what he currently has.
20- Ukrainian and Russian units
For the last map, I will show you the excellent work of @UAControlMap with all the deployed units of both sides.
Always remember more than 80% of the russian army is currently in Ukraine.
Here is the end of this thread. Tell me which maps do you prefer here with the 3 numbers (for example, i will say 5/3/14).
I reached 80 000 followers, thank you very much ! Don't forget to follow me on LinkedIn.
On a 250 km long frontline, I managed to map 12 000 russian 🇷🇺 and ukrainian 🇺🇦 artillery strikes thanks to the snow cover
With this map, I'll analyse with precision the current trends and next movements on the frontline as well as the location of the frontline
🧵THREAD🧵1/20⬇️
The latest commercial satellite images (Sentinel-2) showed most of eastern Ukraine covered with snow, which is very useful.
Indeed, we can see every artillery and airstrike impacts, something we cannot see otherwise. I mapped 12 000 of them between Kostiantynivka and the Dnipro river, with two holes, the area around Novopavlivka/Ivanivka (some clouds) and the one north of Stepnohirsk and along the Dnipro, because there was no snow.
Disclaimer, this map is obviously not showing all the impacts, I may have missed some, and the ones in urban areas are a bit more difficult to map. Moreover, some of those impacts are in fact airstrikes, but it is a minority.
Let's start !
First, we can see 3 main areas of bombing : Pokrovsk-Dobrbropilla, Hulialpole-Ternuvate and Stepnohirsk.
There is one trend : Russia is putting a big effort to attack Orikhiv from both sides and to take Dobropilla in the first part of the year.
L'attaque de l'aéroport de Niamey au Niger 🇳🇪 un an et demi après celui de Bamako au Mali 🇲🇱 est un signe très clair de l'augmentation des capacités djihadistes.
La situation sécuritaire des Etats de l'AES 🇲🇱🇳🇪🇧🇫 s'est tellement dégradée qu'elle menace désormais toute la région d'Afrique de l'Ouest.
L'attaque de l'aéroport de Niamey où sont stationnés la majorité de la force aérienne nigérienne (drones de combats qui permettaient, jusqu'à là d'obtenir des victoires locales contre les djihadistes), les 350 soldats italiens 🇮🇹 (qui n'ont pas combattu, semble-t-il) et les 200 soldats russes 🇷🇺 d'Africa Corps qui gardent le précieux convois d'Uranium (volé à la société Orano et qui devait prendre le chemin de la Russie) était prévisible.
Un an et demi auparavant, en septembre 2024, c'était l'aéroport de Bamako qui était attaqué par le JNIM, faisant de nombreuses victimes parmi les cadets de l'armée et détruisant plusieurs avions, dont l'avion présidentiel.
Les 3 états putshistes du Sahel, Mali, Niger et Burkina Faso, qui forment l'AES, l'Alliance des Etats du Sahel font face à l'explosion du terrorisme islamiste depuis qu'ils ont demandé le départ des occidentaux et de leurs alliés africains.
Tout a commencé par le départ forcé des français et des américains, les deux seuls états qui disposaient d'une force aérienne suffisante pour contrer les rassemblements djihadistes et permettre aux armées locales de tenir le terrain. Depuis, l'absence de cette force aérienne, compensée par quelques avions et hélicoptères russes et surtout des drones turcs ne permet plus de mener autant de missions qu'auparavant. Résultat, les deux groupes djihadistes concurrent, le JNIM (Al Qaida) et l'Etat Islamique, Province du Grand Sahara (EIGS) peuvent s'entrainer facilement, se déplacer dans les 3 états et lancer des offensives multiples, sans toutefois, occuper les principales villes, qui se transforment souvent en garnisons encerclées.
La stratégie des putschistes de mener une guerre beaucoup moins propre, en faisant venir Wagner, puis Africa Corps, en lançant des attaques de représailles contre les populations locales et en basant leur discours sur la propagande n'a pas vraiment fonctionné.
Les peuples du nord, marginalisés et menacés sont bien plus enclin à rejoindre les groupes djihadistes, ou, le cas échéant, les groupes séparatistes, comme les Touaregs de l'Azawad. Les djihadistes, profitant des défaillances généralisées des états locaux peuvent avancer vers des régions qu'ils ne contrôlaient pas, des régions plus riches, peuplées ou ils trouvent de quoi alimenter leurs forces et recruter des hommes.
Ces derniers jours, le JNIM a frappé l'ouest du Mali, détruisant 50 camions de carburant, tandis qu'en parallèle, l'Etat Islamique frappait Niamey et Ménaka au Mali.
En l'espace de 4 ans, les groupes djihadistes ont réalisé une expansion rapide vers le sud. Alors qu'ils étaient concentrés dans le nord du Sahel, ils sont désormais positionnés dans l'ouest et le sud du Mali, dans le nord de la plupart des Etats du golfe de Guinée, à peu près partout au Burkina Faso sauf dans la région centrale et principalement dans l'ouest du Niger.
Des Etats peuplés et aux ressources économiques conséquentes sont donc désormais menacés, à cause des 3 états de l'AES qui s'effondrent sur eux-mêmes.
▪️Le Mali, en voulant décapiter l'Azawad a provoqué l'effet inverse. Les rebelles sont désormais coalisés au sein du FLA. La présence des FAMA et de l'Africa Corps aux confins du nord du Mali requiert ainsi une ligne logistique de moins en moins tenable. Et ce, alors qu'au même moment, le JNIM en a profité pour assiéger de fait les principales villes du Nord et du Centre et faire son apparition au sud et à l'ouest, comme nous l'avons vu avec les attaques sur les ressources de carburants. Aujourd'hui, un voyage entre Bamako et la frontière Sénégalaise se fait forcément par un passage via un checkpoint du JNIM, obligeant la ségrégation dans les bus.
▪️Le Burkina Faso a lui fait le choix des milices locales d'auto-défense, les VDP, pour l'aider à combattre le JNIM à l'ouest et au nord et l'EIGS au nord et à l'est. Le pays est dans une situation catastrophique face à la progression djihadiste, qui se permettent parfois des entrées dans de petites villes.
▪️Le Niger est principalement touché à l'ouest, avec l'EIGS qui est présent à quelques dizaines de km de la capitale Niamey. La situation du pays est aussi mauvaise, comme nous l'avons vu avec la dernière attaque, que celle de ses voisins, d'après de nombreuses sources russes (Telegram), l'armée nigérienne n'a pas vraiment défendue l'aéroport de Niamey et la force aérienne aurait été annihilée sans la présence des soldats russes.
Only 3 years after the ceasefire of the devastating Tigray war (600 000 dead), a new war is on the verge in northern Ethiopia
This time, Sudan🇸🇩 Erytrea🇪🇷 Somalia🇸🇴 the UAE🇦🇪 Egypt🇪🇬 and others may be implicated.
🧵THREAD🧵1/17 ⬇️
What we are calling the "Pretoria Peace Deal" now seems closer than never to belong to the past.
Already, 5 months after the deal between Tigray and Ethiopia (november 2nd 2022), a new war was starting, this time in Amhara, Ethiopia second most populated region.
The war in Tigray lasted 3 years. It saw the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), the Amhara special forces and Eritrean troops occupy most of Tigray before being humiliated by a massive TPLF counter-offensive.
The war ended in status quo, on the border of the state.
Le réveil européen 🇪🇺 tant annoncé en 2022 n'a eu lieu que dans la tête et le discours des dirigeants après 4 ans de guerre.
On nous a promis un "tournant historique" qui n'arrive pas et pendant ce temps nos adversaire s'affutent. L'heure est à un premier bilan.
🧵THREAD🧵1/7⬇️
Les grands sommets, Versailles en tête, étaient censés inculquer une nouvelle dynamique. Une Europe puissance, capable de tenir tête à la Russie seule.
Les discours martiaux appelant au réarmement, à la défense européenne, au basculement stratégique n'ont pas donné de véritable suite.
D'abord, il a fallu du temps, beaucoup de temps pour se réveiller. Quand certains avaient commencés en 2014, d'autre sont partis de presque 0 en 2022, comme l'Allemagne. Il y a un bon élève, la Pologne, qui dépense 4.8% de son PIB pour la défense, qui recrute énormément pour l'armée, mais, en achetant principalement hors UE.
Les autres font mieux, mais la lenteur du processus est frappante. Certains ne se sentent même pas concernés (Espagne ou Italie)...
Entre 60 et 80% des armes achetés par les états membre de l'UE depuis 2022 ne proviennent pas de l'UE.
64% sont achetés directement aux Etats-Unis. Un symbole, le F35, choisit par 13 !!! Etats européens. En sachant que :*
-Le F35 est très cher
-Sa maintenance est complexe
-Les Etats-Unis peuvent l'empêcher de voler
-C'est un avion qui est très performant mais fragile, très couteux à faire voler…
Dans le cas des Etats-Unis, malgré 4 ans de guerre à l'est (et une aide américaine qui baisse constamment), les pays européens n'ont pas vraiment changé de doctrine. Certes, l'Europe aide plus l'Ukraine que les Etats-Unis, mais elle continue de compter sur Washington pour sa défense.
Big victory for the Sudanese 🇸🇩 Army after they lifted the 2.5 years long siege of the city of Dilling
It is the biggest victory for the SAF since they liberated the capital city a year ago. At the same time, RSF attempted to open a new front in Blue Nile.
Massive forces led by the 5th division of El Obeid, the 10th division of Abu Jubaynah as well as the brigades 53rd and 38th and joint forces entered today the city of Dilling in South Kordofan.
After a month long counter-offensive south of El Obeid, those forces took the Rapid Support Forces by surprise, pushed on open terrain between the Nuba mountains and reached Habila this morning.
After that, they continued their push and reached the city of Dilling, one of the two remaining encircled garrison (after most fell, apart from Kadugli, capital city of south Kordofan, still encircled.
Held by the 54th infantry brigade alone, the city stood 2.5 years.
Who are the actors, why are they fighting ? Is the conflict origine from money, gold, oil, power, religion or ethnicities ? Which foreign powers are involved ?
Here, you will find a general guide of the Sudan war :
🧵THREAD🧵1/24 ⬇️
When did it start ?
On april 15th 2023. Where ? In Khartoum, the capital city, unlike previous conflicts.
Sudan was already partly at war before, discontinuously since 1983 (1983-2005, 2nd South Sudan war, 2003-2020, Darfur war, 2011-2020, South Kordofan and Blue Nile war).
Who is fighting :
The Sudanese Armed Forces :
The SAF are based in Khartoum and Port Sudan; they defend the state's borders and internal stability. Their leader is Al-Burhan, and the military commanders are heirs to the military-Islamist regime of Omar al-Bashir (1989-2019).