Thread by @emilkastehelmi

Ukraine may be repeating a costly mistake in Pokrovsk.

It’s a recurring pattern, seen for example in Vuhledar and Kursk – a reluctance to conduct a controlled, militarily justified withdrawal from a threatened salient when the situation no longer favors the defender. 1/

The situation in Pokrovsk is difficult for the Ukrainians. Russians have consolidated positions in the southern parts of the city, and are advancing further north. Most of the city is a gray zone, where infantry groups fight without a clear frontline. 2/

The latest Ukrainian counterattacks have not turned the situation decisively in Ukraine's favor. They managed to recapture various positions in Rodynske and in the Dobropillia direction, but the threat of encirclement in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad has not been removed. 3/

In Russian operational art, reinforcing success is a core element. After several failed mechanized assaults in the Dobropillia direction in October, Russia appeared to cease committing more resources to the failing salient and put even greater emphasis on Pokrovsk. 4/

In Pokrovsk, the chance of a decisive outcome is higher, as the situation for the Ukrainians keeps deteriorating. Russian advances and continuous drone strikes have crippled key logistical routes. Getting reserves and supplies in – or the wounded out – is arduous. 5/

This phenomenon has been seen multiple times before. Russia advances on the flanks and creates an encirclement threat; logistics become untenable for larger forces; coordinated defense crumbles; counterattacks don’t fix it – and finally Ukraine withdraws at the last moment. 6/

Even though advancing is slow and costly for Russia, Ukraine also suffers unnecessary losses in these situations. It has avoided major catastrophes, but decisions to withdraw have often come dangerously late. The latest example was the hasty retreat from Kursk in spring 2025. 7/

The tendency to hold ground as long as possible gives an opportunity for the Russians to attrit the defending units. Staying in Myrnohrad extends the Ukrainian frontline by roughly 40 kilometers, and keeping the gap between Rodynske and Pokrovsk open is difficult and costly. 8/

Politically, leaving Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad would be a bitter setback, but if Ukraine retreats and conserves as much manpower as possible while avoiding the worst scenarios, the end result can be viewed as a Pyrrhic victory for the Russians. 9/

After a year of fighting on the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad axis, losing the cities now would have limited effect on the broader operational picture. A Ukrainian retreat from the area doesn’t mean Russia would automatically gain momentum which they could capitalize on immediately. 10/

Even though land and cities would be lost, abandoning the salient could benefit Ukraine militarily. The most acute threat of encirclement would be gone, units could operate under better logistics, and the front would straighten and shorten by dozens of kilometers. 11/

Note: Maps from this area are indicative visualizations. In practice, there is no clearly traceable frontline. Patrols can slip through porous defenses. Ambushes are a constant risk, and troops hide amid the ruins of buildings, often in overlapping positions. 12/

This is an issue elsewhere too, but the situation around Pokrovsk and Dobropillia is especially dynamic. It is clear that the Russians can feed troops into the battle from the southern side of the city, but after that, their actual level of control is a rough estimate. 13/

Thanks for reading, it's been a while since I last wrote a longer thread here. I've been simply very busy recently. Despite that, we at @Black_BirdGroup continue to follow and map the war.

Our map can be found in the link below. 14/14

scribblemaps.com/maps/view/The-…