Thread by @clement_molin

I agree, Ukraine had established its strategy in the defense of cities by retreating into them (Sievierodonetk, Sumy, Kyiv…)

Since Bakhmut, the Ukrainian army is no longer able to defend inside cities, examples : (Avdiivka, Selydove, Kourakhove, Pokrovsk…)

🧵THREAD🧵1/13⬇️

https://twitter.com/Jonpy99/status/1985836449162232235

The core of ukrainian strategy in 2022 was to retreat from the countrysides into large cities, this happened in the north, Nyzhin, Chernihiv, Konotop, Romny...

During the movement warfare, cities were the base of the defense, and Ukraine tryied to keep it later.

In 2023, Ukraine also based its defense on major cities, the main example is Bakhmut, for which the urban battle was one of the biggest and longest (talking about fightings inside, not in the flanks).

-> Bakhmut was the last battle fought during long time inside a city

Later, Ukraine based its defenses in front of cities, not inside.

-> The battle for Avdiivka lasted 10 years but fightings inside the city only 2 months
-> The battle for Vuhledar lasted 2 years but the city was abandonned before being encircled

Russia's strategy has been to progress in the countryside and slowly envelop small and large cities, avoiding direct fightings inside.

However, this has changed, Russia is still trying to encircle cities, to cut logistics, but it is now relying on direct infiltration.

Examples :

-> Ocheretyne (direct push in city center)
-> Ukrainsk (direct push in city center)
-> Selydove (infiltration on north and south of the city before UAF withdrawal)
-> Kourakhove (semi-encirclement and infiltration directly in the center)

There is one big exception, Toretsk, but why ?

-> Impossible to encircle the city (solid frontlines all around, large fields, difficult to entrench)
-> Ukraine fought for it during 1 year, with large infantry presence
-> It delayed attacks on Kostiantynivka

The Russian army now has a large number of infantry available for deep infiltrations. Starting in August, Russian soldiers occupied Pokrovsk.

It is easy to slip between the lines and then take up positions behind them for extended periods.

Why are these infiltrations so effective in cities, but much less so in rural areas like Dobropilla?

Because in cities, it's easy to hide, and houses and apartments are full of food and water, unlike hedges and mines. Furthermore, any cleanup operation is arduous.

Thus, Russian troops remained in Pokrovsk for an extended period, enabling eventual consolidation of power, facilitated by the severe shortage of Ukrainian infantry, given the limited effectiveness of drones in such situations.

In Dobropilla, the Russians held out for 50 days behind their lines.

From now on, any infiltration into a city endangers the Ukrainian army, which will have difficulty maintaining and re-establishing its positions (for example, in Kupyansk and Kostiantynivka).

The Ukrainian strategy is therefore based on the periphery, using a city to hide.

Thus, the most difficult for the russian army is to make progress in the immediate vicinity of a city, especially when it is fortified (Pokrovsk has been a good example).

When inside the city, they easily overwhelm ukrainian defenders, since drones cannot do anything in cities.

The Ukrainian strategy is now based on diging lines of defense which will slow down and contain the Russian push towards urban centers or villages.

Battle for cities will be more and more difficult to win, with the inability to find new infantry...