Russia launched a total of 268 missiles, with 152 intercepted (57% interception rate). This is a lower interception rate compared to September, attributed to Russia's shift towards targeting rear areas with single or grouped strikes of ballistic missiles like the Iskander-M (9M723). These strikes often target areas lacking Patriot or IRIS-T air defense systems capable of intercepting them.
The Iskander-M missiles have reportedly undergone modernization, allowing for mid-course maneuvers, complicating interception efforts.
The following types of missiles were used in October 2025:
■ 14/87 "Iskander-M" (9M723)
■ 53/72 Kh-101
■ 30/46 "Iskander-K" (9K728)
■ 13/17 "Kalibr" (3M14)
■ 2/10 Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal"
■ 0/2 Kh-31P
■ 15/24 Kh-59/69
■ 0/8 unknown type
The Iskander-M is overtaking the Kh-101 as the main missile type and is currently one of the most difficult to intercept.
■ 14/87 "Iskander-M" (9M723)
■ 53/72 Kh-101
■ 30/46 "Iskander-K" (9K728)
■ 13/17 "Kalibr" (3M14)
■ 2/10 Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal"
■ 0/2 Kh-31P
■ 15/24 Kh-59/69
■ 0/8 unknown type
The Iskander-M is overtaking the Kh-101 as the main missile type and is currently one of the most difficult to intercept.
The most massive combined missile strike occurred on the night of September 28th, involving 48 Kh-101, 3M14 "Kalibr," and Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" missiles. Four combined missile strikes were conducted throughout October at intervals of 4-7 days, demonstrating Russia's limited capacity for massive Kh-101 missile attacks.
Since the second half of 2025, Ru🇷🇺 has become significantly limited in its ability to carry out massive strikes on Ukrainian territory with Kh-101 cruise missiles. The limitation of these capabilities is a consequence of the SBU's "Spiderweg" operation on 1 June, 2025, which resulted in the destruction and damage of dozens of primary Kh-101 missile carriers, strategic bomber-missile carriers Tu-95MS and Tu-160, as well as carriers of Kh-22/32 – Tu-22M3.
After this operation, Ru🇷🇺 lacks a sufficient number of carriers for the Kh-101 to launch 100 missiles per sortie. As for the remaining ones, the Ru🇷🇺 is maximally conserving the resource of old, decades-worn aircraft.
For example, the last strikes on Ukraine using Kh-101 missiles were on 5 October, and then again on 30 October – this is despite the fact that the accumulated ammunition, as well as the preparation of carriers for a new strike, allows for launches on average every 4-7 days. As for the quantity, the last launch of Kh-101s, totaling about 55 to 36 intercepted, was recorded on 25 May, 2025.
After this operation, Ru🇷🇺 lacks a sufficient number of carriers for the Kh-101 to launch 100 missiles per sortie. As for the remaining ones, the Ru🇷🇺 is maximally conserving the resource of old, decades-worn aircraft.
For example, the last strikes on Ukraine using Kh-101 missiles were on 5 October, and then again on 30 October – this is despite the fact that the accumulated ammunition, as well as the preparation of carriers for a new strike, allows for launches on average every 4-7 days. As for the quantity, the last launch of Kh-101s, totaling about 55 to 36 intercepted, was recorded on 25 May, 2025.
It is even more difficult for Russia to carry out massive launches of "Kalibr" (3M14) due to critical losses and damage in the Black Sea to the main missile carriers of this type of armament. Throughout 2025, the Russian Navy has not launched more than 20 "Kalibr" missiles on a monthly basis.
Ballistic "Iskander-M" (9M723) and ground based "Iskander-K" (9M728) have become more frequent lately, and it is precisely these that the Ru🇷🇺 predominantly uses to strike the near and medium rear areas of Ukraine.
On the night of 10 October, the Ru🇷🇺 used the maximum number of missiles of this component – 14 missiles of the Iskander-M and 12 missiles of the Iskander-K, totaling 26 strike assets. A minimum of 13 launch platforms were involved, which generally reflects the Ru🇷🇺 real capabilities for mass use of these missiles with a limited number of launchers.
On the night of 10 October, the Ru🇷🇺 used the maximum number of missiles of this component – 14 missiles of the Iskander-M and 12 missiles of the Iskander-K, totaling 26 strike assets. A minimum of 13 launch platforms were involved, which generally reflects the Ru🇷🇺 real capabilities for mass use of these missiles with a limited number of launchers.
While Russia likely produces around 175 Shahed-type drones daily, their recent deployment has been conspicuously low for six consecutive days, with larger assaults now relying more on missiles. This imbalance leads to the question, are these large-scale attacks driven by a buildup of missiles, or is the accumulation of drones the more significant factor?
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