Kazakhstan has officially joined the Abraham Accords
Here's the context behind that move and what it means /THREAD
Kazakhstan and Israel already have established ties, they date back to the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse (1992 to be precise)
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu already visited Kazakhstan in 2016 /1
Kazakhstan has also maintained an equi-distant policy in the Gaza War and the prevailing view from journalistic pieces/research on Kazakh society is that it wants to be insulated from Middle East developments
So engagement with Israel is par for the course /2
Kazakhstan was historically a significant oil supplier to Israel as well
At the time of Netanyahu's visit in 2016, 25% of Israeli oil was Kazakh in origin and Israeli business leaders were actively pushing for more imports /3
Support for engagement with Israel cuts across both the cliques of the first president Nursultan Nazarbayev and current president Tokayev
Karim Masimov, who lost power with the 2022 protests, lobbied for Israeli ties, and now Tokayev has entered the Abraham Accords /4
So there is little new in Kazakhstan-Israel relations but the strategic impact could be profound
It will hasten US involvement in non-oil industries, thinking fintech, AI and smart cities here which are key priorities for Tokayev with a new AI ministry /5
It will also ensure that the US C5+1 integration push has greater Republican support ahead of Rubio's expected tour of the region
Azerbaijan's pro-Israel stance and Sharm al-Sheikh participation helped it with Trump, Kazakhstan wants the same playbook to work /6
Critical minerals are also a major frontier for US investment in Kazakhstan, which is straddling the US-China tech rivalry and mitigating sanctions exposure associated with some activities of Kaz Minerals
Much like DRC and Ukraine, rare earths are key to Trump's calculus /7
We should be sceptical of claims that this will add energy to the Abraham Accords
The de-escalation in Gaza is unlikely to lead Saudi Arabia to join the accords or to further expansion in the GCC region or to Syria/Lebanon /8
Azerbaijan could join the accords but its relationship with Israel is much deeper and closer than Kazakhstan
So the Abraham Accord label is mostly semantics and merely reinforces existing trends /9
US-Central Asia policy could get a win from Kazakhstan's move
As Russian soft power wanes, China's connectivity dominance endures and Iran's exclusion from the regional order grows, now is the time for the US to step up its role /END
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A ceasefire has taken hold in Gaza and Israeli hostages are about to be released
Here's an overview of what will likely come next /THREAD
The ceasefire was driven by two key factors
The first was that Hamas saw no chance of outlasting Israel's military resolve and surviving as a governing power in the pre-2023 form
The second was that Israel also realized the complete annhiliation of Hamas was unachievable /1
Pressure on Israel from the US was also mounting
During my recent trip to Washington, Democrats framed Israel's war as a Netanyahu regime survival mission and Republicans were quizzical about whether Israel was trading short-term wins for long-term insecurity /2
Armenia and Azerbaijan have struck a peace agreement
There are still numerous unsettled issues but its a major geopolitical sea change
Here's what's likely to come next /1
The US's brokering of the Armenia-Azerbaijan final settlement deals a significant blow to Russia, Iran and Europe's status
Russia wanted the 3+3 format including itself, Iran and Turkey as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to achieve a breakthrough /2
The problem was that Russia was regarded as a power that was stoking the conflict to maximize its leverage
Selling arms to both sides before the 2020 war and there was widespread skepticism in Azerbaijan about the hegemonic intentions of Russian peacekeepers /3
This is the debate in Washington right now after Trump's pivot against Russia
In this thread, I break down what economic measures will work and won't work against Russia /THREAD
Trump's secondary tariffs against Russia are unlikely to be enforceable without escalating a trade war with China, torpedoing UAE investments and derailing a trade deal with India
Its not a viable approach even though if implemented to max, they would be devastating /1
Instead, the focus needs to be on closing key loopholes in the sanctions regime
While significant progress has been made against banks like Sberbank and Gazprombank, they are not the only front against Russia's SWIFT access
The Russia-China-Iran-North Korea authoritarian axis has been widely discussed since 2022
It has functioned effectively in Ukraine but flopped spectacularly in the Israel-Iran war
Some more details on what this means /THREAD
This authoritarian axis has often been framed as a bloc that is presenting a normative/geopolitical challenge to US hegemony and the Western liberal order
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine crystallized as the West isolated Russia, these powers backed Russian aggression /1
This framing is problematic for several reasons
First, these bilateral relationships were not created due to a changing world order
They formed during the Cold War, 1980s and 1990s /2
The US has launched major military strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities
Here are some thoughts on what might come next /THREAD
The US escalation reflects a middle ground between the two camps within the Trump orbit
It is an escalation that goes beyond what the voices of de-escalation (Carlson, Bannon, Gabbard) wanted but is short of the regime change war that the hawks (Graham, Cotton) likely want /1
The Trump admin views the US attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities as a bargaining chip to facilitate new negotiations with Iran being in a position of grave weakness
A delayed Iranian retaliation that targets Israel only and not US bases in a major way supports this /2
Russia is increasingly concerned by the threat of Chinese espionage
Here's some more context on this trend /THREAD
This trend has got three key dynamics
The first is age-old mistrusts bubbling to the surface, concerns that Russia's military vulnerabilities in Ukraine are being studied by China so it can assert influence over the Far East /1
The second is concern about strategic overdependence on China
Russian intellectuals especially at HSE framed China as the Ukraine War's winner in 2022. There is a divide between the pro-China siloviki and more Sino-sceptic RDIF and business community /2