The conventional wisdom, which is wisdom, is that the main reason you don't want to expand government power is because of how your political opponents (and even enemies) will use those expansions of power. There's a deeper reason too, though, which Vance's arguments for big government power aligned to his values can't touch.
Incentives are in some sense the ultimate rulers of worldly affairs. Warren Buffet's investing partner, Charlie Munger, in fact, said, "show me the incentive, and I'll show you the outcome." The fact is that government does not have the right incentives to be able to do the kinds of things that create and expand prosperity and abundance.
It isn't just that the private sector produces and the public sector redistributes. In fact, that's facile. The government COULD (and HAS) own(ed) and run industries, and it has gone some way in solving the problem of "unleashing the productive forces," as Lenin would have phrased it.
The People's Republic of China, a Communist state-run command economy running a Fascist-Communist (Stakeholder) hybrid command-economy model, for example, clearly produces and wields its economy for its own national interests. Yeah, they're super tyrannical too, but maybe it's worth it, some think?
The real and better argument is deeper and more important. It's that governments do not have the right incentive structures to produce abundance and prosperity. Period.
This problem is intractable to government because they're third-person economic entities in every regard all the time everywhere always, so they have third-person incentive structures that cannot produce prosperity and abundance.
First-person participants in an economic situation have to balance a lot of variables directly for themselves. They want solutions to their problems that are efficient, effective, adequate, innovative, economical, and, when the profit motive is enabled, scalable (because other people have similar problems and will buy solutions at a profit to the seller). As buyers, they're also balancing cost and quality (multi-variable term) using their own appraisals of the situations they're actually in: their problems, not someone else's problems.
Third-person participants in economic situations are using other people's money (indirect buyers) to solve other people's problems (not solving their own problems). The only incentives they have for efficiency, effectiveness, adequacy, innovation, and economy are by policy. They have no incentives for scalability because the profit motive is non-existent.
The magic of first-person--centered economic situations (private sector with minimal government interference and application) is that the profit motive allows people to want to solve problems for other people whose problems they don't care about. There's no policy saying we have to go fix x, y, z, problem in the world (as with the government). There's simply the situation that you can benefit A LOT by figuring out a way to solve problems lots of people have and coming up with innovative, adequate, efficient, economical, and scalable solutions to other people's problems even without caring about those problems or the people who have them (though you can care and get extra benefit too).
Government doesn't have the capacity to make people care about other people's problems or even to act like they care about other people's problems, and this applies reflexively to the government itself.
Profit doesn't make people care about other people's problems, but it allows for an incentive mechanism (self-interest) that incentivizes people to want to solve other people's problems whether they care about those people or their problems in any respect at all. Thus you unlock society.
This set of incentives is crazy magical because it encourages people to create surpluses (abundance) but not excessive (stupid) surpluses. People are incentivized to scale their solutions to other people's problems only to the degree that the demand (arising from other people's problems that need solutions) indicates. Thus we end up with efficient surplus production being incentivized strongly by independent actors who are free to remain ignorant and disinterested of all the varieties of experience for which their surpluses solve problems. We call this situation "wealth" and "prosperity."
Again, government doesn't have any of these incentives AT ALL. Even a benevolent dictator or king doesn't have these incentives, so it will always devolve, even if it doesn't go bad (which it always will because power is inherently corrupting to the fallen human spirit too).
Vance, therefore, isn't just wrong here; he's deeply wrong in the fundamentally un-American way. I hope this little essay helps you understand that.
Canada seems to be trying to set some kind of record for being a completely self-unaware Woke retard country, and this official parliamentary report on combating antifeminism is a great unintentionally hilarious but terrifying new example.
You can tell from the summary that this is going to be grade-A retardation where the feminists and masculinity scholars (lol) who wrote it cannot begin to fathom that what they're on about is 100% predictable backlash to their own feminist abuses of men, boys, society, and women.
I'm not going to go through it all here, but these recommendations are so stereotypically Woke that it's funny except that they're actually going to implement it and aim to criminalize totally normal things because they can't figure out that people hate being abused by them.
Some more ramblings of Russian anti-West, anti-American, weirdo Aleksandr Dugin, darling of the Woke Right, sounding surprisingly like JD Vance's economic policy (which Grok will confirm if asked):
"The true "third way" in economics found its classic embodiment in the works of Friedrich List, who formulated the principles of "economic autarchy of large spaces."
"This theory proceeds from the fact that the economic development of capitalist societies is uneven and from the logical consequence of economic colonization by the "richer" countries of the poorer ones; moreover, for the "rich" in such conditions "free trade" is beneficial, and for the "poor" on the contrary.
"From this, List concluded that at certain stages of the economic development of society, it is necessary to resort to protectionism, dirigism and customs restrictions, i.e. to limit the principle of "freedom of trade" at the international level, in order to achieve the level of national and state independence and strategic power.
["Dirigism" refers to an economic system in opposition to laissez-faire in which the state takes an active and directive role in shaping and guiding the economy, rather than limiting itself to a purely regulatory or hands-off approach within a market economy.]
"In other words, it was obvious to List that the economy should be subordinated to national interests, and that any appeal to the "autonomous logic of the market" is only a cover for the economic (and subsequently political) expansion of rich states to the detriment of the poorer, and the subsequent enslavement of the latter.
"This approach immediately sets clear boundaries in which the "market" principle should operate, and in which the "socialist" one.
"It is interesting that Rathenau, the author of the German "economic miracle," and Witte, Lenin, and even Keynes formulated their economic principles on the basis of the doctrine of Friedrich List, although they used a language that was closer to or purely capitalist, or communist vocabulary, that the economy should be subordinated to national interests, and that any appeal to the "autonomous logic of the market" is only a cover for the economic (and subsequently political) expansion of rich states to the detriment of the poorer, and the subsequent enslavement of the latter."
CC: @PhilWMagness
After describing the theory a little, our behated weirdo continues, ominously given the context:
"It is very interesting that it was the Friedrich List model that was used by historically developed capitalist countries in times of crisis. Thus, even the United States, the radical defenders of the principle of "free trade", periodically resorted to protectionist measures and state subsidies to the industrial sector when periods of "economic depression" began.
"It was precisely such a period that was the stage of implementation of the New Deal, when the Americans almost literally reproduced the principles of List, although they submitted them in a relaxed version of Keynes, the author of the theory of "economic insulation", which, in general, is nothing but a new name for the theory of "economic autarky of large spaces ".
"By the way, List himself lived in the United States for a long time and observed the process of capitalist construction in the early phases. Based on these observations, he formulated the basic principles of his theory in relation to Germany. But, of course, the most ambitious results were given by the implementation of List's doctrine in National Socialist Germany, when his ideas were implemented totally and without any liberal or Marxist amendments."
Sounds very Woke Right overall, including the idea of a new New Deal, the favortism of FDR who implemented it, and all the rest. The Woke Right's rejection of Keynes here and a certain revisionist tendency that shows up in that last sentence in Dugin is blatantly concerning.
For further context, Dugin began this discussion (in The Foundations of Geopolitics) by criticizing the application of Hayek to the Russian context in the post-USSR period (which is what he's technically writing about here). All our favorite Woke Right weirdos also criticize Hayek rather strangely and specifically, claiming he is the falsely "conservative" wing of the same liberal (or neoliberal) project that gives us Woke and Communism.
Very interesting, indeed.
CC: @PhilWMagness
It gets a little worse. Remember, this is Dugin writing in 1997 for the Russian context, but our question is why is this the American post-liberal vision today in these United States of America:
"It is this version of the "third way" economy that is the only alternative in today's Russia, which is opposed at the same time to rampant liberalism and restorationist projects of neo-communists who do not want to seriously correct outdated and proved ineffective dogmas. If it were not for the instantly emerging associations with the Hitler regime, one could call this project "socialism of the national type.""
Rather than foregrounding identity politics, it will push:
1) Affordability (Marxist materialism); 2) Anti-corruption (ironic but an excuse to go after Trump); 3) Anti-Israel (pro-Palestine).
It will be warm to political violence.
The identity politics won't go away, but it won't be foregrounded any longer. It will definitely play supporting roles. They won't lead with it, though.
They'll find much superficial alignment with the Woke Right and Woke-ish "Libertarians" on their three key issues and violence
The agreement will only be superficial and occasionally strategic to block actual patriots. Like with every issue upon which they align, Woke Left (2.0) and Woke Right will come at the issues from different angles, e.g. pro-Palestine vs anti-Israel. Applies to all issues.
From my Woke Encyclopedia, an explanation of the "friend-enemy distinction" of Carl Schmitt, which is the Woke political logic. Link at the end!🧵
(1/13) The friend-enemy distinction refers to the cornerstone object of the political and judicial philosophy of a German theorist named Carl Schmitt, who wrote a number of works of right-wing political philosophy and thought before becoming such an enthusiastic Nazi in 1933, just after Adolf Hitler took power, that he earned the informal title “the Crown Jurist of the Third Reich.”
Though most of his significant political thinking was done both before and after he was a Nazi, during the years when he was a part of Hitler’s National Socialist movement and Party, he contributed strongly to the legal theory that justified the Nazi “total state,” including writing the 1933 piece that gets rendered in English as “The Legal Basis for the Total State,” which is significantly based upon the friend-enemy distinction.
Friend-enemy distinction:
(2/13) Schmitt’s thought is primarily of interest on the Woke Right, where he is a favored thinker and model political mind. He is vigorously forwarded for a handful of his political concepts, perhaps most visibly his “friend-enemy distinction” as the essential criterion of what makes politics political. This idea is first presented and developed in full detail in his 1927/32 book The Concept of the Political.
Friend-enemy distinction:
(3/13) For Schmitt, what makes the politics political is the distinction between (public) friend and (public) enemy, where enemies are defined as those who are interested in destroying one’s way of life and friends are defined as those who are willing to band together in its defense.
Schmitt specifically compares the essential nature of this distinction in politics to the distinction between good and evil in morality, beautiful and ugly in aesthetics, and profitable versus non-profitable in economics.
That is, politics is only political to the degree that it recognizes the possibility of factions that exist in mutual enmity underwritten by the potentially existential threat of violence. Of course, that means that Schmitt believes the essential criterion of politics is war, which he reveals also in part by making his point by completing the identity contained in von Clausewitz’s famous remark that “war is politics by other means.”
All radical movements find themselves in a pinch: they can only really advance when people don't know their true intentions, but they can only really advance by going public with what they're doing. It's an intrinsic dilemma that only rare figures in rare circumstances can win.
Mamdani is a good example of a rare figure (extremely good at presenting himself disingenuously while looking real) in rare circumstances (terrible primary opponent, then running against a terrible combination of Cuomo/Sliwa, then still not winning by huge margins).
The primary reason NYC got Mamdani isn't something to do with the electorate, the climate, or anything else. Mamdani, with tons of weird money, ran a very strong campaign (rare figure) in very weird circumstances, most of which were candidate-specific, not conditional.