Thread by @WarintheFuture

Recently, I returned from my second 2025 visit to Ukraine. It was, as always, both enlightening & inspiring to spend time with Ukrainian military personnel who are innovating & fighting to keep Ukraine free. I published several articles while in #Ukraine, linked below. In this long-ish thread, I cover drone operations. 1/20 🧵🇺🇦

2/ During my visit, I published a series of articles. These were at my Substack, Futura Doctrina, and can be read here: mickryan.substack.com/p/ukraine-disp…

I also published a couple of pieces for the Lowy Interpreter, which can be read at this link: lowyinstitute.org/the-interprete…

3/ In this thread, as noted above, I will cover my observations and assessments about the operation of autonomous systems in #Ukraine.

4/ A key observation is that the frontline is now at a point of 'drone saturation.' Now, within 15km of the front line, vehicle movement is difficult to impossible. Infantry soldiers must march to their positions for 10-15km. When armoured vehicles and artillery are deployed, these can be subject to up to 40 attacks per platform per day.

5/ Ukraine has invested in decoys and deception activities, and every HQ is now buried deep underground. The re-birth of modern deception is an important lesson from Ukraine, albeit an old one re-learned.

@peterwsinger & I recently published an in-depth report on this topic. newamerica.org/future-securit…

6/ The question however is whether this saturated environment, which has built up over three and half years, is possible elsewhere? In non-contiguous theatres like the Pacific, it might be difficult to achieve this level of saturation, at least in a short period of time. This offers opportunities, but also may see ISR gaps for an adversary to exploit.

7/ Despite this saturated drone environment, infantry is more important than ever to seize and hold ground. An indication of this is that while every Ukrainian brigade has 1-2 drone battalions, they all retain 3-5 infantry battalions as well. Drones are not replacing soldiers but extending and complementing their capabilities.
(Image: @maria_avdv & Oleg Petrasiuk)

8/ A key takeaway is that we must resist the positions of some who think that drones will replace humans in warfare. The evidence does not support this in Ukraine - or the Middle East. Drones do however enhance human capacity on the battlefield and beyond.

The real question is "what is the right balance of humans and autonomous systems for different organisations, for different missions and for different theatres?"

And, why would we ever want non-human sentience or machines making the key strategic and political decisions about war?

9/ The current drone saturation is mainly occurring with aerial platforms. Despite the huge efforts to develop and deploy uncrewed ground combat vehicles, some interlocutors indicated to me that these have been less successful in combat units than hoped for. The exception to this is forward resupply and casualty evacuation.

https://x.com/FedorovMykhailo/status/1978432513245606046?s=20

10/ Of concern, Russian innovation in drones probably now just outstrips that of #Ukraine. This was the view of the frontline combat leaders I spoke with. It is the result of continued momentum in Russia's improving learning systems. Over nearly 4 years, the Russians have learned how to learn better, and this has reached a critical mass on the battlefield and beyond. With regards to drone operations, this has several contributing factors.

11/ First, Russia stole a march with fibre-optic controlled drones and continues to lead in their development and employment. These provide a stealthier platform and superior imagery for targeting other drones, artillery, etc.

12/ Second, Russia has standardised its drone production around a limited number of models . This has logistics, training and production implications.

13/ Finally, the Russian Rubikon units have transformed Russian drone operations and the targeting of Ukraine drone control centres. Russia sees these drone control centres as the Ukrainian tactical centre of gravity, and therefore these are now the Russian tactical focus. More on Rubicon at this link: rferl.org/a/russia-drone…

14/ Counter-drone technologies are improving rapidly. We might ponder whether drones and counter-drone systems will achieve parity in many circumstances in future conflicts. As such, we might ask the question of whether we will see again the dominance achieved by drones in this war, particularly in the period 2022-2023?

This has implications for the force structures and warfighting concepts of other nations in other theatres beyond Ukraine.

15/ EW and drones are a co-evolutionary system. One cannot be considered without the other in modern war. Both drone operations and EW operations must be integrated and have common learning and adaptation systems. Believing that a military can do one without the other is a false premise.

16/ Training is vital to drone effectiveness. Ukraine has found that well trained operators have a better success rate at completing the missions assigned to them. But this training is not just about drone operations. Drone armourers and maintenance personnel must be trained. So too is training required for tactical planners in the integration of drones into combined arms activities. Ukraine has much to share with us in this regard.

17/ When describing the character of this war, we should resist the notion that Ukraine is a Drone War. It is, in reality, a large, complex war where drones have gained prominence. As I note above, evidence shows in Ukraine and elsewhere, that drones don’t replace human capacity - they extend it. And they have not replaced artillery or tanks or infantry or engineers or logisticians in Ukraine - they have complemented them.

18/ Over multiple visits, Ukrainians talk about how they view drone operations as improving existing conventional systems, changing how they are used, and covering gaps in conventional capacity, but not replacing them. They talk of a battle triangle J2-J3-Drones/EW which integrates combined arms and air-land operations.

19/ And, to re-state a crucial point, as the Ukrainians have discovered on the frontline, drones cannot replace a soldier holding ground. This is one of the enduring truths of war – and bears frequent restating lest the message get lost in the preaching by over zealous drone advocates.

20/ Thanks for sticking with me. There is much to learn from #Ukraine about the use of drones for an array of different missions in different geographical theatres. In future threads, I will explore other issues including the ongoing adaptation battle as well as war #strategy. End. (Image: @DefenceU)