I stumbled across the work of Arthur E. Stamps III this morning and, wow, my eyes have been opened!
He's was (is?) an architect in San Francisco who wrote scores of academic papers on the mass public's aesthetic preferences & the failure of "design review" to serve them.
🧵/18
His studies show that San Francisco's Great Downzoning (1970s & early 1980s) was an answer to the public's genuine aesthetic dislike of residential dingbats and downtown "refrigerator towers."
/2
The city planning department had tried to address the public's dislike of midcentury "plain box" style by mandating bay windows. That yielded "Richmond Specials" -- a slight improvement, but still substantially disfavored by public relative to random sample of existing bldgs.
/3
What came next was one regulatory misfire after another.
- The city strictly controlled heights, but Stamps's studies find that public barely objects to taller infill until the new building is approx 2x the height of its neighbors
/4
- Tall and interesting downtown skyscrapers were welcomed by the public (even as the refrigerator boxes were hated).
The Transamerica Building: beloved since 1974!
/5
- The city passed a bunch of rules about setbacks, stepbacks, break up the massing. Stamps finds that people don't care about this stuff. Worse, "breaking up the massing" often introduces asymmetries, yet the public prefers symmetry.
/6
What the public really *does* care about, according to Stamps's studies, is:
- (1) maintaining the stylistic homogeneity of homogeneous block faces,
- (2) architectural decoration,
- (3) trees/greenery.
/7
The most mind-blowing of the Stamps studies elicited ratings of 2-3.5 story Victorians and 2-3 story "little boxes" in the ~1940s style.
No surprise: people love Victorians, especially the tall grand ones.
/8
And yet, the most disliked composite block face consisted of uniform "small plain buildings" with one "large fancy" Victorian, sticking out like a gorgeous sore thumb.
/9
Stamps also studied the highly subjective design review process, as it was practiced in various Bay Area jurisdictions.
/10
He found that, on average, design review resulted in (at best) very marginal improvements vis-a-vis the public's aesthetic preferences.
/11
Neither the architect-board judging "beauty contests" to allocate downtown office space in San Francisco, nor the lay-citizen review board w/ jurisdiction over Bernal Heights, acted in accordance with the public's preferences.
/12
Citizens who self-selected into serving on the Bernal review board were disproportionately conservatives who liked small, plain houses and were not interested in building.
/13
Stamps also asked the organized neighborhood groups that regularly participate in planning commission hearings to submit pictures of buildings they consider to be exemplars.
The general public liked them about as well they liked a a random sample of the city's buildings.
/14
As for architect-submitted exemplars, they received essentially the same average rating from the mass public as Richmond Specials! (screenshot in preceding tweet).
/15
There's lots of other interesting stuff in Stamps's body of work, including on architect vs. layperson judgments (very different!), and on diversity in layperson judgments (he finds great consistency across demographic groups).
/16
The one absence in his work is any assessment of the relative importance of aesthetic vs. non-aesthetic attributes of new development (e.g., affordability, resident demographics, traffic, etc.).
@dbroockman, @j_kalla & I will have results on that front soon!
/17
In the meantime, if you know whether Arthur E. Stamps III is still alive (and if so, how to reach him), please reply!
/end
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New decision from CA Court of Appeal on the fee-shifting provisions of AB 1633 has big implications for NIMBYs' incentive to challenge housing approvals under CEQA & beyond.
Context: As part of the 1970s revolution in admin law, states & the federal gov't actively encouraged self-appointed "private attorneys general" to sue, via attorneys' fee bounties.
/2
Asymmetric fee-shifting provisions were written into scores of public laws: If a plaintiff challenging a gov't decision wins, the gov't has to pay for the plaintiff's attorney; if the plaintiff loses, they don't have to pay for the gov's attorney.
"For a typical mid-rise apartment in San José, construction costs can exceed $700k–$900k per unit."
I 💯% agree w/ @MattMahanSJ that reducing construction costs should be a top priority for 2026 -- and that this is mainly a job for the state legislature.
Reason #1. CA's fiscal constitution + local political incentives push local govs to extract "value" from development w/ impact fees, IZ & transfer taxes.
This drives up the cost of building enormously.
/2
The state leg should preempt most such fees, IZ, & taxes, ***and create a substitute source of local revenue.***
My preferred alternative: a state parcel tax assessed on the "net potential square feet" or "net potential units" created by upzoning pursuant to state law.
/3
Could L.A. really land in the Builder's Remedy penalty box, just for f'ing around with a single low-income housing project which a nonprofit developer wants to build on city-owned land?
In October, @California_HCD sent L.A. a sharply worded letter, warning that the city's housing element had relied on the Venice Dell project both as a "pipeline project" and as part of the city's strategy to "affirmatively further fair housing."
/2 hcd.ca.gov/sites/default/…
The HCD letter also flagged five "policies" and two "programs" in L.A.'s housing element that per HCD should "facilitate the project."
The city's course of action has been "inconsistent with these policies."
Cooking in San Diego: A turquoise, 23-story test of the Permit Streamlining Act's new-and-improved "deemed approved" proviso.
This could turn into a big constitutional battle.
🧵/22
Enacted in 1977, the PSA put time limits on CEQA and other agency reviews of development proposals.
If an agency violated the time limits, the project was to be "deemed approved" by operation of law. Wow!
It proved wholly ineffectual.
/2
As @TDuncheon & I explained, courts first decided that the Leg couldn't possibly have meant for a project to be approved before enviro review was complete.
- San Francisco almost certainly must approve this 25-story project on a site zoned for 4 stories
- The city's new ordinance deregulating density in "well-resourced areas" will operate as de-facto downzoning of such sites
🧵
This project's site is zoned for retail use and is currently occupied by the Marina Safeway.
The zoning classification also allows residential use at density of 1 unit per 600 sqft of lot area or density of nearest residential district, whichever is greater.
/2
The nearest residential district, RM-4, allows density of 1 unit per 200 sqft of lot area.
That translates into 567 units on site.
Developer proposes to build 790 units, which requires a 39% density bonus (790/567 = 1.39).
By describing the credible commitment problem (the need to reassure developers of new housing or energy that their project won't face price controls for a very long time) I didn't mean to imply, as some critics on the right insist, that the problem is insurmountable.
/2
I think the problem can be greatly mitigated:
1. By offering DC-style "certificates of assurance" to developers, i.e., recordable contracts for compensation if the project is subjected to price controls within a defined period of time.
/3