*On the zionist occupation’s prisons as a meeting ground for various Palestinian factions: a short thread*
(image from Tarek Hamoud, “Evaluating the Structural Political Developments in the Islamic Palestinian Resistance Movement as a Ruling Authority Between 2006-2017”, 2023)
In its earliest stages, the zionist occupation’s prisons served as a crucial setting for fostering interaction between Hamas and other Palestinian factions. The origins of Hamas’s concept of national partnership are generally believed to have emerged within zionist prisons during
the late 1980s and early 1990s, while the shifts triggered by the Oslo Accords may have acted as a catalyst that transformed this idea into practical political cooperation with other Palestinian forces. In an interview on 22 October 2020 with Tarek Hamoud, Saleh al-Arouri stated
that zionist prisons had laid the initial groundwork for a national partnership between Hamas and other Palestinian groups, noting that “the shared circumstances of all Palestinian prisoners led to a deeper understanding of the other.” Al-Arouri elaborated that “inside the
[zionist occupation's] prison, one perceives things up close and realises that the commonalities and similarities are substantial, whereas the imagined differences and divides are quite narrow.” Likewise, in an interview on 18 November 2020, Ghazi Hamad reiterated that the prison
environment had played a significant role in narrowing the ideological divides between Hamas and other factions, though he emphasised that its influence at that point remained limited. Sami Abu Zuhri, in an interview with Hamad 21 October 2020, also affirmed that the evolution of
Hamas’s relations with other factions began within the zionist occupation's prisons, arguing that the prison environment provided an initial space for coexistence among Palestinian groups following a period in which they had refused to recognise one another. Abu Zuhri further
noted that this phase of coexistence during the First Intifada later paved the way for the post-Oslo national partnership between Hamas and other Palestinian factions. In a similar vein, Husam Badran, interviewed by Hamad on 1 June 2022, recalled the harsh conditions faced by
Hamas prisoners in the late 1980s. He explained that “during that period, Hamas detainees were prevented by PLO prisoners from forming their own organisational wing inside Israeli prisons, as the PLO did not recognise any movement outside its affiliated factions.” Badran added
that prisoners from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) shielded Hamas detainees from the hostility of Fatah and other PLO factions, leading the small group of Hamas prisoners at the time to join the PFLP’s prison wing. He concluded that this joint PFLP–Hamas
prison wing constituted Hamas’s first experience of national partnership.
Scholarly literature on the Palestinian national movement frequently addresses the question of prisoners’ participation in political decision-making (see: JM Norman, "Beyond Hunger Strikes: The Palestinian
Prisoners' Movement and Everyday Resistance Journal of Resistance Studies," vol. 6., 2020). In the case of Hamas, the movement’s prisoners play a distinctive role in the decision-making process through a symbolic rather than bureaucratic relationship, as explained by Maher Salah
in an interview with Hamad on 26 October 2020. The approximately 1,800–2,000 Hamas prisoners held in zionist prisons have established a representative framework known as the Supreme Leadership Body for Hamas Prisoners (see: A. Abu Amer, 'How Hamas Prisoners Elect Leaders Behind
Bars,' "Al Monitor," 2017; Available at: . This body typically consists of between eleven and seventeen members, organized across four regional divisions: Gaza prisoners, along with prisoners from the northern, central, and southern areas of the West Bankal-monitor.com/originals/2017…
(see: A. Issa, "Dawr Alhayyat Alqiadiat Li'asraa Hamas Fi Sujun Alaihtilal Bitaeziz Makanat Al'asraa 2005-2017" [The role of the leadership body of Hamas prisoners in strengthening the status of the prisoners 2005-2017]., 2018).
Every two years, each prison elects roughly
seventeen representatives on a proportional basis to form a General Conference of approximately 350 members. This General Conference then elects the Hamas Prisoners’ Shura Council, composed of fifty-one members (ibid.). The Shura Council of the Hamas prisoners subsequently elects
both the head and deputy head of the Supreme Leadership Body for Hamas Prisoners, while the remainder of the body’s leadership board is composed of elected representatives from each prison (ibid.).
Although no formal bureaucratic link exists between the Supreme Leadership Body
for Hamas Prisoners and the Executive Committee of Hamas, the prisoners’ leadership plays a meaningful role in key decision-making moments—such as the reconciliation efforts between Fatah and Hamas, the 2011 prisoner exchange agreement, participation in the 2006 Palestinian
elections, and the formulation of the 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies, which outlined the movement’s strategic orientation (ibid.).
In this regard, Saleh al-Arouri noted in an interview on 22 October 2020 that Hamas prisoners played a pivotal role in drafting
what became known as the Prisoners’ Document of 2006, developed through dialogue with prisoners representing other Palestinian factions. The document provided a conceptual framework addressing major national issues and served as a roadmap for overcoming the political impasse that
followed Hamas’s victory in the 2006 elections (see: "National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners - Document by Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israeli Jails," United Nations, 2006; ).un.org/unispal/docume…
The Prisoners’ Document gained wide acceptance among leaders of the Palestinian factions and became known as the National Conciliation Document, which continues to serve as a reference point in most national dialogue efforts among Palestinian groups (see: A. Mallouh, "Wathiqat
Al'asraa Radun Ealaa Tahmish Dawrihim Alsiyasii Waealaa Eajz Alqadat Ean Alwafiq" [The prisoners’ document is a response to the marginalisation of their political role and the leaders’ inability to agree], 2007). As emphasized by Sami Abu Zuhri in an interview on 21 October 2020,
the Prisoners’ Document remains the foundational basis upon which Hamas recognizes and upholds the principle of national partnership with Fatah.
During the 1990s, the prisoners’ leadership within Hamas has held a primarily symbolic role in the movement’s decision-making process.
However, this role expanded significantly following the establishment of Hamas’s tripartite leadership structure in 2009. From that point onward, both the head of the Supreme Leadership Body for Hamas Prisoners and its deputy became members of the Central Shura Council.
Later, in 2015, the president of the Supreme Leadership Body for Hamas Prisoners was also appointed as a member of the Executive Committee.
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@DougLain @JacktheFate @ccutrone1970 @compactmag_ To claim that Hamas took Gaza by force and has held it by force is historically inaccurate. Hamas prevented the PA, trained by Keith Dayton and bolstered by Condoleezza Rice, from exacting a coup. Hamas has not repressed the PFLP or socialist organizations, which do enjoy a base
@DougLain @JacktheFate @ccutrone1970 @compactmag_ and do not “tail” Hamas. In fact, Hamas and PFLP, DFLP, and other socialist organizations have enjoyed good relations, despite some debates and disagreements, since George Habash, secretary general of the PFLP, spoke with notable enthusiasm about Hamas in the publication
@DougLain @JacktheFate @ccutrone1970 @compactmag_ “Filastin al-Muslima” (March 1990, p. 12), in which he remarked:
“From the ideological position of total confrontation, I welcome Hamas joining the swell of total resistance to the Zionist enemy. Whoever is familiar with that (Islamic) movement—its slogans, its priorities, and
THE PRE-HISTORY OF HAMAS' AL-QASSAM BRIGADES FORMATION: A SHORT THREAD ON THE FORMATION OF “THE PALESTINIAN MUJAHIDUN" & AL-MAJD
(photo from the First Intifada, graffiti reading "Against Conferences for the Sale of Our Land", Musa Allush Collection)
In 1985, Sheikh Yassin was released after 11 months in prison, due to a prisoner exchange between the zionist entity and Ahmed Jibril’s PFLP-General Command. After his release, Yassin went back to work; in 1985, he helped set up a new armed organization called al-Majd (Glory), an
acronym for Munazamat al-Jihaf wa al-Da’wa (The Organization of Holy War and Preaching). According to Khaled Hroub’s “Hamas: Political Thought and Practice” (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 2000), Majd was founded in 1983 and had been charged with “the task of liquidating
*On Hamas’ Unique Nationalist-Islamic Code of Conduct, its Approach to Education During the First Intifada, and the PA’s Repressive Response Thereafter*
During the years 1987 - 1993, Hamas differed from the PLO-affiliated Unified National Leadership of the Intifada on the
subject of declaring general strikes affecting schools; while the latter insisted on the participation of all students in the general strike, leading to the closing down of schools, Hamas exempted educational establishments from general strikes and called on students to attend
classes. In its Periodic statement no. 45 of 21 July 1989, Hamas appealed to students to attend classes; the statement's heading read: “Read, in the name of thy God, the Creator. Learning and studying are a sacred right that we safeguard. No one outdoes us in this regard.”
@TLAVagabond @ResistancePoppy @TheLemming5 @mbeez__ @ProtectPal I would argue that Hroub, Tamimi and especially Seurat do (and I am glad you are familiar with Seurat, whose recent book goes in depth about the issue of the Great March of Return 2018-19 negotiations); Tamimi especially is instructive re: the Zakat-based funding and how the x.com/mujammaharaket…
@TLAVagabond @ResistancePoppy @TheLemming5 @mbeez__ @ProtectPal licenses were distributed during the entity’s occupation of Gaza in particular (whether it be Fatah’s Shabiba clubs in 1981 or the Palestinian Ikhwan’s al-Mujamma). Regardless of whether I have convinced you, however, I would aver that the matter is no by no means obvious—
@TLAVagabond @ResistancePoppy @TheLemming5 @mbeez__ @ProtectPal hence the extant body of politival science debate on the issue (including Beverley Milton-Edwards, who I recommend readers exercise caution when consulting)
* Hamas, Iran, and the 1991 International Conference to Support the Palestinian People’s Islamic Revolution: A Short Thread on the Nascent Beginning of Iran-Hamas Relations*
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat had landed in Tehran in 1979 as the first official visitor to the capital
under the revolutionary government of Iran and was given a triumphal welcome befitting mujahidin. The visit resulted in the opening of a Palestine embassy in place of what used to be the Israeli mission under the Shah. The first few months witnessed the flowering of fraternal
sentiments, during which Palestine’s representatives in Tehran were hosted and feted. However, when tensions between Iraq and Iran developed after 1980, what Khaled Hroub calls Iran's "honeymoon with the PLO" began to dissipate.
*Hamas’ Relationship with Other Resistance Factions During the First Intifada: A Short Thread*
As Hamas was established as the First Intifada began and was organically part and parcel of this uprising, it was politically necessary and organic for it to form alliances with other
Palestinian resistance organizations, which were also involved in the Intifada. Notably, these relationships were contextualized by the then accelerating pace of the so-called “peace process”, which picked up in parallel with the Intifada as a Palestinian state was declared at
the Algiers 1988 Palestinian National Council (PNC) session. With the subsequent 1991 Madrid Conference and the 1993 Oslo Agreement, those Palestinian political factions opposed to normalization recognized the need for coordination with one another.