Germany needs to fully wake up (it is happening but too slowly)
China's auto export growth did not slow in October.
825K vehicle exports (an annualized pace of close to 10m), likely over 700K passenger car exports (8.5m annualized). Crazy numbers
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Overall export growth slowed in October, but auto exports were surprisingly strong (2024 forecasts that China's export book was set to fizzle out haven't been born out, export growth actually reaccelerated)
The vehicle surplus now exceeds $100b
2/
The acceleration in exports is clearest in volume terms, but it shows in dollar terms as well -- and imports are being pushed out of the Chinese market (auto imports are now less than 2% of Chinese domestic sales ... )
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The 2025 export surge has been driven in large parts by EVs/ NEVs (including plug in hybrids)
4/
I had to extrapolate a bit to get an estimate for October, but it sure looks like NEV exports are heading toward 4m a year -- a big sum (for comparison, Tesla's global production ins less than 2m I think, including 1m in China)
5/
The magnitude of the swing in auto trade over the last 5ys is mind boggling -- and it isn't over ...
Don't see how policy makers in the big auto producing regions of the world can sit still
6/6
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The first relatively weak Chinese trade data release in a while -- October is usually down v September, but y/y growth in exports and imports also stalled. If October is a leading indicator for q4, the goods surplus will stabilize at (gulp) around $1.2 trillion
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There is a standard seasonal fall in export in October tied to the mid-autumn festival -- and that dip may be a bit pronounced this October. But y/y volume growth looks close to flat (after a surprisingly strong 11-12% increase in Sept)
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Averaging the monthly data (October is an estimate) would suggest export volumes are growing ~ 5% -- still faster than global trade, but a deceleration from most of 2024 and the first part of 2025
Somehow, the US has ended up with a tariff structure for many goods that doesn't really encourage a shift in production out of China. Quote is from Sean Stein of the US-China Business Council, in a new piece from @AnaSwanson
To be sure, the legacy 25% 301 tariff on lists 1-3 does discourage final assembly of those goods in China -- but the term 2 tariffs haven't added to that penalty ...
The bulk of current US imports from China have a 301 tariff of either 7.5% (many household/ consumer goods) or zero (electronics) and now face a 20% tariff (10 reciprocal, 10 fentanyl) -- which isn't much different from the 19 or 20% tariff on SE Asia.
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Jason Douglass and Jonathan Cheng in the WSJ -- the Trade War Didn't Change China.
In fact, China's economy is more unbalanced and more reliant on exports for the demand than it was when section 301 case first started
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Open trade failed, spectacularly, to liberalize China's political system.
More restricted trade if anything led China to double down on its manufacturing intensive, channel capital to industry model
2/
I think it is fair to say that China has weaponized the chokepoints generated by its control over the supply of critical inputs (rare earths, magnets, legacy chips, processing of chips) quite effectively --
China's goods and services data on a balance of payments basis is now effectively out for q3 (with the September monthly data) -- and on a balance of payments basis, exports jumped up a bit in q3
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The q2 surplus using China's (whacky) BoP methodology was well below the q2 customs surplus -- but the q3 BoP surplus is strong, and up v q2 (while the customs surplus is down)
2/
So my estimate for the q3 current account surplus is just over $200b ($800b annualized) -- or well above q2 ...
There needs to be a better consensus number for the tariff on China. The effective tariff rate (Tariff paid/ imports) was 37-38% in July and August. It should fall to under 30% with the recent deal.
As @EtraAlex notes, that is still higher than the effective tariff rate on most other countries (India is a bit of an outlier, but there should be a deal) -- the electronics exclusion lowers the effective tariff on SE Asia ...
2/
There of course is a lot of sectoral variability in the tariffs -- all sorts of 232s that knock out the reciprocal tariffs, and in some cases (electronics/ chips & pharma) that has really lowered the actual applied tariff (same for the USMCA exclusion)
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China's currency is objectively very weak, especially in inflation adjusted terms (it is down just under 20% from its 2021 high). And it is very tightly managed against the dollar --
But within that broad regime, there has been a tiny bit of appreciation over the last 6ms
1/ many
And to be sure, the movement is primarily against the dollar -- the yuan remains incredibly weak against the euro (contributing to the second China shock, China's rising share of the EU auto market & German automotive angst)
2/
There is something technically very strange about the yuan's appreciation -- it has come even though the onshore spot rate has remained weaker than the daily fix (in theory the mid point of the band). That is strange ...