Iran reports @iaeaorg "The quantity of HEU produced & accumulated by Iran, the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon State to have done so, which remains in Iran without the Agency being able to verify it...is a matter of serious concern and a matter..." -1-
"of compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement." Report says @rafaelmgrossi "has made clear to Iran that it is indispensable and urgent to implement
safeguards activities in Iran in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement, which remains in force,
and that..." -2-
@rafaelmgrossi "its implementation cannot be suspended under any circumstances." -3-
@rafaelmgrossi "Until 22 May 2025, issued long-term visas to Agency inspectors designated for Iran as requested
by the Agency, provided proper working space for the Agency at nuclear sites and facilitated
the use of working space at locations near nuclear sites in Iran (para. 67.2). " -4-
@rafaelmgrossi "After this date, Iran no longer issued one-year multiple entry visas for Agency inspectors, but continued to provide proper working space at nuclear sites unaffected by the military attacks and to facilitate the use of working space at locations near nuclear sites in Iran." -5-
@rafaelmgrossi "On 12 June...Iran notified the Agency of a new enrichment facility (Isfahan Fuel Enrichment
Plant (IFEP)), to which the Agency requested immediate access to conduct design information
examination & verification, which was agreed by Iran. However, the Agency cancelled these" -6-
@rafaelmgrossi "planned verification activities due to the commencement of the military attacks. As no verification activities have been conducted at this facility, the Agency does not know the precise location of IFEP, its status for safeguards purposes, including whether it contains..." -7-
@rafaelmgrossi "...nuclear material, or whether it was affected by the
military attacks." -8-
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So @araghchi is saying he made a serious offer yesterday to E3. The E3 is saying it was unsatisfactory as tweeted earlier. So what was the offer? I now have a picture from a few sources. -1-
- Iran would pledge to meet with Witkoff/US. Not clear if that would be direct/indirect. For that, US must give guarantee of no attacks.
In exchange for Iran pledge to meet, E3 would have to pledge to extend snapback. -2-
- Those talks would focus on the issue of the 60% stockpile. Iran would retrieve all the 60% it could. Once retrieved, the UNSC would kill Resolution 2231 supporting the JCPOA. Which means killing off E3 snapback option. -3-
Assuming snapback happens tomorrow, there's a lot of confusion over what happens next under the 30 day period. It's best explained to say that we effectively enter a new phase of negotiation at least for the first 10 days...
Under the mechanism that i think is being used for the first time, the presidency of the UNSC has to put forward a resolution after 10 days which offers to cancel snapback. That can be vetoed in the normal way by Britain, France or the US (or Russia and China.) And then we'd -2-
get snapback after 30 days with the old sanctions and resolutions taking effect. There will be intense negotiation, diplos say, over the form of that resolution. Among the questions are will 2231 be extended and for how long and will snapback clearly be allowed at a later date-3-
A thread around the @Gharibabadi comments today in NY, which @mgordonwsj and I storified here. There's an intricate game going on that may not be clear enough to those who aren't following closely. -1-wsj.com/world/middle-e…
Last Friday, I reported here that the E3 had told Iran they were open to extending the October deadline for snapback if Iran could meet certain conditions. It was a critical potential concession that could change the way the pre-snapback summer events would flow. -2-
Before sharing that possibility with @araghchi, the E3 had two choices. 1/ Snapback 2015 sanctions on the basis that Iran wasn't headed towards a new nuclear deal with the U.S., a strong likelihood. That would have risked a major crisis, possibly killing off diplomacy. Iran...-3-
Perhaps it’s time to remind people of the most eye catching part of the comprehensive report. Not only did the iaea accuse Iran of providing no evidence of its claim of Israeli sabotage explaining the presence of undeclared nuclear material. It went further. It exposed Iranian -1
claim. I.A.E.A. pointed out that Iran had placed many cameras in a warehouse in the area of Turquz Abad yet Iran was unable to provide any evidence of the alleged sabotage. Iran claimed those cameras were only put there in late Sep 2018 so couldn’t have captured it. -2-
I.A.E.A. provided evidence that this was not true. Photos in the Iranian media showed that those cameras were there before late sep. Here’s the section. -3-
Just as there was too much hyping of the early successes of Israel’s op against Iran, there’s a danger of too much hyping now of the areas where israel appears not to have succeeded. Let’s take as an example the stockpile — an issue I’ve been raising for 18 months as a problem-1-
So let’s assume Iran has full control of it. Which seems likely. What does it now do? IAEA will want inspectors there to check caskets and amounts. Iran can delay a few days. Then what? If access and a full accounting of it is refused, what is Iran saying to Trump and US? -2-
Of course Iran could complete and ratify its bill on non cooperation with iaea. It could exit the NPT. But the fundamental question remains. There’s nothing theoretical any more about US action to prevent an Iranian nuke. And that’s leaving aside challenges of building covertly-3
Cometh the Iran moment. Comment the Europeans. For the first time since Trump took office, possibly for the first time since 2022, the Europeans have a real role on the future on Iran’s nuclear program and U.S.-Iran talks. For better or worse. Tomorrow’s meeting in Geneva…-1-
could be importantly, offering the opportunity of an off ramp for Iran which puts US-Iran talks back in play. Of course, Washington may ignore what happens here. Iran may stick to all its old positions and red lines. But the talks could be an important point in the new 2-week…-2
timeline set by @realDonaldTrump. A sign of the potential significance, the presence of @kajakallas at the Geneva talks. At times, she’s seemed happily aloof from any hint of Iran nuclear diplomacy. But when the moment matters, she’s coming. -3-