The explanation for Taiwan's exceptionally weak currency (on the big Mac index & pretty much any other indicator) is Taiwan's central bank "as Taiwan has exported its way to prosperity, the CBC has tried to avoid such a fate by suppressing the value of the local currency"
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Agreed --
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And a bit of support for the trade wars are class wars thesis: "Taiwanese workers have good reason to feel aggrieved. Labour productivity has doubled since 1998, yet unlike in most rich countries or even in wage-suppressed China, pay has not risen in tandem"
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And holding the currency down while avoiding too much scrutiny from the currency cops effectively meant the creation of a massive fx mismatch that threatens the long-run solvency of the lifers
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"Taiwanese insurers have made $960bn of promises to savers, which are backed by $700bn in higher-return foreign (principally American) assets. The industry thus suffers from an alarming mismatch, backing Taiwan-dollar promises with American-dollar holdings."
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And it seems like the CBC (Central Bank of China, Taipei) doesn't like criticism or scrutiny
"“Many colleagues within the CBC are also critical” says Chen Nan-Kuang, who was its deputy governor from 2018 to 2023. “But the CBC has many means of intimidation.”
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That maps to my experience; I was on the receiving end of several strongly worded letters from the then Deputy Governor back in 2018 and 2019 --
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Luckily, STW and I had a strong rebuttal to the CBC -- namely we were right, they were in fact hiding their forward book (and some dollars on deposit in the local banks) at the time
And I note that the CBC hasn't stopped intervening in the fx market -- their defense of 29 in some way set the stage for the dollar's broader recovery, as it showed that Asian central banks could still fight appreciation w/o any real pushback from Trump&co
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And the insurance against appreciation that the CBC provides seems to have induced the already in over their heads lifers to add to their enormous fx overweight (and open position) in the third quarter ...
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above all, this is a story about how a country's politics can coalesce around a policy, namely a massive currency undervaluation, with very substantial, but largely hidden costs --
Bloomberg reports that China's regulators have warned China's state banks about the risk of holding too many Treasuries --
The Chinese regulators must know something that the Treasury doesn't, as the Treasury data doesn't suggest that China has been buying any Treasuries
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The official US data on foreign holdings doesn't show any basis for Chinese concern -- China's Treasuries in US custodianship (in theory state accounts as well as state bank accounts) are heading down not up
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That is of course inconsistent with the warning that the regulators provided to the state banks! They seem to be warning about nothing ...
The Treasury has indicated that it will look at the activities of China's state banks in its next assessment of China's currency policies--
It is hard to see how this doesn't become a bit of an issue ... unless of course summitry gets in the way of analysis 1/
It is quite clear that state bank purchases (and in 23/ early 24 sales) of fx have replaced PBOC purchases and sales and the core technique China uses to manage the band around the daily fx -- i.e. settlement looks like an intervention variable
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My latest blog looks both at how fx settlement (a measure that includes the state banks) has displaced the PBOC's own reported reserves as the best metric for Chinese intervention & lat some of SAFE's balance sheet mysteries
The blog is detailed and technical -- and thus probably best read by those with a real interest in central bank balance sheets, the balance of payments and how to assess backdoor foreign currency intervention
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Drawing on historical data, I propose that the gap between fx settlement and the foreign assets on the PBOC's balance sheet (fx reserves + other f. assets) is a good indicator of hidden intervention --
Obviously overshadowed by the news about a Fed nomination, but the Treasury released its delated October 2025 FX report today and it is worth reading -- not the least b/c of a clear warning to SAFE.
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This seems clear
"An economy that fails to publish intervention data or whose data are incomplete will not be given any benefit of the doubt in Treasury’s assessment of intervention practices."
This report only covers the period between July 24 and June 25, so it misses the bulk of the 2025 surge in fx settlement (December = $100b plus). But this chart suggests the use of more sophisticated analytical techniques than those used in past reports --
A bit of background. Taiwan's lifers hold $700 billion in foreign currency assets abroad (more counting their holdings of local ETFs that invest heavily in foreign bonds) v ~ $200 billion in domestic fx policies -- so fx gap (pre hedging) of $500 billion
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Taiwan's regulator (perhaps the most complicit regulator on earth) not allows the lifers NOT to mark their fx holdings to the fx market -- so the lifers are incentivized not to hedge (and they are rapidly reducing their hedge ratio)
Japan is an interesting case in a lot of ways. It has a ton of domestic debt (and significant domestic financial assets) which generates heated concerns about its solvency/ ability to manage higher rates. But it is also a massive global creditor --
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Japan's net holdings of bonds (net of foreign holdings of JGBs) is close to 50% of its GDP (a creditor position as big v GDP as the US net det position). That includes $1 trillion in bonds held in Japan's $1.175 trillion in reserves, + over $2 trillion in other holdings
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That translates into big holdings of US debt -- the MoF's Treasuries all show up in the US TIC data, but the corporate bonds held by the lifers, postbank and the GPIF are only partially captured in the US data b/c of third party management/ the use of EU custodians