The explanation for Taiwan's exceptionally weak currency (on the big Mac index & pretty much any other indicator) is Taiwan's central bank "as Taiwan has exported its way to prosperity, the CBC has tried to avoid such a fate by suppressing the value of the local currency"
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Agreed --
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And a bit of support for the trade wars are class wars thesis: "Taiwanese workers have good reason to feel aggrieved. Labour productivity has doubled since 1998, yet unlike in most rich countries or even in wage-suppressed China, pay has not risen in tandem"
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And holding the currency down while avoiding too much scrutiny from the currency cops effectively meant the creation of a massive fx mismatch that threatens the long-run solvency of the lifers
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"Taiwanese insurers have made $960bn of promises to savers, which are backed by $700bn in higher-return foreign (principally American) assets. The industry thus suffers from an alarming mismatch, backing Taiwan-dollar promises with American-dollar holdings."
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And it seems like the CBC (Central Bank of China, Taipei) doesn't like criticism or scrutiny
"“Many colleagues within the CBC are also critical” says Chen Nan-Kuang, who was its deputy governor from 2018 to 2023. “But the CBC has many means of intimidation.”
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That maps to my experience; I was on the receiving end of several strongly worded letters from the then Deputy Governor back in 2018 and 2019 --
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Luckily, STW and I had a strong rebuttal to the CBC -- namely we were right, they were in fact hiding their forward book (and some dollars on deposit in the local banks) at the time
And I note that the CBC hasn't stopped intervening in the fx market -- their defense of 29 in some way set the stage for the dollar's broader recovery, as it showed that Asian central banks could still fight appreciation w/o any real pushback from Trump&co
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And the insurance against appreciation that the CBC provides seems to have induced the already in over their heads lifers to add to their enormous fx overweight (and open position) in the third quarter ...
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above all, this is a story about how a country's politics can coalesce around a policy, namely a massive currency undervaluation, with very substantial, but largely hidden costs --
And China's net auto exports far exceed the 1.3 m cars Germany exported on net in 24 ...
Michael Dunne and others put China's production capacity at ~ 50m cars. EV production capacity by the end of the year should approach 25m cars, so the right answer depends on how much ICE capacity has been retired. Huge v the 25m internal market and 30+ m in current output
The old exportweltmeister has been dethroned -- and its economy is suffering at the hand of the new exportweltmeister (China).
That is the story told by both a new ECB paper and the FT in an excellent new piece
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Put simply, Germany is the most exposed large G-7 economy to the second China shock (Japan has been buffered by an incredibly weak yen).
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The impact of the second China shock is in all the relevant data sets -- & it reflects a clear Chinese policy choice: “As a country, the Chinese have been in the last years much better, more proactive, more consistent in going after the big technologies and conquering them”
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Germany needs to fully wake up (it is happening but too slowly)
China's auto export growth did not slow in October.
825K vehicle exports (an annualized pace of close to 10m), likely over 700K passenger car exports (8.5m annualized). Crazy numbers
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Overall export growth slowed in October, but auto exports were surprisingly strong (2024 forecasts that China's export book was set to fizzle out haven't been born out, export growth actually reaccelerated)
The vehicle surplus now exceeds $100b
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The acceleration in exports is clearest in volume terms, but it shows in dollar terms as well -- and imports are being pushed out of the Chinese market (auto imports are now less than 2% of Chinese domestic sales ... )
The first relatively weak Chinese trade data release in a while -- October is usually down v September, but y/y growth in exports and imports also stalled. If October is a leading indicator for q4, the goods surplus will stabilize at (gulp) around $1.2 trillion
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There is a standard seasonal fall in export in October tied to the mid-autumn festival -- and that dip may be a bit pronounced this October. But y/y volume growth looks close to flat (after a surprisingly strong 11-12% increase in Sept)
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Averaging the monthly data (October is an estimate) would suggest export volumes are growing ~ 5% -- still faster than global trade, but a deceleration from most of 2024 and the first part of 2025
Somehow, the US has ended up with a tariff structure for many goods that doesn't really encourage a shift in production out of China. Quote is from Sean Stein of the US-China Business Council, in a new piece from @AnaSwanson
To be sure, the legacy 25% 301 tariff on lists 1-3 does discourage final assembly of those goods in China -- but the term 2 tariffs haven't added to that penalty ...
The bulk of current US imports from China have a 301 tariff of either 7.5% (many household/ consumer goods) or zero (electronics) and now face a 20% tariff (10 reciprocal, 10 fentanyl) -- which isn't much different from the 19 or 20% tariff on SE Asia.
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Jason Douglass and Jonathan Cheng in the WSJ -- the Trade War Didn't Change China.
In fact, China's economy is more unbalanced and more reliant on exports for the demand than it was when section 301 case first started
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Open trade failed, spectacularly, to liberalize China's political system.
More restricted trade if anything led China to double down on its manufacturing intensive, channel capital to industry model
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I think it is fair to say that China has weaponized the chokepoints generated by its control over the supply of critical inputs (rare earths, magnets, legacy chips, processing of chips) quite effectively --