Brad Setser Profile picture
Nov 14 13 tweets 4 min read Read on X
The Economist takes a look at Taiwan this week -- and its peculiar combination of a weak currency and a massive external surplus;

"[Taiwan has] the world’s most undervalued currency and one of its biggest trade surpluses."

1/

economist.com/briefing/2025/…
The explanation for Taiwan's exceptionally weak currency (on the big Mac index & pretty much any other indicator) is Taiwan's central bank "as Taiwan has exported its way to prosperity, the CBC has tried to avoid such a fate by suppressing the value of the local currency"

2/
Agreed --

3/ Image
And a bit of support for the trade wars are class wars thesis: "Taiwanese workers have good reason to feel aggrieved. Labour productivity has doubled since 1998, yet unlike in most rich countries or even in wage-suppressed China, pay has not risen in tandem"

4/
And holding the currency down while avoiding too much scrutiny from the currency cops effectively meant the creation of a massive fx mismatch that threatens the long-run solvency of the lifers

5/ Image
"Taiwanese insurers have made $960bn of promises to savers, which are backed by $700bn in higher-return foreign (principally American) assets. The industry thus suffers from an alarming mismatch, backing Taiwan-dollar promises with American-dollar holdings."

6/ Image
And it seems like the CBC (Central Bank of China, Taipei) doesn't like criticism or scrutiny

"“Many colleagues within the CBC are also critical” says Chen Nan-Kuang, who was its deputy governor from 2018 to 2023. “But the CBC has many means of intimidation.”

7/ Image
That maps to my experience; I was on the receiving end of several strongly worded letters from the then Deputy Governor back in 2018 and 2019 --

8/
Luckily, STW and I had a strong rebuttal to the CBC -- namely we were right, they were in fact hiding their forward book (and some dollars on deposit in the local banks) at the time

9/

cfr.org/sites/default/…
Recommend the Economist story on the downsides of maintaining a structurally undervalued currency over time -- and the policy dilemmas it now creates

10/

economist.com/briefing/2025/…
And I note that the CBC hasn't stopped intervening in the fx market -- their defense of 29 in some way set the stage for the dollar's broader recovery, as it showed that Asian central banks could still fight appreciation w/o any real pushback from Trump&co

11/ Image
And the insurance against appreciation that the CBC provides seems to have induced the already in over their heads lifers to add to their enormous fx overweight (and open position) in the third quarter ...

12/ Image
above all, this is a story about how a country's politics can coalesce around a policy, namely a massive currency undervaluation, with very substantial, but largely hidden costs --

economist.com/briefing/2025/…Image

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Brad Setser

Brad Setser Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @Brad_Setser

Nov 13
Data on domestic sales is clearly off -- Image
And China's net auto exports far exceed the 1.3 m cars Germany exported on net in 24 ... Image
Michael Dunne and others put China's production capacity at ~ 50m cars. EV production capacity by the end of the year should approach 25m cars, so the right answer depends on how much ICE capacity has been retired. Huge v the 25m internal market and 30+ m in current output
Read 4 tweets
Nov 12
The old exportweltmeister has been dethroned -- and its economy is suffering at the hand of the new exportweltmeister (China).

That is the story told by both a new ECB paper and the FT in an excellent new piece

1/ Image
Put simply, Germany is the most exposed large G-7 economy to the second China shock (Japan has been buffered by an incredibly weak yen).

2/ Image
The impact of the second China shock is in all the relevant data sets -- & it reflects a clear Chinese policy choice: “As a country, the Chinese have been in the last years much better, more proactive, more consistent in going after the big technologies and conquering them”

3/
Read 19 tweets
Nov 9
Germany needs to fully wake up (it is happening but too slowly)

China's auto export growth did not slow in October.

825K vehicle exports (an annualized pace of close to 10m), likely over 700K passenger car exports (8.5m annualized). Crazy numbers

1/ Image
Overall export growth slowed in October, but auto exports were surprisingly strong (2024 forecasts that China's export book was set to fizzle out haven't been born out, export growth actually reaccelerated)

The vehicle surplus now exceeds $100b

2/ Image
The acceleration in exports is clearest in volume terms, but it shows in dollar terms as well -- and imports are being pushed out of the Chinese market (auto imports are now less than 2% of Chinese domestic sales ... )

3/ Image
Read 6 tweets
Nov 7
The first relatively weak Chinese trade data release in a while -- October is usually down v September, but y/y growth in exports and imports also stalled. If October is a leading indicator for q4, the goods surplus will stabilize at (gulp) around $1.2 trillion

1/ Image
There is a standard seasonal fall in export in October tied to the mid-autumn festival -- and that dip may be a bit pronounced this October. But y/y volume growth looks close to flat (after a surprisingly strong 11-12% increase in Sept)

2/ Image
Averaging the monthly data (October is an estimate) would suggest export volumes are growing ~ 5% -- still faster than global trade, but a deceleration from most of 2024 and the first part of 2025

3/ Image
Read 7 tweets
Nov 2
Somehow, the US has ended up with a tariff structure for many goods that doesn't really encourage a shift in production out of China. Quote is from Sean Stein of the US-China Business Council, in a new piece from @AnaSwanson Image
To be sure, the legacy 25% 301 tariff on lists 1-3 does discourage final assembly of those goods in China -- but the term 2 tariffs haven't added to that penalty ...

2/

nytimes.com/2025/11/02/bus…
The bulk of current US imports from China have a 301 tariff of either 7.5% (many household/ consumer goods) or zero (electronics) and now face a 20% tariff (10 reciprocal, 10 fentanyl) -- which isn't much different from the 19 or 20% tariff on SE Asia.

3/
Read 10 tweets
Nov 1
Jason Douglass and Jonathan Cheng in the WSJ -- the Trade War Didn't Change China.

In fact, China's economy is more unbalanced and more reliant on exports for the demand than it was when section 301 case first started

1/ Image
Open trade failed, spectacularly, to liberalize China's political system.

More restricted trade if anything led China to double down on its manufacturing intensive, channel capital to industry model

2/ Image
I think it is fair to say that China has weaponized the chokepoints generated by its control over the supply of critical inputs (rare earths, magnets, legacy chips, processing of chips) quite effectively --

3/

wsj.com/world/china/th…
Read 9 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(