The operational situation for the ukrainian 🇺🇦 army is getting increasingy more difficult
After losing most of Pokrovsk, Ukraine is facing an accelerated advance towards Zaporizhzhia in the south.
Russia 🇷🇺 is pushing everywhere at a faster pace.
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Weeks from today, I was posting this showing that Russia was pushing to Zaporizhia and that the city may be threathened next year.
I wasn't wrong, Russia not only continued to push but made it faster, threatening Hulialpole, one of the main stronghold.
After crossing the Uspenivka-Poltavka line in only few days, the russian army is getting in sight of the Pokrovsk'e-Ternuvate-Hulialpole line.
They already reached the main road and may go around Hulialpole, an old stronghold of the southern front.
The situation on the Vovocha river is not better. If for 3 months at least, Ukraine have held, a mechanized assault using the fog to hide managed to enter half of Novopavlivka.
At the same time, the fall of Orestopil and the pression into Ivanivka raise fears of a crossing.
Ukraine still has an advantage, it holds the high ground and most of the rivers shore are being used as defensive line.
However, if there is still lot of water currently, it may soon change with the winter. The next weeks will be crucial.
In Pokrovsk, I believe that around 80 or 90% of the city is under russian control. This map shows geolocalisation before november in white, between november 1 and 8 in green and since then in orange. Russia forces are sighted in all of the city.
The situation in Myrnohrad remains very difficult for the last Ukrainian defenders, who are waging more of a guerrilla war than a pitched battle.
With half of Rodynske now under Russian control, the withdrawal from Myrnohrad is probably slowly underway.
The situation around Shakhove remains favorable to Ukraine, which has been able to halt all Russian assaults and, prevent any attempt to outflank the Donbas strongholds from the west.
The Ukrainian army is also continuing to reinforce its fortifications upstream.
The situation in the heart of the Donbas is not necessarily good; the Russian army is using the bad weather and fog to infiltrate Kostiantynivka and advance towards Siversk.
In Lyman, only a few kilometers remain before reaching the Siverki Donets River.
In Kupyansk, the first signs of a slow Ukrainian withdrawal are appearing, with Russian advances in the pocket east of the city. Fighting continues in the heart of the city; it is not yet possible to speak of total Russian control over any particular district.
Finally, the situation at Vovchansk has deteriorated, with the Russian army reaching the southern outskirts of the destroyed city.
In the long term, there is a risk of a wider advance southward, especially since the fortifications are very far from the current front line.
While the situation is more or less under control everywhere, with the Ukrainian army slowly retreating, the situation on the southern front is far more worrying.
New defensive lines are being hastily erected in the west.
I believe they want to protect Pavlohrad and Dnipro as well as central Ukraine with those 3 lines (there is now way they will finish the first one imo).
The main problem is that they are not connected south, which means, the area south is intended to be slowly abandonned.
In summary, the situation around Houlialpole is becoming increasingly difficult. The lack of reserves and the dilapidated state of the units present raise fears of an even faster advance.
Ultimately, Zaporizhzhia and its 800,000 inhabitants, 70 km to the west, are threatened.
Thanks for following along. Feel free to ask me questions and follow my account if you haven't already.
I've noticed a drastic drop in engagement and views; it's harder to post under these circumstances... Do you still see my posts ?
If you want further details of the overall situation, I recommend reading this :
The Dnipro campaign, from Kalanchak to Vosenssensk, 2022-2025 🇺🇦/🇷🇺
With this series of 42 historical maps, let's revisit one of the most unique military campaigns of the war in Ukraine 🇺🇦.
PART 1 : Analysis of Ukraine's southern front, february-march 2022
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Feburary 23rd, 2022. More than 20 000 russian 🇷🇺 soldiers amass themselves on the border, facing around 500 ukrainian 🇺🇦 defenders.
Russian 58th, 49th and 22nd army are facing ~1 300 soldiers from the 58th motorized brigade (including 1 000 of whom are at the training ground of Oleshky sands).
This unit is the only one facing the russian invasion south of the Dnipro river. The closest reinforcements are in Mykolaiv (35th Marines), in Zaporizhia, Odessa or Mariupol (they are quite busy). A day before the invasion, 300 soldiers from the 58th motorized are repositioned to Henichesk and Chaplinka, to support the 137th Marine bataillon and border guards (200 soldiers in total).
Why so few men ? Because Ukraine thought Russia would attack in the Donbass, usually, 3 brigades should have been positionned in front of Crimea (the 93rd mechanized brigade was redeployed a week before to Kharkiv, and managed to save the city), only one was there and was not occupying border positions.
On the morning of the 24th, Russia launched massive air and missile strikes on ukrainian positions, radars, airport and air-defense.
The 58th motorized brigade moved from Oleshky sands to meet the russians while the 137th and border guards started fleeing to the bridges.
Russia strikes on to directions, with the 58th army attacking Henichesk and the 49th Kalanchak. Both armies were supported by numerous helicopters and planes.
La question moldave est revenue dans l'actualité, comme très régulièrement depuis 4 ans, avec cette fois une déclaration choc de la président Maia Sandu, qui "voterait pour la réunification avec la Roumanie s'il y avait un référendum".
Si près de 85% de la population du pays se dit moldave ou roumaine (très similaires, histoire commune, les moldaves sont plus nombreux en roumanie), il y a environ 15% de minorités (ukrainiens, russes, gagaouzes, bulgares, allemands, roms...) et la réunification fait 50/50.
Turkiye 🇹🇷, Chad 🇹🇩, UAE 🇦🇪, Kenya 🇰🇪, Saudi Arabia 🇸🇦... who supports who in the Sudan war ?
The Sudan 🇸🇩 war opposing SAF and RSF is no longer a local war for power but rather a regional confrontation between multiple countries.
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Disclaimer : mapping which country supports the RSF and FSR does not mean everything is correct. Russia and Ukraine are not allied, Ethiopia is closed to Turkiye and Saudi Arabia and multiple countries are barely involved or neutral so I kept them in white.
The borders you can see is not the recognized border map but the actual control lines. In black stands djihadist groups, in green SAF allies and in red RSF allies.
Feel free to give me informations on the countries that I mapped as "neutral".
Countries supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces :
The SAF was during a long time without serious allies, but the situation recently changed after they liberated the capital Kharoum.
Here, we'll see the main SAF allies and foreign proxies :
They lost in Yemen during these last days, but it was previously a victory for the UAE :
-created a pseudo separatist state of South-Arabia
-took control of Aden city in 2018
-invaded and occupied the strategic and touristic Socotra island
-annexed other islands
Let's get back to the history of the UAE foreign policy :
After gaining independence in 1971, the UAE pursued a foreign policy that was:
▪️Discreet and defensive
▪️Closely aligned with Saudi Arabia and the United States
▪️Focused on the survival of the young federal state
C'est passé inaperçu mais l'Arabie Saoudite 🇸🇦 vient de mettre un coup à la stratégie séparatiste des EAU 🇦🇪 au Yémen 🇾🇪
En quelques jours, le gouvernement pro-saoudien a refoulé les séparatistes qui avaient atteint la frontière saoudienne en décembre.
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Les tensions entre l'Arabie Saoudite et les Emirats ne font que s'intensifier ces dernières années.
MBS et MBZ, jadis proche alliés, notamment lors du blocus du Qatar ou de l'intervention anti-houthiste au Yémen, sont désormais en pleine confrontation.
L'Arabie Saoudite désapprouve en plus haut point la stratégie séparatiste menée par les Emirats en Libye (soutien d'Haftar), au Soudan (soutien des FSR), en Somalie (soutien du Somaliland) et au Yémen (soutien du STC).
Les nouvelles lignes de défenses ukrainiennes 🇺🇦 sur une carte simplifiée :
Elles sont au cœur de la nouvelle stratégie défensive 🛡️ukrainienne, robustes, nombreuses et préparées devant les villes, elles devraient entrer en action cette année sur le front 🪖
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Je ne vous les présente plus, évidemment, les idiots utiles en commentaires vont continuer de les décrier alors même qu'on a déjà vu leurs résultats, ces lignes sont des lignes d'OBSTACLES, pas des lignes pour y mettre l'infanterie...
Par exemple à l'ouest de Pokrovsk, on compte 3 lignes de type New Donbass Line (NDL), en jaune, ainsi que d'autres lignes anciennes ou récentes en blanc (pas NDL).