Thread by @MartinKragh1

I have a somewhat different take on Russia’s approach to ‘peace negotiations’. The Kremlin uses them as a tool to derail the threat of sanctions, or otherwise hinder a development considered contrary to Russian interests. 🧵

https://twitter.com/sceeus_ui/status/1993642398820577392

My report details 3 cases.

1. In August, Trump threatened ‘severe consequences’ for Russia if the Kremlin refuses negotiations. However, Putin responded by suggesting a summit in Alaska. Afterwards, Trump failed to follow through on his threat of sanctions.

2. In October, it was reported that U.S. considered deliveries of Tomahawk cruise-missiles to Ukraine. Putin suggested a meeting in Budapest. Although the meeting never took place, the plan to deliver Tomahawks was also scuttered.

3. In the context of the 28-point plan, it should be noted that the full enforcement of the U.S. Treasury Department’s sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil took place on 21 November – the same day that the plan was leaked to the media.

There are also other issues. The 28-point plan set the parameters for further negotiations. It envisages Russian encroachment on Ukrainian sovereignty, and places limitations on NATO, G7 and Ukrainian allies in Europe. The 19-point plan has only modified these contentious issues.

The 19-point plan, to clarify, was the one put together by Ukraine, E3, and the US. In a peculiar turn, the US has managed to sponsor two widely opposed documents. It puts them in a position where their credibility to lead negotiations has been weakened.

The 28-point plan’s provision that ‘Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees’ (point 5) is also contradictory, as it is followed by a prohibition of any stationing of allied forces on Ukrainian territory (point 8) – in effect making the guarantees empty promises.

Lastly, several provisions in the 28-point plan contradict core principles of international law – including core tenets of the U.N. Charter, the OSCE Helsinki Act (1975) and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990).

Putin insists that his war aims have not changed. He believes that Russia is winning, and thinks he has the upper hand in a war of attrition. From now on, the 28-point plan will be on his agenda - thanks to team Witkoff et al.