1) oil on water (includes floating storage) and oil in transit well surpassed Covid levels.
Part of it reflects inefficiency of the sanctioned Russian & Iranian oil trade as well as the recent US sanctions on Rosneft & Lukoil.
Part of it is an outright bearish oil market = too many barrels chasing too few buyers -> needs lower prices.
2/n: Oil in transit
2) Weak Chinese petroleum product consumption:
China is in recession due to its property bust and despite the CCPs desire to steer clear of it by forcing every other industry to build what isn’t required domestically (overcapacity issue) and then dump goods onto global trade.
Because of the latter most observers still don’t get the painful economic status China is in. But China is in it.
Also, the CCP prefers coal fuelled transportation as well as LNG truck driving for the purpose of geopolitics.
Both requires less, not more, diesel and gasoline in 2026 vs 2025. Jet and Naphtha are different story but won’t drive oil buying by refineries => Oil demand by 2nd largest economy globally is bearish. Accept.
However, the CCP may take the absurd to the next level in 2026 and force refineries to build even more floating-roof oil tank storage (as part of meeting an artificial Soviet 2.0 plan within its Investment-led Growth Model) in which case refineries may buy more oil next year, but not for the purpose of producing more petroleum products but solely for storages. If they do so, however, their crude oil buying will be EXTREMELY price sensitive.
Time and State companies oil quotas will tell.
PS: If u care to understand China’s property bust structurally, here is a link to my 7 part Stack series. It remains as valid then as now.
3) Meanwhile, OECD petroleum product demand is slowing faster than Non-OECD demand is growing, structurally that is.
Take the world’s largest petroleum demand market, the United States. Despite all the ridiculous gas dazzling car buying, the US consumer is hurting (affordability crisis) and this is here to stay in 2026.
Meanwhile, neither Europe, South Korea or Japan are growing product demand. If anything, they too are in a technical recession, certainly in Britain, France and Germany.
4/n
Graph: US 4-week average petroleum demand
…and no, Indian Petroleum demand isn’t bailing out EM demand growth either this time (graph below; stagnation) and despite cheap crude prices around or below $60 per barrels.
One may argue crude at $50 will stimulate additional consumption but I have a hard time to see the incremental value for Indian consumers here.
I think oil is cheap enough already when compared to 2022 prices above $100/barrel. It’s the economy that must trigger it.
5/n
4) Trump may use this to fill up SPRs.
Low oil prices offer an opportunity for the US to replenish its store of emergency crude, which was only 60% full as of mid-Nov.
Reserves remain diminished after the Biden administration released supply into the market to try to tame the gasoline price spike that followed Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Trump vowed during his inaugural address to fill the SPR “right to the top.” Taking advantage of low oil prices, the Energy Department awarded contracts worth almost $56 million in Nov to procure 900k barrels for this stockpile.
However, as part of Trump’s sweeping tax-and-spending law passed over the summer, Congress only appropriated $171 million for oil purchases for the SPR between 2025 and 2029, a limit the government could hit very quickly.
That sum equates to less than 3 million barrels at current prices, which is a far cry from the roughly 300 million barrels needed to bring the SPR to full capacity.
I think US SPR noise is a distraction in 2026, not a key demand source.
6/n
5) Supply Side Surpluses
Meanwhile, the oil market is swimming in supply. One reason is the market share game by core OPEC that I forecast in 2024 and which every self-declared oil expert on X denied while living in their own little OPEC love bubble.
But of course, I was proven right once more as math, not emotions, run oil ministries.
Let’s take Saudi Arabia, my favourite EM basket case: the “Kingdom” (ridiculous, I know), the world’s 2nd-largest oil producer after the US, is seeking to diversify its economy through the Vision 2030 program.
However, the massive investments being made in mega construction projects, such as the flagship Neom development nonsense, as well as other initiatives to build Red Sea tourism resorts, electric-vehicle factories and data centers, have left it MORE dependent on oil revenue.
While MBS is forced to rejigging its mega-project spending mania, i.e. delaying and scaling back some developments and accelerating others, such as pleasing Trump. it’s still expecting a national budget shortfall for the next few years.
Bloomberg Economics estimated in November that the Saudi government needs an oil price of $98 a barrel (!) to balance its budget and $115 when including domestic spending by its sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund.
That’s well above this year’s average of $69 a barrel for Brent through the start of December.
So what will they do next, when oil price doesn’t cooperate? I let u figure it out yourself this time. Not hard.
Meanwhile, the Saudi Aramco is reported to reduce the price of its Arab Light grade for Asian customers to a 60-cent premium to the regional benchmark for January, according to a price list seen by Bloomberg.
It’s the lowest since January 2021 and a drop that was largely in-line with a survey of refiners and traders. Yes, that is bearish, not bullish 🤣…
7b/n
6) Core OPEC isn’t alone pushing export volumes.
Most of “Americas” is pushing output too as yet another textbook boom-bust commodity capex-cycle is unfolding in real time post the 2020 bust.
Take Brazil’s deepwater reserves, the unlocking of which is taking the country into the big leagues of global oil exporters in the coming years and without OPEC membership.
Offshore projects such as Buzios field, the world’s largest offshore field, won’t stop bc of oil volatility. These are long-cycle projects, unlike US shale output, which is short-cycle.
8/n: Brazil Oil Production in Barrels per month = 4.1mbpd in Oct
7) Canadian sands, some of the world’s largest oil reserves, are also steadily contributing to higher Canadian oil output, now at 5.4mbpd…!
Canada is a sleeping oil giant and its capable operators figured out how to produce oil at low breakevens over the years.
PS: if u see this as UAE oil minister, what do you do? Yes, you panic and order a reserve audit among OPEC members to get a higher quota as you know everyone’s oil reserves (which determine output quotas) such as Kuwait are overstated, as typical for ME low trust societies.
My point? UAE had it with cheaters. They too want to produce more oil or leave OPEC sooner rather than later.
9/n
8) Other nations that are set to produce more oil regardless of oil price volatility is Guayana, Argentina, Kazakhstan, potentially also Venezuela down the road. The latter possesses the largest oil reserves globally.
10/n
9) Russia, one of the top-three oil producers and exporters globally, is also worth understanding.
Western sanctions have made Russia’s 5mbpd oil exports heavily dependent on China and India, who demand big discounts to keep importing this seaborne crude. Note: Russia also exports 2-2.5mbpd products.
In the absence of a peace deal to end the war in Ukraine, recent US sanctions and an oversupplied global market will force Russian producers to cut their prices further.
As the US ban on dealings with Rosneft and Lukoil started to come into force in November, Russia’s flagship Urals blend was more than $20-25 a barrel cheaper than Brent.
While that gap is significantly smaller than in the earlier years of the war in Ukraine, it’s still markedly wider than the historical discount of $2 to $4.
Meanwhile, Russia is in a form of oil trap already. If Trump lifts sanction on Rosneft & Lukoil to suck up virtual Kremlin business, global balances are even more loose and prices go lower.
If not, the global crude surplus prevents higher benchmarks despite some Ural losses but keeps diesel markets tighter than without Sechin sanctions.
The way the Kremlin will address this is by charging excessive taxes on the sector nevertheless. All Russian producers are firmly Kremlin controlled and Patrushev wants to keep his war going one way or another.
But what that also means is that, at some point in the not too distant future, producers didn’t invest enough today to keep output stable tomorrow. With water cuts already at 90% in West Siberia, the Kremlin, too, will pay its invoices. Just be patient.
11/n
12) What does this now all mean for the crude surplus in 2026? I have no idea whatsoever.
What I do know is that the 4mbpd surplus as forecast by the IEA is typical agency rubbish.
Were we in such a surplus in a single month in 2026, Brent would crash below $30 and without hesitation. It would become a total massacre which isn’t in anyone’s interest.
But the warning of the big oil trading houses from Switzerland are big enough to assume 2026 is a bigger bear than 2025.
Expect lower prices and a dynamic market in a difficult setup as their are no magic adjustment cards such as a massive Chinese stimulus program to bail out weak fundamentals everywhere and also not for 2027 and until US Shale and Russian crude oil outputs finally rolls over in earnest.
This remains a structural bear we I sit.
12/n Thx/End
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Let me add a few more facts & figures and some high level observations about the United States goods trade deficits with Switzerland of some $20bn annually.
The Swiss government and certain companies have little reason to lament—these tariffs were foreseeable.
Yes, the real issue is their scale: 39% compared to Europe’s 15%, which clearly puts some Swiss exports at a competitive disadvantage. It is what it is.
And while I still believe this situation is fixable, we must be prepared for the worst-case scenario to persist—or even worsen, with potential new tariffs on pharmaceuticals (currently exempted).
So, who is at fault? As some of us learned in officer school during military service: the Bundesrat misjudged the fundamentals of strategic assessment—Lagebeurteilung (judgement of enemy situation). That needs to be addressed. Trump wants balanced trade. Address it. Period.
History is not kind to those who choose dreams over reality—or to the weak who paint themselves as victims.
Therefore, whether Trump’s trade deficit logic makes any sense whatsoever (which it clearly doesn't in the Swiss case) is beside the point.
He’s the president. He has communicated his views clearly and consistently for decades. Adapt. Take the man seriously.
Trustworthy or not, as lamented by President Keller Sutter is none of our business.
2/n @SecScottBessent @BobgonzaleBob
Let’s now take a closer look at Switzerland’s goods trade surplus with the United States.
At Burggraben, we rely on the OEC tool (a paywalled MIT spin-off) for robust global trade data as part of our investment analysis process of all sorts—so we can assess this with confidence. I hope our readers will appreciate the data quality shared herewith for free.
While the annual trade surplus has fluctuated in recent years, the underlying—or let’s call it intrinsic—gap consistently hovers around $20 billion, as the data below will show.
More concretely, Iran likely enriched some 250kg of HEU stockpiles since 2021. Worse, it also said to adds significant new capacities.
That material so far could quickly be turned into the fuel for the equivalent of 10 bombs, should Iran’s leadership take the political decision to pursue weapons, according to Bloomberg.
Here is my theory how the major incident - a so called blackout - occurred at 12:30 CET today in the power system of Spain & Portugal:
1/n
At the time of the incident, Spain and Portugal operated the grid at very high renewables share of about 66% - i.e solar (55%) and wind (11%; eolica)
2/n
While this isn’t unusual for Spain, it does mean that the grid operates with little inertia (resistance to change) during such time. The grid is therefore vulnerable to external effects…!
On this platform, certain perma bulls keep pushing a bullish crude narrative based on relative U.S. inventories—day after day, for three years now.
Their logic: Total U.S. crude inventories (including the SPR) are at 838 million barrels (orange line), 200 million barrels below the 10-year average → bullish!
Yet, inventories keep falling, and prices remain stuck in a range. Clearly, they are wrong.
1/9 @UrbanKaoboy @Iris62655179 @BrentRuditLeo
The problem with their logic?
a) The U.S. is no longer the marginal importer of crude oil—Asia is (or was).
b) U.S. inventories are artificially high on a 10-year average due to the shale boom, which took off in 2014. Shale growth and Covid distort the data, keeping inventories (ex SPR) elevated. So any 5- or 10-year comparison is meaningless—period.
2/n US Crude Oil Inventory ex SPR
Including SPRs, the picture looks more normalised - but not tight. But does the US really need 700mb of strategic reserves in 2025? I don't think so.
Yesterday, I shared a few thoughts that I’d like to expand on, especially given how volatile the current tariff landscape under this admin has become.
Navigating it isn’t just difficult—it’s nearly impossible to avoid missteps. Hopefully some traders will expand on my thoughts...
1/n
What do we know?
As at 23 March 2025, Comex copper price in New York is trading at 14% premium to LME in London. Buying a tonne of copper in NY costs $11,213 versus 9,842 in London, $1,371 per tonne more than in London.
2/n
Why is that? Because of tariff FEARS, not tariffs.
Traders are hedging future risk of potential tariffs on all forms of the raw material, such as cathodes, concentrates, ores, and even scrap. But there aren't such tariffs in place for copper yet (unlike alumnium).
The current Comex price action in the U.S. is basically a Trump tariff trade mirage and is otherwise as misleading of fundaments as the May 2024 price action of which I warned on multiple occasions.
1/n $/pound
In May 2024 however, U.S. price action was more in synch with London. But it didn't reflect weak Chinese housing & construction fundamentals which has been 15-30% of GLOBAL copper use for the past two decades. Today, U.S. prices trade as if borders close tomorrow.
2/n Comex - LME arb in $/t
Unlike May 2024, copper blue chips like $FCX, however, do not buy the rally. So at least it seems that the equity market understands the tariff aspect of the copper price mirage.