Cooking in San Diego: A turquoise, 23-story test of the Permit Streamlining Act's new-and-improved "deemed approved" proviso.
This could turn into a big constitutional battle.
🧵/22
Enacted in 1977, the PSA put time limits on CEQA and other agency reviews of development proposals.
If an agency violated the time limits, the project was to be "deemed approved" by operation of law. Wow!
It proved wholly ineffectual.
/2
As @TDuncheon & I explained, courts first decided that the Leg couldn't possibly have meant for a project to be approved before enviro review was complete.
The Leg mustered a partial fix for the due-process issue, declaring that projects couldn't be "deemed approved" without "public notice required by law."
The Leg also established a self-help procedure for applicant to notify public of the possibility of a "deemed approval."
/5
Courts then split on whether advance notice to the public of a potential deemed approval satisfies due process under Horn v. County of Ventura (1979), a CA Supreme Court decision from heyday of degrowth era.
Mahon: yes
American Tower: no
/6
This split was of more theoretical than practical interest, because the CEQA carveout meant cities could delay projects indefinitely w/o worrying about deemed approvals.
Some (probably most) cities adopted convention of approving project & CEQA docs at same time.
/7
You might suppose that the PSA would at least have worked for ministerial projects -- which are not subject to CEQA, and for which the neighbors aren't entitled to a hearing under Horn.
But the Leg carved ministerial projects out of the PSA.
/8
Today, we're in a new world, thanks to major statutory reforms enacted in 2023 and 2025.
In 2023, the Leg passed AB 1633, which provides a remedy for CEQA delay on infill housing projects.
Here's my contemporaneous thread on AB 1633 & the PSA,
In 2025, the Leg passed AB 130, the blockbuster @BuffyWicks & @CAgovernor trailer bill, which carved most infill housing out of CEQA entirely.
AB 130 made important tweaks to the PSA, too.
/10
First, it removed the PSA's exclusion for ministerial housing permits. Now they too will be "deemed approved" if city misses the deadline.
This is a big deal for cities that are subject to the ministerial-permitting penalty box of SB 35/423.
Looking at you, San Francisco.
/11
Second, AB 130 ditched the Leg's earlier due-process "fix," removing the stipulation that a project becomes deemed-approved only after any "public notice required by law."
(Self-help notice was repealed too.)
/12
In effect, the Leg said to the courts, "Decide whether Horn is still good law today."
My student @mimiminassians wrote a terrific paper arguing that Horn should be distinguished or overruled. Mandatory reading for CA land-use lawyers!
Yet even assuming that the courts distinguish (as I expect) or overrule Horn, further leg tinkering will probably be needed before the PSA works as more than a negotiating tactic.
Two big problems remain.
/14
First, the PSA does not apply to "administrative appeals."
Many cities authorize de novo review of housing entitlements by city council or a board of permit appeals. This almost surely counts as an administrative appeal.
/15
There's a plausible (not decisive) argument that a deemed-approved permit may be rejected or modified on internal appeal on same basis as a regularly issued permit...and that city council may take as long as it wants to hear the internal appeal.
/16
If the PSA merely advances a project from a city's less-political decision-making body (planning department or commission) to the more-political one (city council), it won't accomplish very much.
/17
Second, deemed-approved permits are subject to judicial review. A court is supposed to vacate the permit if the project wasn't approvable (i.e., violates an applicable objective standard).
E.g., when does the statute of limitations for filing a lawsuit start to run?
In Ciani, the court said the normal SOL applies but is tolled until project opponent has notice of the deemed approval.
Yet the deemed approval is something that happens by operation of law...
/19
... it's not memorialized anywhere, and, as in this San Diego example, there may well be disputes between the city and the developer about whether it even occurred.
/20
.timesofsandiego.com/politics/2025/…
Second, what is the record on judicial review? By hypothesis, there was no public hearing or notice before the project was "deemed approved."
Does that mean neighbors may introduce new evidence in court? Is court to hold a trial de novo on whether project was approvable?
/21
These problems are fixable if the Leg wants to make the PSA work. Will the new San Diego case prod the Leg to address them?
- San Francisco almost certainly must approve this 25-story project on a site zoned for 4 stories
- The city's new ordinance deregulating density in "well-resourced areas" will operate as de-facto downzoning of such sites
🧵
This project's site is zoned for retail use and is currently occupied by the Marina Safeway.
The zoning classification also allows residential use at density of 1 unit per 600 sqft of lot area or density of nearest residential district, whichever is greater.
/2
The nearest residential district, RM-4, allows density of 1 unit per 200 sqft of lot area.
That translates into 567 units on site.
Developer proposes to build 790 units, which requires a 39% density bonus (790/567 = 1.39).
By describing the credible commitment problem (the need to reassure developers of new housing or energy that their project won't face price controls for a very long time) I didn't mean to imply, as some critics on the right insist, that the problem is insurmountable.
/2
I think the problem can be greatly mitigated:
1. By offering DC-style "certificates of assurance" to developers, i.e., recordable contracts for compensation if the project is subjected to price controls within a defined period of time.
/3
I have great respect for @nealemahoney & @BharatRamamurti, but I just about pulled my hair out reading their op-ed this morning.
Price controls aren't going to be "a way out" unless their advocates can credibly commit not to apply them to today's projects tomorrow.
🧵/12
The authors briefly acknowledge this concern at the end of their piece but offer nothing beyond a brief nod to sunset clauses and income targeting.
/2
They fail to acknowledge that the NYC controls that Mamdani campaigned on strengthening (w/o income targeting...) have been in place for 50+ years; that popularity of rent controls surely depends on them *not* being income targeted;
/3
In "The Symbolic Politics of Housing," @dbroockman @j_kalla & I showed that public opinion about housing policies correlates w/ affect towards the groups that the policies make salient (via framing or criteria in the policy itself).
🧵/19
Readers asked, "But is the relationship causal?"
We set out to answer their question, focusing on a much-maligned group that ordinary people blame for high housing prices & rents: Real-estate developers.
/2
Working with a filmmaker and a real-life developer, we created short-form videos that sought to humanize the developer -- without conveying information about what her projects look like or how housing development affects prices or local amenities.
/3
I stumbled across the work of Arthur E. Stamps III this morning and, wow, my eyes have been opened!
He's was (is?) an architect in San Francisco who wrote scores of academic papers on the mass public's aesthetic preferences & the failure of "design review" to serve them.
🧵/18
His studies show that San Francisco's Great Downzoning (1970s & early 1980s) was an answer to the public's genuine aesthetic dislike of residential dingbats and downtown "refrigerator towers."
/2
The city planning department had tried to address the public's dislike of midcentury "plain box" style by mandating bay windows. That yielded "Richmond Specials" -- a slight improvement, but still substantially disfavored by public relative to random sample of existing bldgs.
If builder's remedy comes to San Francisco, the city's anti-demolition / displacement rules go out the window.
For progressive supes & tenant orgs who believe what they say about those rules, enacting a compliant rezoning & constraint removal plan should be Priority #1.
🧵/9
Explanation:
- s/t narrow exceptions, a city may not impose any local requirements on a builder's remedy project that EITHER (1) render project infeasible, OR (2) prevent a project that meets certain requirements from being constructed "as proposed by the applicant"
/2
- any local rule or procedure that prevents the demolition of the existing structure on a lot almost surely will "render the project infeasible"
- the exceptions, enumerated in GC 65589.5(d)(1)-(4), do not include tenant or old-building protections