Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Key Summary 2025
In December 2024 we said two things that upset people:
- There's plenty of war left
- We hope Russia advances 4000 square kilometers (Hold your outrage)
We'll be covering in this thread 🧵on what that meant in 2025, and beyond
In December 2024 we said two things that upset people:
- There's plenty of war left
- We hope Russia advances 4000 square kilometers (Hold your outrage)
We'll be covering in this thread 🧵on what that meant in 2025, and beyond
2/ In 2025, the war was firmly settled into attritional drone warfare, where Russia decided that they'd save their few remaining vehicles and attempt to advance with manpower, taking and accepting the resultant trade off in personnel casualties.
Warspotting shows equipment losses are about 60% of 2024 (when you factor in lag time and an additional 500 or so to come). Tanks are at 519 this year vs 1139 last, and AFVs are at 1316 this year vs 3073 last. It's not difficult to see why the personnel casualties have rocketed
Warspotting shows equipment losses are about 60% of 2024 (when you factor in lag time and an additional 500 or so to come). Tanks are at 519 this year vs 1139 last, and AFVs are at 1316 this year vs 3073 last. It's not difficult to see why the personnel casualties have rocketed
3/ Russian infantry losses mounted dramatically reaching approx ~100,000 KIA this year & so many hundreds of thousands wounded, and neither side can manoeuvre freely without catastrophic exposure. Where vehicles are used, they are often met with destruction before they even reach the front.
Last December in 2024 our internal lowest estimate was ~184k KIA total for the war, so you can see what a large increase this year has had.
Some estimates put KIA for the war as high as 400k, others around 300k. Mediazona's confirmed and verified KIA is over 156,000, and they physically can't keep up and they know they are very very behind.
Do you now see why we said we wanted Russia to advance 4000 sq kilometers or less than 1% of Ukraine?
Last December in 2024 our internal lowest estimate was ~184k KIA total for the war, so you can see what a large increase this year has had.
Some estimates put KIA for the war as high as 400k, others around 300k. Mediazona's confirmed and verified KIA is over 156,000, and they physically can't keep up and they know they are very very behind.
Do you now see why we said we wanted Russia to advance 4000 sq kilometers or less than 1% of Ukraine?
4/ Russia made incremental territorial gains in parts of Ukraine through sustained pressure and manpower expenditure, but failed to achieve any operational breakthrough or collapse of Ukrainian lines, nor any of their goals inside Ukraine.
These advances were costly and slow, reinforcing that Russia could still advance but only at extreme human and material cost.
These advances were costly and slow, reinforcing that Russia could still advance but only at extreme human and material cost.
5/ Ukrainian forces managed to make Russia pay for the roughly ~4300 sq km taken this year inside Ukraine very dearly, and can do this on paper for a years more now that decent €90 billion European funding loan has been agreed in mid December. More on this later.
6/ Northern and Northeastern Fronts
Ukrainian forces held Sudzha in Kursk, and surrounding areas early in the year with very little plan beyond "hold ground" against vastly greater numbers of North Korean and Russian troops, whilst their logistics were increasingly interdicted by Russian fibre-optic drones. By the middle of March, Ukraine had been defeated and withdrawn from Kursk into Sumy, losing substantial amounts of equipment in the process. Russian attempts to push toward Sumy - largely on foot - were contained near the border, where the line largely remains today with no real effort to clear the border area.
Ukrainian forces held Sudzha in Kursk, and surrounding areas early in the year with very little plan beyond "hold ground" against vastly greater numbers of North Korean and Russian troops, whilst their logistics were increasingly interdicted by Russian fibre-optic drones. By the middle of March, Ukraine had been defeated and withdrawn from Kursk into Sumy, losing substantial amounts of equipment in the process. Russian attempts to push toward Sumy - largely on foot - were contained near the border, where the line largely remains today with no real effort to clear the border area.
7/ At Kupyansk, Ukraine suffered a serious setback at first. Despite clear OSINT warnings, Ukrainian command assurances masked a growing problem as Russian infantry crossed the Oskil river into villages north of the city and eventually into Kupyansk itself. Only in late autumn were these warnings realised and acted upon. Ukraine then demonstrated notable operational discipline, retaking multiple villages and re-entering the city without the usual fanfare.
In an interesting episode, Gerasimov claimed Kupyansk had fallen to Putin himself, only for geolocation data to show the opposite - Ukraine was on the verge of regaining full control with remarkably low casualties for a city of its size, and Zelenskyy popped over for a selfie at the Kupyansk stele outside the city. It took until late December for Russia to finally acknowledge that they'd really fucked it.
In an interesting episode, Gerasimov claimed Kupyansk had fallen to Putin himself, only for geolocation data to show the opposite - Ukraine was on the verge of regaining full control with remarkably low casualties for a city of its size, and Zelenskyy popped over for a selfie at the Kupyansk stele outside the city. It took until late December for Russia to finally acknowledge that they'd really fucked it.
8/ Lyman, Siversk, Kostyantynivka
At Lyman, heavy mechanized attacks continued at Torske and Zarichne, and infiltrations to the north allowed Russian forces to create a salient west of Terny. Ukrainian forces were unable to stop the salient, and eventually were pushed back here. Russian forces reached Lyman, and took Yampil before Ukrainian forces managed to stop them yet again, but simply don't have the manpower to conduct counterattacks.
In the Siversk direction, Ukrainian defences were gradually ground down over the year, resulting in Siversk being lost in early December. A grand total of just 12 kilometers taken in a straight line here over the course of the year.
One other notable event about this was the very well executed Ukrainian withdrawal from the Serebryanka forest area south west of Kreminna / north of Bilohorivka that had held for two years - as soon as it became untenable with Russian advances near Torske, and also near Serebryanka over the river to the south, Ukraine managed a withdrawal in good order.
At Lyman, heavy mechanized attacks continued at Torske and Zarichne, and infiltrations to the north allowed Russian forces to create a salient west of Terny. Ukrainian forces were unable to stop the salient, and eventually were pushed back here. Russian forces reached Lyman, and took Yampil before Ukrainian forces managed to stop them yet again, but simply don't have the manpower to conduct counterattacks.
In the Siversk direction, Ukrainian defences were gradually ground down over the year, resulting in Siversk being lost in early December. A grand total of just 12 kilometers taken in a straight line here over the course of the year.
One other notable event about this was the very well executed Ukrainian withdrawal from the Serebryanka forest area south west of Kreminna / north of Bilohorivka that had held for two years - as soon as it became untenable with Russian advances near Torske, and also near Serebryanka over the river to the south, Ukraine managed a withdrawal in good order.
9/ Heavy fighting continued at Chasiv Yar, and in Toretsk. Over the course of the year, Russian forces finally captured Toretsk and some villages surrounding it but heavy fighting goes on to this day in the Kostyantynivka direction. It is one of the most recorded and geolocated areas in the entire front thanks to one persons efforts (@AudaxonX )! A fascinating map with so many geolocations over 2025 during very heavy and brutal fighting.
10/ Onto the main Russian effort (and where so many of the casualties are at) at Pokrovsk now. Heavy fighting in this area continued through most of the year, with crippling manpower issues styming Ukraine, and Russian rotating in new units time and time again, including the new Marine Divisions and an Air Assault Division.
East of Pokrovsk in the Dobropillya direction, Ukrainian lies regarding which positions they held resulted in a large breach of the defences that Russia poured into in early August, resulting in a large loss of land which took a few months to resolve. Some positions were lost for the foreseeable, until Ukraine managed to cobble together a defence.
Ukraine didn't learn from the lying bit, and subsequently lost numerous positions inside Pokrovsk during August, September and October which has resulted in the settlement being contested (though majority Russian) ever since. At Christmas, Ukraine withdrew from Myrnohrad as positions to the north were increasingly untenable and Russian forces finally moved in.
East of Pokrovsk in the Dobropillya direction, Ukrainian lies regarding which positions they held resulted in a large breach of the defences that Russia poured into in early August, resulting in a large loss of land which took a few months to resolve. Some positions were lost for the foreseeable, until Ukraine managed to cobble together a defence.
Ukraine didn't learn from the lying bit, and subsequently lost numerous positions inside Pokrovsk during August, September and October which has resulted in the settlement being contested (though majority Russian) ever since. At Christmas, Ukraine withdrew from Myrnohrad as positions to the north were increasingly untenable and Russian forces finally moved in.
11/ At the start of the year, Russian forces had reached south of Pokrovsk, but were stopped, and were instead pushing towards west Donetsk, and continued Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka, which was captured in January.
Over the course of the next year, Russian forces pushed Ukraine out of western Donetsk and entered Zaporizhia from the east, and also entered Dnipropetrovsk oblast.
The next few months were a retreat for Ukrainian forces who utterly failed to hold the rivers east of Hulyaipole, and just barely managed to sort out a defence west of Hulyaipole. This was Russians most significant success with very few casualties this year and highlighted a huge weakness in Ukraine.
Over the course of the next year, Russian forces pushed Ukraine out of western Donetsk and entered Zaporizhia from the east, and also entered Dnipropetrovsk oblast.
The next few months were a retreat for Ukrainian forces who utterly failed to hold the rivers east of Hulyaipole, and just barely managed to sort out a defence west of Hulyaipole. This was Russians most significant success with very few casualties this year and highlighted a huge weakness in Ukraine.
12/ Numerous attempts by Russian in western Zaporizhia this year resulted in numerous losses near Mala Tokmachka and Robotyne, but resulted in failure. The only small change here is Kamianske fell to Russian hands, and fighting moved to Stepnohirsk. Once again, Ukrainian forces do not have the manpower to conduct a counteroffensive here currently.
13/ Other key events included:
On June 1st, the SBU conducts Operation Pavutýna or Spiderweb, where prepositioned drones from containers were released near numerous military airfields, to conduct drone strikes on the strategic bomber flight lines. This destroyed at least 4 Tu-22M3 and 7 Tu-95MS, a solid 10% of their strategic bomber fleet. Beleya and Olenya airfields were the most severely affected.
On June 1st, the SBU conducts Operation Pavutýna or Spiderweb, where prepositioned drones from containers were released near numerous military airfields, to conduct drone strikes on the strategic bomber flight lines. This destroyed at least 4 Tu-22M3 and 7 Tu-95MS, a solid 10% of their strategic bomber fleet. Beleya and Olenya airfields were the most severely affected.
14/ At the start of August, Ukraine began their refinery campaign in earnest with new drones and lessons learned from previous strikes, with barely a night going by without a strike on oil or power infrastructure. Later in the year, Ukraine also decided that the Russian strikes on their shipping were enough, and began to strike Russian tankers - not only with USVs in the Black Sea, but also at port in Rostov or near oil terminals - even the Caspian sea, and finally a drone strike in the Mediterranean. A Kilo class sub was even damaged and made unseaworthy inside the Novorossiysk sub bay when a USV detonated close by.
15/ The US rolled out the red carpet for Vladimir Putin in Alaska in August 2025, firmly cementing US presidential (if not government wide) policy against Ukraine. As expecting, it was more yap that accomplished very little, bar showing the world what is likely to happen if Europe doesn't step up.
16/ We also saw a rarity for the occupied territories at the end of August, where resistance members managed to set fire to dry grass near a 35th Combined Arms Army headquarters, which led to the fire spreading and killing 18 officers in the post, one of the most successful resistance activities that is visible to OSINT. Much of the occupied territories and resistance is opaque to us - and that's probably for the best.
17/ Improvements for Russia seen this year include Russia forces have dramatically improved their kill chain for missile strikes, and as keeping up a strong VKS sortie rate, and have also dramatically increased their drone usage. Their production continues mostly unhindered, as production of things such as drones continues to grow despite sanctions.
Manpower management has allowed Russia to maintain their force levels through recruitment via coercion and lucrative contracts, resulting in a normalization of high attrition as the cost of advance.
They've also simply accepted that they can't do complicated manouvers or achieve significant breakthroughs, and thus have become better at enduring and absorbing losses, and grinding forward under drone-saturated conditions.
Manpower management has allowed Russia to maintain their force levels through recruitment via coercion and lucrative contracts, resulting in a normalization of high attrition as the cost of advance.
They've also simply accepted that they can't do complicated manouvers or achieve significant breakthroughs, and thus have become better at enduring and absorbing losses, and grinding forward under drone-saturated conditions.
18/ Improvements for Ukraine seen this year are better built defences, huge focus on drone combat with the introduction of the Unmanned Systems Forces which produce huge casualties, proven on camera.
Huge increase and usage of interceptor drones, large improvements to their air force with Western aircraft finally arriving in decent number, and - this is key - an accurate and very dangerous weapon in the form of better FP-1 and FP-2 drones allowing for strikes deep inside Russia.
EU funding was agreed for two more years, which takes some pressure off and allows longer term planning.
It does seem that some in Ukraine are finally realising this is an existential war though, and acting accordingly.
Huge increase and usage of interceptor drones, large improvements to their air force with Western aircraft finally arriving in decent number, and - this is key - an accurate and very dangerous weapon in the form of better FP-1 and FP-2 drones allowing for strikes deep inside Russia.
EU funding was agreed for two more years, which takes some pressure off and allows longer term planning.
It does seem that some in Ukraine are finally realising this is an existential war though, and acting accordingly.
19/ Russian issues this year that have cropped up continue to be the high casualty rate, and low training quality resulting in said higher losses. Around 100,000 KIA is our estimate for the year alone bringing us to around 300k total KIA for the war, and who knows how many hundreds of thousands of wounded.
Fractures in the military continue, with high levels of 'accidents', corruption and fratricide amongst their own troops.
The economy is in real trouble, and there's no real sign of that getting fixed.
Could be worse though, as European sanctions are too easy to bypass, and are too slow to counteract the changes. There is little appetite to take it further. Just take a look around at the Russian owned properties in your own countries - they are still relatively unhindered and operating as normal. The wealthy look after the wealthy.
Fractures in the military continue, with high levels of 'accidents', corruption and fratricide amongst their own troops.
The economy is in real trouble, and there's no real sign of that getting fixed.
Could be worse though, as European sanctions are too easy to bypass, and are too slow to counteract the changes. There is little appetite to take it further. Just take a look around at the Russian owned properties in your own countries - they are still relatively unhindered and operating as normal. The wealthy look after the wealthy.
20/ Ukrainian issues this year are pretty much the same as last year - a huge manpower deficit, and huge AWOL numbers from training centers. And as we've always said, if Ukrainians aren't willing to fight, then they'll become Russian and they'll like that even less.
Fractures in the military have appeared but not on the same levels as Russia - and anti corruption methods in Ukraine are beginning to work with many high profile cases coming to light. I truly wish we had the same rabid drive for anti corruption as Ukraine currently does, but all this will be squandered if Russia wins, and it'll make the current corruption look like charity when Russia rapes the country dry.
The key thing to focus on is getting those manpower numbers up and ensuring the personnel are trained. Without fixing this (and we truly do not expect them to fix it, after having harped on about it for a long time), the front-line will continue to erode. Russian advances remain incremental and very casualty-intensive, indicating that Ukraine's defenses, while heavily strained, are still functioning at the moment but this is not guaranteed in future.
Fractures in the military have appeared but not on the same levels as Russia - and anti corruption methods in Ukraine are beginning to work with many high profile cases coming to light. I truly wish we had the same rabid drive for anti corruption as Ukraine currently does, but all this will be squandered if Russia wins, and it'll make the current corruption look like charity when Russia rapes the country dry.
The key thing to focus on is getting those manpower numbers up and ensuring the personnel are trained. Without fixing this (and we truly do not expect them to fix it, after having harped on about it for a long time), the front-line will continue to erode. Russian advances remain incremental and very casualty-intensive, indicating that Ukraine's defenses, while heavily strained, are still functioning at the moment but this is not guaranteed in future.
21/ Both sides have shaken up their orders of battles. Russia for example, has upgraded numerous Brigades to Division level, and also upped at least two Naval Infantry Brigades to Division size.
Ukraine on the other hand has focused on it's Corps system, which still isn't working effectively with units often out of place and makes you wonder why they did it at all. Many Ukrainian TDF Brigades were reorganised in what seems like a paper shuffling exercise, where they have linearised the battalions to 1st to 6th battalion as opposed to the sequentially numbered battalions than before.
The Assault troops of Ukraine have been receiving more than their fair share of manpower replacements, at the expense of other units and whilst they have achieved success after a diabolical start, albeit with higher than usual casualties, the lack of manpower in general just makes it so regular mechanized units can't hold the line and the assault troops are needed to firefight.
Both sides continue to expand their Unmanned Systems (Drones) Forces, which is now institutionalised on both sides.
A great OSINT team under @WarUnitObserver has emerged to focus on ORBAT changes, and are very good at what they do.
Ukraine on the other hand has focused on it's Corps system, which still isn't working effectively with units often out of place and makes you wonder why they did it at all. Many Ukrainian TDF Brigades were reorganised in what seems like a paper shuffling exercise, where they have linearised the battalions to 1st to 6th battalion as opposed to the sequentially numbered battalions than before.
The Assault troops of Ukraine have been receiving more than their fair share of manpower replacements, at the expense of other units and whilst they have achieved success after a diabolical start, albeit with higher than usual casualties, the lack of manpower in general just makes it so regular mechanized units can't hold the line and the assault troops are needed to firefight.
Both sides continue to expand their Unmanned Systems (Drones) Forces, which is now institutionalised on both sides.
A great OSINT team under @WarUnitObserver has emerged to focus on ORBAT changes, and are very good at what they do.
22/ One key aspect that's tied both sides together in getting worse is the amount of misinformation - not to deceive the enemy, but to cover their own arse and in the process really cripping their own war effort.
Ukrainian commanders pretending the situation is under control when it's blatantly not, Russians pretending to have captured an area like Kupyansk when they blatantly hadn't - and were quickly shown otherwise. It's one area where we as OSINT can genuinely have a better understanding of the front as a whole than many on the ground.
We know some areas are very opaque to us, and we know where our weaknesses are, and what we can't see and as such try not to comment on those, but we're pretty damn sure when we can see something and are quick to point it out!
Ukrainian commanders pretending the situation is under control when it's blatantly not, Russians pretending to have captured an area like Kupyansk when they blatantly hadn't - and were quickly shown otherwise. It's one area where we as OSINT can genuinely have a better understanding of the front as a whole than many on the ground.
We know some areas are very opaque to us, and we know where our weaknesses are, and what we can't see and as such try not to comment on those, but we're pretty damn sure when we can see something and are quick to point it out!
23/ Entering 2026, the conflict remains attritional for both sides. US military assistance isn't expected to grow, and European policy remains fragmented but with some extremely bright areas, such as funding being announced for a further two years and increased production.
The Western posture along with the lack of recruitment from many Ukrainians cripples Ukraine's ability to regain significant territory and emboldens Putin, but it can very much continue to deny Russia success.
On a strategic strike capability, Ukrainian forces now have far better capabilities via long range drones and targeting for striking deep inside Russia, causing billions of dollars of damage to the Russian war effort. This is expected to grow in 2026 raising the cost on Russia which can increasingly just plain not afford it.
Ukraine will likewise get struck by vast amounts of Russian long range strikes, which was going to happen anyway - but at least this time Ukraine can strike back.
The Western posture along with the lack of recruitment from many Ukrainians cripples Ukraine's ability to regain significant territory and emboldens Putin, but it can very much continue to deny Russia success.
On a strategic strike capability, Ukrainian forces now have far better capabilities via long range drones and targeting for striking deep inside Russia, causing billions of dollars of damage to the Russian war effort. This is expected to grow in 2026 raising the cost on Russia which can increasingly just plain not afford it.
Ukraine will likewise get struck by vast amounts of Russian long range strikes, which was going to happen anyway - but at least this time Ukraine can strike back.
24/ In summary, we won't say "There's plenty of war left" for 2026, though it's likely there will be.
We can both see the critical weaknesses in both sides from a lack of manpower that isn't even remotely getting fixed on the Ukrainian side to the huge casualties and economic woes on the Russian side which also isn't getting fixed, and important events such as the dramatic anti-European stance the US Presidency has taken or Ukraine's new strike capabilities.
We don't expect the diplomatic yap to achieve anything that is "good" for Ukraine, and we don't expect Russia to go for a diplomatic option unless it cripples Ukraine and tears it apart for easy pickings in future - Zelenskyy would be better off putting his efforts into bolstering his country.
Ukraine has shown again it can endure territorial loss without losing the war. Even in 2025, Russia paid staggering human costs for gains that amounted to less than one percent of Ukrainian land. Terrain can be retaken and lives cannot. How many Russians are the Kremlin prepared to sacrifice for every kilometre?
"Molon labe" - Come and take them - remains the reality facing anyone who believes Ukrainian land can be seized without consequence.
We can both see the critical weaknesses in both sides from a lack of manpower that isn't even remotely getting fixed on the Ukrainian side to the huge casualties and economic woes on the Russian side which also isn't getting fixed, and important events such as the dramatic anti-European stance the US Presidency has taken or Ukraine's new strike capabilities.
We don't expect the diplomatic yap to achieve anything that is "good" for Ukraine, and we don't expect Russia to go for a diplomatic option unless it cripples Ukraine and tears it apart for easy pickings in future - Zelenskyy would be better off putting his efforts into bolstering his country.
Ukraine has shown again it can endure territorial loss without losing the war. Even in 2025, Russia paid staggering human costs for gains that amounted to less than one percent of Ukrainian land. Terrain can be retaken and lives cannot. How many Russians are the Kremlin prepared to sacrifice for every kilometre?
"Molon labe" - Come and take them - remains the reality facing anyone who believes Ukrainian land can be seized without consequence.
25/ On the OSINT side, we're so proud of what our volunteer team has built with no funding. For almost 4 years, UAControlMap has provided open data used by analysts, media, researchers, NGOs, and government bodies worldwide.
We've supported reporting, research, workshops, and investigations - and we’ve kept everything open by core design. Even if you disagree with us, the information is there for you to make your own opinion.
To help cover running costs, we've finally set up:
buymeacoffee.com/uacontrolmap
We've supported reporting, research, workshops, and investigations - and we’ve kept everything open by core design. Even if you disagree with us, the information is there for you to make your own opinion.
To help cover running costs, we've finally set up:
buymeacoffee.com/uacontrolmap
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