Thread by @emilkastehelmi

2025 can reasonably be seen as an operational and strategic failure for Russia, but all scenarios remain on the table. Any optimism is premature, as Ukraine also faces serious challenges.

In this thread: An assessment of the past year and its broader implications. 1/

First, some numbers. Russia took under 4,600 km² of Ukrainian territory in 2025, compared to roughly 3,500 km² in 2024.

Despite the increase, focusing only on square kilometers provides poor tools for analyzing current dynamics and the war’s future. 2/

Russia failed to achieve operational goals. The front advanced relatively evenly despite local salients. Most captured territory consisted of fields, villages and small towns.

Even when brief momentum appeared, Russian forces were unable to turn it into a larger breakthrough. 3/

Although Huliaipole and most of Pokrovsk & Myrnohrad fell in late 2025, the overall situation did not change significantly. The war remains attritional, and despite tactical adaptations, the slow, grinding pace continues without a decisive shift in sight in the coming months. 4/

The growing phenomenon of de-mechanization and extended kill zones - driven by a increasing numbers of drones, drone units, and technical & tactical developments - has now effectively eliminated the possibility of conventional, operational-level mechanized breakthroughs. 5/

Amidst of these challenges, Russia has failed to find the means to decisively weaken or break Ukraine militarily. Ukraine is still able to negotiate without immediate coercion that would undermine its sovereignty, which in turn is one of Russia’s central objectives. 6/

Despite averting major crises, Ukraine faces internal and external problems that are damaging, or could further damage, its war effort. Manpower issues remain unresolved, and a sharp rise in desertions in 2025 has worsened an existing challenge. 7/

Ukraine conducted counterattacks and halted Russian offensives in several sectors, but even its most successful operations were largely local. It's difficult to see how Ukraine could achieve success beyond the tactical level in 2026, but local operations will continue. 8/

From another point of view, Ukraine’s actions produced a relatively successful overall defence that denied the enemy many of its objectives. Tactical successes mattered: Ukraine held against a stronger opponent while losing less than 1% of its total territory. 9/

Unfortunately, the loose coalition supporting Ukraine is showing cracks. US policy has been tentative and Europe’s aid limits have been tested, as seen in difficult negotiations over financial assistance. EU reached an agreement this time, but the next may be harder. 10/

Europe would need to increase economic and military support for Ukraine to even preserve its current position militarily and politically. However, as 2026 progresses, I'm afraid major changes won't occur, which narrows Ukraine’s options and strengthens Russia’s leverage. 11/

Russia seeks a more favorable European security architecture for itself and is prepared to sacrifice vast resources to achieve it. Ukraine’s ability to pursue an independent foreign and security policy is fundamentally incompatible with this goal. 12/

It is naive to think Russia’s ambitions stop at Donbas’ administrative borders. If Ukraine preserves full sovereignty while losing only land, Russia will have won a territorial victory, but will have failed strategically. Russia won't accept such an outcome easily. 13/

Russia’s desired victory requires Ukraine’s subjugation: heavy influence over society, no NATO path, no Western security guarantees, and limits on defensive capabilities. Achieving this demands prolonged military and diplomatic pressure, so a quick resolution is unlikely. 14/

From Moscow’s perspective, better outcomes remain within reach. Ukraine’s negotiating position is likely going to worsen as the war drags on.

Russian society will of course continue to deteriorate as costs mount, but Russia isn't fighting for optimal quarterly GDP figures. 15/

Multiple scenarios remain possible, making definitive predictions difficult. Still, this is a year in which all parties will seek some kind of a resolution. Someone will lose more than others. I hope it won’t be those fighting for freedom and democracy. 16/16