America has just released its 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Not seeing much press activity from the Dept of Defense/War on this. While I need time to ponder the deeper implications of the document, a few things stand out on first reading. 1/11 🧵
2/ First, the document is consistent with the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) released by the Trump Administration in November 2025. Key priorities in the NDS align with the NSS, as you would expect. However, while the NSS has priorities, the NDS has "Lines of Effort". whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl…
3/ There are four Lines of Effort in the new NDS:
1. Defend the U.S. Homeland. 2. Deter China in the Indo-Pacific Through Strength, Not Confrontation. 3. Increase Burden-Sharing with U.S. Allies and Partners. 4. Supercharge the U.S. Defense Industrial Base.
4/ In its examination of the security environment, the document is clear that America sees Russia as a mainly (but not solely) European problem, and that America's interest is to "defend against Russian threats to the U.S. Homeland." The graph below is included to helpfully point out that Europe has the resources to deal with Russia if it choses to.
5/ On China, the document notes that "although we are and will remain engaged in Europe, we must—and will—prioritize defending the U.S. Homeland and deterring China." It also states the following:
"The NSS directs DoW to maintain a favorable balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific. Not for purposes of dominating, humiliating, or strangling China. To the contrary, our goal is far more scoped and reasonable than that: It is simply to ensure that neither China nor
anyone else can dominate us or our allies."
6/ It is hard to know exactly where the Trump administration is headed with China. The document states that America desires "a decent peace." Fair enough. It also states America does not want confrontation.
The problem is, China is already on a war footing with America, and has been executing large-scale cognitive warfare and massive industrial espionage against the Homeland for two decades. These are not mentioned at all in the document.
Trump's upcoming summit with Xi may give us more insights.
7/ There is a useful section on the challenges of concurrency for U.S. military forces. This is a reasonable and logical section - America cannot do everything. This is used to build the case for more burden sharing from allies, a consistent theme from this administration. Some of America's allies have stepped up to this challenge in Europe and Asia. But others have not.
8/ Interestingly, in the section that discusses increasing burden sharing with allies (Line of Effort 4), almost every region of the world is discussed except the Asia-Pacific region (Korean peninsula has its own section).
A couple of key takeaways from this:
1. America side-steps any discussion about the defence of Taiwan in the strategy. Indeed, Taiwan is not mentioned. It does however commit to erecting "a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain." 2. America has avoided getting into any dust ups with Asia-Pacific allies on their defence spending. This is a shame - too many of us continue to shirk our responsibilities.
9/ In the strategic environment, there is no mention of the potential threats posed by new technologies. I will need to give this more thought but I thought it was an interesting topic missing from the document.
10/ Finally, the conclusion makes the following interesting assertion: "Taking our nation from the precipice of a world war just a year ago..."
Did I miss something last year? Or should that have read "a week ago"?
11/ Overall, the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy does not introduce any surprises. It reinforces the NSS as well as statements by President Trump and other members of the administration over the past year. That said, I will need to read it a few more times. More analysis to follow, from me and many others, in the next day or so! media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/20…
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“The advantages of threatening an American ground intervention are real. The advantages of actually committing boots on the ground are also real but more limited. The disadvantages could be numerous.” My weekly update on Iran, Ukraine and the Pacific. 1/6 🧵
2/ Ukraine has achieved something significant in the south. Ukrainian attacks there have disrupted Russian offensive planning, consumed Russian reserve forces, and demonstrated that Ukrainian combined arms operations can impose genuine operational costs. But there is also a trade-off in these southern operations. Gains in the south have come at some cost to northern Donetsk, and Russian forces retain the initiative on what is Russia’s main effort on the ground: the envelopment of Ukraine’s fortress belt and the remainder of Donetsk.
3/ In Iran, the oldest lesson in strategy keeps surfacing: military success in the air and at sea does not automatically translate into political outcomes on the ground. Iran has not been beaten. The question being probably being considered in the Pentagon, Congress and the White House is whether ground forces would ensure that the military campaign achieves a decisive political outcome - or whether it would lead to a larger and more difficult American military commitment to the Middle East with uncertain results.
The latest update on drone and missile attacks on the UAE has just been released. With this as context, I thought I would share some initial insights arising from this Iranian retaliatory campaign and the overall war against #Iran. 1/9 🧵
2/ First, the battlespace is not transparent. It is highly visible but high visibility is not the same as high wisdom about what is seen. And we must not fall into the trap of assuming that we actually are seeing everything we need to see rather than what the enemy wants us to see. Finally, no tech can see into the hearts and minds of soldiers and combat leaders, especially when they are functioning under conditions of existential threat.
3/ Second, Understanding the enemy, and how resilient it is, matters. The Iranians have been preparing for this fight for decades, will have many caches of weapons and have strategised how this might play out. And assuming that a few bombs from the sky topple a regime (especially when it has never been achieved before) badly under estimated the Iranians.
"America & Iran are fighting two very different wars and have two different theories of victory. China & others in the authoritarian learning & adaptation bloc are observing closely & learning." An assessment of where we are, & who is learning from the Iran War. 1/6 🧵
2/ This assessment examines the two wars in and around Iran: the military campaign that Washington is fighting, and the economic campaign that Tehran is waging. It then asks the following question: what are the respective theories of victory, and how does that theory play out differently for each belligerent?
3/ A theory of victory is not simply a list of military objectives. It is a coherent account of how the application of military force produces a political outcome that endures. The Trump administration entered Operation Epic Fury with a theory of the means, and a range of constantly changing ends (at least in public). It might be able to use the military to win the war, but it is unclear whether it has a longer-term plan to win the peace.
Wars are never simple. Despite the efforts of governments, war resists the clarity, certainty & clever narratives supported by AI slop videos, we wish to impose on them. The #Iran war & developments in #Ukraine, were exemplars of this during the week. 1/7
2/ Welcome to my weekly update on war and strategic competition. This week, shifting strategic initiative in Ukraine, the war in Iran, politics in the Pacific & my Big 5 reading recommendations.
3/ In #Ukraine, Ukrainian forces achieved some of the most operationally significant gains of the past year, reclaiming territory in the south while striking deep into Russia’s military-industrial complex. Diplomacy continued its chaotic and erratic journey.
"At some point, Putin will have to reckon with the failure of his strategic bombing campaign against Ukraine’s cities to shift Ukraine’s political posture, and the slow-rolling military failure that is Russia’s bloody ground campaign." A comprehensive update of the big #Ukraine & Pacific issues this week. 1/6 🧵🇺🇦
2/ In Europe this week, the annual Munich Security Conference was held. Lots of interesting speeches, but not a lot of progress on ending the war in Ukraine.
And as Zelenskyy stated: "A lot of time now is spent on negotiations. We truly hope that the trilateral meetings next week will be serious, substantive, and helpful for all of us. But honestly – sometimes it feels like the sides are talking about completely different things."
3/ In Ukraine, the armed forces were able to undertake opportunistic counter attacks against Russian forces deprived of Starlink.
But otherwise, as I describe in my assessment of the trajectory of the war in 2026, "the brutal calculus of the past four-years will continue into 2026 unless there is a significant breakthrough in technology, tactics or strategy that changes the deep, close and rear aspects of the overall battlefield dynamic.
The only other thing that might significantly change the trajectory of the war is if there is a significant shift in political will in Kyiv or Moscow."
"The Oreshnik is the sign of a Fearful, Worried Putin, Not a Leader Confident of Victory." My first 2026 update on war and great power competition. This week: the Oreshnik attack, peace talks progress, the ground war in #Ukraine, China's reaction to Venezuela and more. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦 (Image: @DefenceU)
2/ In events related to #Ukraine this week, the Oreshnik strike absorbed a lot of attention. But this was not an event that demonstrates Russia's strength. Indeed it showed the opposite. Also, peace talks in Paris took place as did a meeting of the Coalition of the Willing.
3/ In the Pacific, China continues to posture about American operations in Venezuela. While we might like to think that China will practice what it preaches with regards to its statement that “military means are not the solution to problems”, its accelerating use of military coercion and aggression against neighbours shows just how hollow and hypocritical the Xi regime is.
Also this week, Trump discussed Taiwan in his New York Times interview.