K. Tristan Tang Profile picture
Feb 3 2 tweets 2 min read Read on X
Recent PLA Daily reporting on Zhang Youxia’s purge has prompted me to revisit the issue in a follow-up analysis just published in @ChinaBriefJT Notes at @JamestownTweets.

These materials largely align with my observations and inferences from my January 26 analysis, linking Zhang Youxia’s removal to preparations for the PLA’s 2027 centenary goal—an important political agenda for Xi Jinping. Such defiance by Zhang is framed by Chinese official discourse as undermining political awareness and as trampling the CMC Chairperson Responsibility System. Many thanks again to @Arranjnh for the timely, spot-on edits.

Executive Summary:

(1) Recent PLA Daily articles include additional details on Zhang Youxia’s purge and reveal differences between Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping over the pace of force building, especially in relation to the 2027 PLA centenary goal, a key political priority of Xi.

(2) The PLA Daily explicitly links the push to achieve the centenary goal to Zhang Youxia’s purge and reiterates that Zhang and Liu had negative effects on the PLA’s combat capability development.

(3) The PLA Daily stresses that the entire force must recognize strategic design, pathways, and target tasks as an established consensus that no one may question, and it underscores that all military planning must submit to political leadership.

(4) Past Chinese official information shows that joint operations capability is emphasized in the 2027 goal, but joint training under Zhang Youxia’s leadership lagged behind expectations and carried political implications of defying Xi Jinping’s orders.

Follow-up analysis (February 3): jamestown.org/more-informati…

Initial analysis (January 26): jamestown.org/zhang-youxias-…Image
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More from @KTristanTang

Apr 13, 2025
(1/10) 🧵
My latest analysis on CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong’s Possible Downfall, published by @ChinaBriefJT:
He Weidong’s Possible Downfall and Xi’s Trust Deficit with the PLA

I analyze the possible reasons behind He Weidong’s investigation and provide examples of key generals who were promoted during his tenure as CMC Vice Chairman but were later investigated and removed from their positions.

I argue that Xi Jinping may have lost trust in He Weidong’s ability to continue managing the PLA's personnel. I also compare the situation regarding the removal of Central Organization Department head Li Ganjie, which indicates Xi Jinping’s dissatisfaction with personnel management in the Party, government, and military.

jamestown.org/program/he-wei…
(2/10)
As reported by @Dimi on @FT, He Weidong was removed from his post, according to five sources familiar with the matter.
ft.com/content/8226e1…

One public signal of his removal was his absence from the Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries (中央周边工作会议), where all other Politburo members and Central Military Commission (CMC) members were present.Image
(3/10)
Two details make the alleged investigation into He Weidong seem unusual.

The first is his apparent loyalty to Xi Jinping. His loyalty can be inferred from public statements he has made, particularly his references to the "CMC Chairperson Responsibility System" (军委主席负责制)—a slogan emphasizing Xi’s total control over the military—during his remarks at the Two Sessions. He Weidong has consistently used this phrase since joining the CMC in 2023, but other CMC members have not invoked this phrase as frequently as he has.

This sets He apart from many other senior generals on the CMC and demonstrates a high degree of public loyalty to Xi, a loyalty that likely led Xi to trust him enough to promote him to his current position.Image
Read 11 tweets
Mar 13, 2025
(1/5) My latest analysis for the @ChinaMaritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the U.S. @NavalWarCollege:

CMSI Note 13: PLA Navy Enhances Realistic Combat Training – Observations of PLA Navy Operations Around Taiwan

digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/13/

Chinese military activities around Taiwan in the first two months of 2025 indicate that the PLA is intensifying its realistic combat training in the region. This trend closely aligns with the PLA’s emphasis in recent years on leveraging peacetime interactions with foreign forces to achieve training objectives—a practice it refers to as “using the enemy to train the troops.”

Special thanks to @ChrisHSharman and @rdmartinson88 for helping elevate this analysis!
@supbrow @OlliSuorsa @AUJ_Ang @BonnieGlaser @CollinSLKoh @AndrewSErickson @GordianKnotRay @michaelturton @BrianTHart @heguisen @brianhioe @peter_dutton @JaimeOcon1 @BassiJustin @DAlexBlumenthal @BethanyAllenEbr @_JakubJanda @jesusfroman @alessionaval @Julia_Famularo @WarintheFuture @ianellisjones @Ian_M_Easton @JosephHDempsey @MeiaNouwens @VeerleNouwens @R_Schulenburg @ZackCooper @mike_mazza @DefenceProf @DrMichaelJGreen @jacobstokes @DerekJGrossman @AlexLuck9 @WMatthewsChina @lylegoldstein @type36512 @Erik_Green8 @paramilipic @WilliamYang120 @OfficialBen_L @MasaNIDS @TangAnZhu @Dr_M_Davis @IBKardon @osmastro @LyleJMorris
(2/5) Compared to the same period in previous years, the PLA has significantly increased the daily presence of naval vessels operating around Taiwan. Image
Read 6 tweets
Feb 11, 2025
(1/4) This is the 2nd time this year that the total number of detected PLA aircraft has exceeded 30, meeting @rcdatw's definition of a Peak Incursion. This trend is similar to the patterns observed in 2023 and 2024.

@OlliSuorsa @AUJ_Ang @AndrewSErickson @alessionaval @JaimeOcon1
(2/4) In @ChinaBriefJT's article, we pointed out that Peak Incursions place an unusually high level of pressure on Taiwan’s Air Force.

jamestown.org/program/milita…
@ChinaBriefJT (3/4) Although the number of PLA aircraft crossings over the Taiwan Strait median line in 2024 far exceeded previous years, the frequency of Peak Incursions did not increase significantly in proportion. Image
Read 4 tweets
Jan 13, 2025
(1/6) January 12, 2025
Weekly Update on PLA Activities in the Waters and Airspace Around Taiwan based on @MoNDefense's data.
Also, RCDA is expected to publish an analysis on the military implications of the 2024 trends in the coming days. @rcdatw Image
(2/6)
RCDA's analysis of the PLA Navy and Air Force's joint combat readiness patrols around Taiwan in 2024, published on @Diplomat_APAC:
thediplomat.com/2024/12/the-ov…
@Diplomat_APAC (3/6)
RCDA's analysis of the mistaken belief in the existence of a "Joint Sword 2024-C"-like military exercise, published on @ChinaBriefJT, titled "Instead of Joint Sword 2024-C, PLA Intensifies Winter Naval Training":
jamestown.org/program/instea…
Read 7 tweets
Jan 2, 2025
(1/7) Did Joint Sword-2024C happen?

RCDA’s Director Chengkun Ma and I published an article on @ChinaBriefJT, titled: "Instead of Joint Sword-2024C, PLA Intensifies Winter Naval Training."
jamestown.org/program/instea…
(2/7) The number of PLA aircraft sorties crossing the median line was significantly lower than during previous exercises, especially as the sorties approaching Taiwan's 24nm each day numbered only 1, 8, and 6, respectively. Image
Image
Image
(3/7) The number of PLAN vessels operating near Taiwan has increased and persisted for several days, while CCG vessels have been present in waters around Taiwan for extended periods, successfully carrying out extensive patrols circling the island.
Read 9 tweets

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