I'm going to make a falsifiable prediction that will either make me look brilliant or destroy my credibility:
The traditional 60/40 portfolio will experience a 25%+ drawdown before the end of 2027.
Here's my exact reasoning: 🧵
First, what counts as "traditional 60/40"?
60% U.S. stocks (S&P 500 or similar)
40% U.S. investment-grade bonds (10yr+ duration)
Rebalanced quarterly
This is the benchmark for $18 trillion in assets.
The setup is already in place:
Current environment:
S&P at ~6,000 (elevated valuations)
10-year yields at 4.5%
Stock-bond correlation at +0.33
Inflation running 3%+ (above target)
Fiscal deficits $1T+ annually
We're one catalyst away from crisis.
Catalyst scenario 1: The fiscal crisis
Treasury yields spike above 6% as buyers strike.
Stocks fall 20%+ (valuation compression + growth fears)
Bonds fall 15%+ (yield spike = price collapse)
Total portfolio drawdown: 28%
Probability: 35%
Catalyst scenario 2: Stagflation shock
Simultaneous inflation spike (5%+) and recession.
Stocks fall 25% (earnings collapse)
Bonds fall 10% (inflation fears dominate)
Total portfolio drawdown: 19%
Probability: 25%
Newsletter with full scenario analysis: []open.substack.com/pub/hacheimsch…
Catalyst scenario 3: The policy error
Fed cuts rates to fight recession, but inflation resurges.
Markets lose faith in central bank credibility.
Both stocks and bonds sell off on loss of nominal anchor.
Probability: 15%
Why 70% confidence overall?
Because I need only ONE of multiple possible catalysts to trigger.
The system is fragile. Multiple paths lead to the same outcome.
And importantly: there's no obvious rescue mechanism like in past crises.
What would prevent this?
Inflation magically drops to 2% and stays there
Fiscal discipline emerges (😂)
Foreign central banks resume buying Treasuries
Productivity boom solves everything
These aren't impossible. Just improbable.
The timeline: 24 months.
Why? Because fiscal pressures compound.
2025 debt ceiling fight + slowing growth + sustained inflation = perfect storm.
Or early 2027 recession forces policy mistakes.
I'll track this prediction publicly.
If I'm wrong by January 2028, I'll write a detailed post-mortem on what I missed.
If I'm right, I'll explain how to position for the aftermath.
Bookmark this thread.
What's YOUR prediction for 60/40 performance through 2027? 👇
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First, what counts as "traditional 60/40"?
60% U.S. stocks (S&P 500 or similar)
40% U.S. investment-grade bonds (10yr+ duration)
Rebalanced quarterly
This is the benchmark for $18 trillion in assets.
The setup is already in place:
Current environment:
S&P at ~6,000 (elevated valuations)
10-year yields at 4.5%
Stock-bond correlation at +0.33
Inflation running 3%+ (above target)
Fiscal deficits $1T+ annually
We're one catalyst away from crisis.
Catalyst scenario 1: The fiscal crisis
Treasury yields spike above 6% as buyers strike.
Stocks fall 20%+ (valuation compression + growth fears)
Bonds fall 15%+ (yield spike = price collapse)
Total portfolio drawdown: 28%
Probability: 35%
The U.S. government needs to sell $2 trillion in bonds this year.
But here's the problem: the three biggest buyers (Fed, China, Japan) are all SELLING.
This creates a doom loop that will destroy portfolio diversification.
Let me explain: 🧵
Quick history: Who traditionally buys U.S. Treasuries?
Federal Reserve (money printing)
Foreign central banks (China, Japan)
Domestic buyers (banks, pensions, you)
This trio absorbed all government debt for decades.
Then 2022 happened.
The Fed reversed: Went from BUYING $120B/month to SELLING.
They've reduced holdings by $1.7 trillion since 2022.
That's a $2+ trillion annual swing in demand.
Someone else has to fill that gap.
In 2022, I watched $18 trillion in "safe, diversified" portfolios lose 16% in a single year.
The math that promised this couldn't happen?
It was taught in every finance class for 70 years.
And it just stopped working.
Here's what broke: 🧵
Modern Portfolio Theory (1952) proved mathematically that 60% stocks + 40% bonds = optimal diversification.
When stocks fall, bonds rise. Perfect balance.
It worked flawlessly through 2008, 2000, 1987.
Until it didn't.
2022: S&P 500 down 18%
Also 2022: Bonds down 13%
Both crashed together.
Financial advisors called it "a once-in-a-century anomaly."
But I pulled 100 years of data.
This isn't an anomaly. It's a reversion.
I'm making 3 falsifiable predictions about private equity's collapse.
These can be proven right or wrong.
If I'm wrong in 2027, roast me mercilessly.
If I'm right, remember who told you.
Let's go 🧵
PREDICTION #1:
By December 2027, at least 3 PE firms currently in the top 20 by AUM will have STOPPED raising new flagship buyout funds.
Confidence: 75%
They'll pivot to credit or evergreen funds rather than admit their flagship product is obsolete.
Why this will happen:
Poor 2020-2021 vintage performance (invested at peak multiples)
LP allocation reductions (denominator effect normalizing)
Competition from credit/infrastructure
= Impossible fundraising environment for median managers
If you're a pension fund, endowment, or family office with 25%+ in private equity:
You're about to learn an expensive lesson.
But there's still time to fix this.
Here's your playbook for the PE reckoning 🧵
Step 2: Cut bottom-quartile and median managers.
This is a hits-driven business where top-quartile funds capture almost all outperformance.
If you can't consistently access tier-1 managers, you're better off in liquid markets.
The "diversification" argument is debunked.
Step 3: Renegotiate fees or walk away.
2-and-20 made sense when PE delivered 15%+ net returns.
At 6-8% net, it's legalized theft.
Push for:
1-and-10 with higher hurdles
Fees on deployed (not committed) capital
Preferential terms for large commitments
From 2009-2021, private equity operated in a fantasy land:
Borrow at 3% → Buy at 12x EBITDA → Do nothing → Sell at 16x EBITDA
The IRRs looked incredible.
It wasn't genius. It was interest rates falling.
And that party is OVER 🧵
Multiple expansion was just falling interest rates in disguise.
When discount rates drop, asset values rise automatically.
PE firms were like homeowners in 2005 thinking they were investment geniuses because their house doubled in value.
The zero-rate playbook was simple:
Cheap leverage + multiple expansion = automatic 15%+ IRRs
Didn't matter if you improved operations.
Didn't matter if revenue grew.
Just hold for 3-5 years and watch multiples rise.