Aerosol Generating Procedures (AGPs) are clinical interventions historically believed to be the only situations producing infectious aerosols triggering higher respiratory protection.
They became the cornerstone of respiratory IPC risk stratification.
The rationale was procedural: disruptive airway interventions- intubation, suction, ventilation were assumed to generate aerosols in quantities capable of transmitting infection.
Routine respiratory activity was not considered comparable risk.
Protection doctrine followed that assumption.
Respirator protection (FFP3/N95) was restricted to AGPs.
Routine care was managed under droplet precautions.
But aerosols aren’t procedure-dependent.
They are produced whenever an infected person exhales - breathing, talking, coughing.
A virus does not become infectious because of a procedure.
By the 2010s, aerosol science had already demonstrated this: infectious aerosols are generated through normal respiratory activity and persist in shared indoor air.
(See previous threads.)
Despite this, IPC frameworks continued to treat aerosol risk as primarily AGP-associated.
Respirator access remained procedure-triggered.
If aerosols are continuously generated, exposure risk exists throughout patient care NOT just during procedures.
Restricting respirators to AGPs misclassifies where risk occurs.
COVID IPC guidance inherited this doctrine.
Respirator protection remained tied to procedures even as a novel respiratory virus spread through shared air.
Next 🧵: how AGP doctrine shaped healthcare worker protection during COVID.
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🧵 THREAD: The quiet revolution in aerosol transmission (2017–2019)
In the years just before COVID, scientists were increasingly clear that “droplet vs airborne” was a false binary and that real-world transmission didn’t fit it.
Across epidemiology, virology, and aerosol science, researchers were synthesising evidence from influenza, SARS-1, measles, and TB that challenged droplet-based infection models.
Scientists including Linsey Marr, Lidia Morawska, Julian Tang, Tellier, and Zeynep Tufekci were making this case publicly in papers, commentaries, and outbreak analyses.
I’ll cover their work in individual profile tweets.
Outside formal IPC guidance, between 2013-2016 scientists were uncovering how everyday human activity generates infectious aerosols in indoor spaces, a finding with direct consequences for hospital transmission.
Using high-speed imaging, Lydia Bourouiba (MIT fluid dynamics) and colleagues showed that coughs, sneezes and speech produce turbulent gas clouds that generate fine aerosols capable of remaining suspended in shared air.
(JAMA 2014; NEJM 2016)
In parallel, Donald Milton (aerosol scientist & infectious disease researcher) demonstrated that infectious aerosols are produced during normal breathing NOT ONLY during coughing or symptomatic events.
How do aerosol viruses like SARS-CoV-2 spread in hospital settings? 🧵
Understanding airborne transmission is essential to preventing hospital-acquired COVID.
Aerosols are tiny particles released when people breathe, speak, cough, or shout.
Unlike droplets, aerosols can remain suspended in the air, travel beyond close contact, and accumulate indoors.
In hospitals, risk increases when:
• ventilation is inadequate
• air changes are low
• spaces are crowded
• patients and staff share air for prolonged periods
This is especially true on wards.