All eyes are on Netanyahu in Washington—focused on Iran, on U.S. escalation, and on Gaza, where despite a “ceasefire,” Palestinians are still being killed daily. But another consequential shift is elsewhere: Israel has all but annexed the West Bank in all but name. #Thread
Since Oct 7, Israel has accelerated a de facto annexation drive: expanded raids, tighter movement controls, record settlement approvals, and legalization of outposts. What was incremental is now systematic—turning temporary control into durable political and territorial change.
New cabinet measures formalize this shift: easing land sales to settlers and asserting decisive control over land use even in Areas A & B, once under PA administration. The goal, openly stated by key ministers, is to foreclose the possibility of a Palestinian state.
Settlement approvals have surged since 2023. Strategic corridors, bypass roads, and expanded municipal boundaries fragment Palestinian territory. The fast-tracked E1 corridor would sever the West Bank north from south, ending any realistic chance of territorial contiguity.
Smaller “security farms” and outposts—once illegal under Israeli law—are being legalized. Their purpose isn’t symbolic; it’s spatial. They seize land, block Palestinian development, and make coherent governance impossible. Annexation here is administrative, cumulative, and deliberate.
Settler violence has risen sharply—arson, assaults, vandalism—while enforcement remains weak. Administrative detention is no longer used against Jewish extremists. The signal is permissive. The effect is to accelerate Palestinian displacement and erode deterrence.
Annexation is not one dramatic declaration. It is land control, fiscal strangulation, legal extension, and security asymmetry—converting occupation into sovereignty without saying so. While focus remains on Iran and Gaza, the map of the West Bank is being redrawn in real time.
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If the SDF is now genuinely collapsing in all but name—and this may unfold over days or even hours—the implications extend far beyond eastern Syria. This is not just a military or tactical shift; it fundamentally reshapes the debate over Syria’s future political order.
Most critically, the collapse of the SDF would likely spell the end of any serious prospect for a federated or confederal Syria. The Kurdish-led project represented the single strongest bargaining chip for federalism. If that leverage is lost and Kurds are compelled to accept arrangements short of federalism, the entire model collapses with them.
If the Kurds—who had territory, arms, external backing, and institutional depth—cannot secure federal guarantees, then no other Syrian community realistically can. The Druze in the south will not obtain more than the Kurds, and the Alawites on the coast certainly will not. The incentive structure now decisively favors accommodation with Damascus.
Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Washington is being misread. Much commentary assumes Riyadh is inching toward normalisation with Israel. It is not. The fundamentals blocking normalisation remain unchanged, and Israel shows no sign of meeting even minimal conditions. #thread
Normalisation is simply not happening. Analysts underestimate how low the regional “price” actually is—and how far Israel is from meeting even that. My War on the Rocks piece explains why: warontherocks.com/2025/04/for-sa…
Summary of the article: Riyadh’s calculus is strategic. Saudi Arabia wants stability, predictability, and a functional regional order. Normalisation only makes sense if it advances those aims. Under current conditions, it does not.
Israel is distinguishing between this agreement and a more wide-ranging political agreement on Gaza, let alone Palestine. Tel Aviv sees this as a hostage deal; everything else is something else. Some good signs - but major obstacles too, which DC must reckon with: #thread
Israel continues to claim that it has the right - and claims that the agreement validates this right - to intervene in Gaza anytime it sees fit. Israel is the occupying power in Gaza, and one should note Tel Aviv has always seen itself as having this right from 1967 onwards. So, nothing new there. (Also, the ICJ rejects that right and insists the occupation is illegal and must be ended).
It's part and parcel of Israel's regional security doctrine, which has seen it invade, strike, and occupy territories in the past 2 years belonging to Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians, Qataris, Iranians, and Yemenis; and also insist it can do the same anywhere (as Netanyahu confirmed post Doha).
There's been a lot of focus on this interview with Jake Sullivan with regards to what he says about US arms to Israel. But there's a larger point it points to, which is a fundamental shift in terms of how US --- and Western --- elites see the future of relations with Israel. 🧵
Here's a transcript of precisely what Sullivan said, and then some analysis:
"The bigger question you're asking is about the future of the U.S.-Israel relationship...
And here I think it comes down to, what is the future of Israel? Are we going to be dealing with a Prime Minister and a right-wing government for years on end? Or is there going to be political change in Israel?
Because I think that would have an impact on what the nature of the U.S.-Israel relationship [will be]. What is the democratic character of Israel two, three, four, five years from now will have a huge impact on what the nature of the U.S.-Israel relationship will be?"
--if nothing changes in their government, if that continues to be a far-right government that continues these sorts of policies?
"Then it won't be the Israel as we've known it. And I think a lot of Israelis would say, you know, they wouldn't recognize Israel then. And obviously that should have an impact on the relationship."
There's something quite profound being said here, and it's not a throwaway comment. It's a regular concern being expressed across Western political elites, including among those who have been immensely pro-Israel for years and decades.
Recognition of Palestine must not be the end of the story - but must be only the beginning. My latest op-ed in the @ft Financial Times.
🇬🇧🇨🇦🇫🇷 Recognition of Palestine by the UK, France & Canada affirms a legal right — but: 🧵ft.com/content/e57483…
Without action, recognition risks becoming symbolic. Recognition must lead to meaningful steps to end the Gaza war and occupation. PM Starmer’s stance conditions recognition on Israeli actions. But this amounts to an Israeli veto — contradicting his own claim that no side should control the decision.
Recognition should be grounded not simply in diplomacy but in law. The UK already acknowledges that Palestinians are an occupied people — this isn’t a favour, it’s an obligation.
As we get closer to a deal being announced between Israel and Hamas, a few things to keep in mind - including the fact that this unlikely to turn out to be an actual ceasefire deal. 🧵
1. I fully expect a deal to be announced in the next 24 hours; maybe 48. Trump wanted to be able to claim *a* deal had been done before he walked into the Oval, and he made sure Netanyahu upheld that. In that regard, he showed he was willing to push Netanyahu more than Biden.
2. But let's not muddy the waters analytically by misdiagnosing quite *what* deal is being agreed to. This deal is *only* a ceasefire deal if there is a commitment to actually fulfill all three phases of it. Withdrawal and cessation of hostilities happens post phase 1.