On Gaza policy in much of the West, logic isn't defining policy. Older culture wars are prescribing positions, especially on the rightwing of the spectrum, to the exclusion of logic.
To put it bluntly: many are shouting at ears that are purposely deaf. The reason is ugly.🧵 This is not comfortable for many of us in Western policy circles to admit, because we like to think we and the mainstream of our arena are above communalism and identity politics. Indeed, we associate such things with immature and underdeveloped understandings of citizenship.

This focus on refusing a two-state solution may well give way to this notion of a 'type' of 'two-state solution', much as what Biden indicated. That's entirely possible, in the abstract. But it is dubious it will have the powers of genuine statehood. 🧵 cnbc.com/2024/01/20/bid…

https://twitter.com/antonioguterres/status/1748909531738812796

Biden is right in that there are UN members that exist that don't have standing armies; that's true. But those share certain characteristics that don't apply to the Palestine-Israel conflict. Most poignantly; usually, another state has agreed to defend them against aggression.

Rather than focus on plans for Israel's defence, worthwhile considering what losing the case may entail for Israeli policies going forward. The Israelis are aware they have almost completely lost international public opinion, and there are dangerous signs as to its next steps. 🧵

https://twitter.com/OrenZiv_/status/1743556457239367833

On Gaza, the Israelis have shown that irrespective of international public opinion and outrage, they will continue as 'they see fit' - in quotes, because much policy in this regard is also about Netanyahu trying to hold his coalition together and stay out of jail.

On Hizbollah & escalation following Israel's strike on Beirut, necessary to get a few framing issues right first:
1. Hizbollah, while closely aligned with Tehran, doesn't just take marching orders from Iran (unlike some Iraqi militias, for example); it has its own calculations. 2. Hizbollah has been careful (and subjected to criticism as a result) not to embroil Lebanon in a new wider conflict with Israel that it knows will mean huge damage to Lebanon. The Lebanese public doesn't want it; nor does Hizbollah's leadership. Nasrallah's made that clear.

Once upon a time, I was deputy convenor of the UK government's working group on tackling radicalisation & extremism. When I saw the initial report last week, it also struck me as utterly fanciful to imagine we could broaden the definition of 'extremism' in this way. But.. #Thread

https://twitter.com/BBCr4today/status/1721442738267111540

First, it wouldn't be the first time we had a government attempt to draw up 'bad law'; law that is unworkable and utterly nonsensical; but which nevertheless achieves a political purpose. It would be a bad idea; and the Lords would probably manage to ameliorate; but still.

"Blinken tries to cajole wary Arabs on support for post-conflict Gaza" - I don't think colleagues in London or DC really understand why there is so little goodwill on *exactly* this point in the region, when it comes from DC. Just a few points: #thread apnews.com/article/blinke… The region (and the UN and most of the world, and when I last checked, DC itself) sees Gaza as not some kind of wayward no-man's land, legally speaking. Rather, it sees Gaza as part and parcel of the territories Israel occupied in 1967. So, Israel has responsibilities.

Something that seems to be going undiscussed in many of our discussions at present: that Gaza is not Israeli-occupied Palestinian territory. Short (maybe) #thread. Gaza was part of British mandate Palestine until the Israel-Arab war of 1947-1948. In the midst of the fighting, Gaza was taken by Egypt, and administered by it therein, while east Jerusalem and the West Bank was taken by Jordan and administered by it therein.

Vis-a-vis claims of critical Iranian support to Hamas in Saturday's attack. However, even the perception of Iranian support is going to have substantial effects on regional dynamics, at a time when the deescalation paradigm was in full force, including with Israel. #Thread

https://twitter.com/lrozen/status/1711203590180679820

De-escalation has been the name of the game for a while now, and we have seen that with Iran-Saudi, Turkey-UAE, Egypt-Turkey, Israel-Turkey/UAE/Saudi, and so on. Saturday makes the continuation of those processes not impossible, but much more difficult.

"Turkish-Syrian normalization put to the test by Erdogan's re-election" in @LOrientLeJour by @noura_doukhi - includes my thoughts. (Fr.)
lorientlejour.com/article/133906… My comments were: “Assad would no doubt have preferred that Erdogan had lost the Turkish election..." #thread "...as Erdogan’s opposition were far more enthusiastic with returning Syrian refugees and reducing or ending Turkey’s role in Syria. Having said, Erdogan’s own approach on Assad appears to be softening over recent months and the recent moves at the Arab League to re-integrate..."

The Arab League meeting yesterday was one of the more interesting, analytically speaking, in the last couple of decades. Mostly due to host Saudi Arabia's use of it for messaging on the West, Israel, Syria, and, by virtue of that, its own geopolitical pole position. #thread Riyadh is on a geopolitical offensive, after dealing with the fallout from (brief) pariah status in the West. It ended the GCC spat (despite objections within its own camp); it has de-escalated with Iran (even though no change in Tehran's behaviour). This meeting is more of that.

This whole "the US has withdrawn from MENA, hence China has now triumphantly entered MENA" narrative really needs serious correctives. The US didn't withdraw; it's still present, tremendously so, and MENA states have made understandable (if not the best choices). Short thread: We keep seeing these pieces saying "the US withdrew from MENA". Well, I still see massive US business interests. I still see massive US military bases. It's not a withdrawal.