1/ Russians who have never served in the Russian army and have never signed a military contract are nonetheless being rounded up as deserters and sent to their deaths in assault squads. It's the result of an ongoing and still unresolved bureaucratic blunder by Russia's MOD. ⬇️
2/ During the war in Donbas, between 2014 and the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022, thousands of Russian nationalists volunteered to fight for the militias of the Luhansk and Donetsk 'People's Republics'. Many were subsequently discharged.
3/ In December 2022, Russia formally incorporated the Luhansk and Donetsk militias into the Russian Army as part of the annexation of both 'People's Republics'. All current and former members of the militias were reclassified as soldiers of the Russian army.
4/ However, as warblogger Vladislav Zizdok explains, this left many in a "legal trap":
5/ "The essence of the legal trap is that after the start of the Special Military Operation Military Operation, that is, even under the previous Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu, the DPR and LPR officially became part of Russia, and their armed forces became part of…
6/ …the Russian Armed Forces. At the same time, no new contracts were signed with former militia members—for some reason, it was assumed by default that all the duties of Russian military personnel automatically extended to them.
7/ "However, there was no automatic transfer of rights, payments, and privileges. If anything were to happen, these people would be left alone to deal with their problems."
8/ In practice, this means that legally granted discharges from the LPR and DPR – even for badly wounded men – are no longer being recognised. Soldiers who had been discharged under the L/DPR's regulations are now being treated as deserters from the Russian Army.
10/ A large part of the problem is that the mobilisation and recruitment processes in the L/DPR were chaotic and poorly organised in the first place, with correspondingly poor documentation and adherence to consistent policies:
11/ "First there was chaos with mobilisation in the L/DPR — arbitrariness, lawlessness, and massive consequences. Then there was chaos with mobilisation in Russia itself, when wild, confused conscripts were roaming around the L/DPR not knowing where to attach themselves.
12/ "Everything went in a chain: chaos → arbitrariness → absence of clear procedures for processing and record-keeping → worsening chaos and outright abuse → an attempt to bring it all to a “common denominator,” but not by actually resolving the situation — …
13/ …instead at the expense of disenfranchised mobilised soldiers / volunteers / AWOL servicemen → after which come the lectures about legal norms, while somehow “forgetting” that previously, at the foundational level and in practice, legal norms weren’t just violated —…
14/ …they simply didn’t exist.
And to this day, the state still does not create clear, understandable, workable mechanisms to resolve “Problem-500.” "
15/ Appeals to the authorities have been of little use and there are few mechanisms for preventing former volunteers from being forcibly detained and sent back to fight. They are treated as deserters, for which the usual punishment is to be sent to die in an assault squad.
16/ 'Soldiers' Truth' highlights the case of Alexander Sergeyevich Cheprasov, call sign 'Bryansk', who is pictured at the top of this thread. A discharged former volunteer for the Donbas militias, he was arrested at the start of January 2026 as a deserter.
17/ He was taken to a holding place for deserters in Kazan despite explaining that he had "no connection to the Russian Ministry of Defence, was not mobilised because he was not eligible for mobilisation, had not served in the army, had not signed a contract with anyone,…
18/ …and was the guardian of a disabled person (his father, who is completely blind)."
Cheprasov was refused permission to meet with an investigator but was promised that "everything would be sorted out".
19/ Instead, on the night of 3 January 2026, he and others were loaded onto buses and taken to Millerovo in the Rostov region. The channel reports that Cheprasov is now listed as missing in action. /end
1/ Russia launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 with the expectation that it would be a quick intervention lasting only a few weeks. Its soldiers went to war lacking a wide range of what turned out to be essential skills. ⬇️
2/ 'Vault No. 8', a serving Russian soldier warblogging on Telegram, recalls the lack of preparedness for an extended conflict among pre-war contract (professional) soldiers when the invasion was launched on 24 February 2022:
3/ "1. Level of training.
According to the regular personnel themselves, they were proficient with the weapons and equipment assigned to them—they could repair and operate them. At the level of training they had.
1/ Russia appears all but certain to fully block Telegram on 1 April 2026, on the grounds that it promotes frauds, disinformation, and violence. The Russian army has many similar problems; one Russian warblogger asks if the government should consider blocking the army instead. ⬇️
2/ Svatoslav Golikov writes:
"In the light of Roskomnadzor's latest attack on Telegram, it's time to explore some new ideas.
Let me remind you of a recent TASS report (I quote):
"Telegram blocked over 235,000 channels in one day, but the problem is systemic.
3/ "Deputy Anton Nemkin expressed this opinion in a conversation with TASS:
'But let's call things by their proper names: if the number of blocked communities is in the millions, then the problem is not isolated, but systemic.'
1/ The AI boom is leading to drastically higher prices and possible shortages of the Chinese-made fibre-optic cables used by many Russian kamikaze drones. Prices have nearly quadrupled due to a massive increase in demand for fibre optics by data centres. ⬇️
2/ According to Russian media reports, Russian buyers are having to pay between 2.5 to 4 times more for fibre optic cable per kilometre than last year. By 2025, Russia was purchasing about 10.5% of all fibre optic cable produced globally – equivalent to 60 million kilometres.
3/ Russia is entirely dependent on Chinese fibre optic manufacturers. Its only domestic fibre optic manufacturer, JSC Optic Fiber Systems in Saransk, was destroyed by Ukrainian drone strikes in April-May 2025.
1/ Former Russian foreign ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin is very gloomy about Russia's prospects after four years of full-scale war in Ukraine. He criticises the country's "feudal-capitalist regime of revenge" and asks whether Vladimir Putin will "lead it to its decline". ⬇️
2/ Writing on his Telegram channel, Demurin – whose views reflect an ultra-nationalist constituency that has been disappointed by Putin's perceived lacklustre approach to the war – is explicitly critical of Putin's leadership:
3/ "On the fourth anniversary of the launch of the Special Military Operation, I have nothing inspiring to say. The reshaping of Ukraine along Nazi and anti-Russian lines, its militarisation, and the NATO takeover of its territory and political space required a rebuff—that's…
1/ Russian warbloggers continue to reflect on the war in Ukraine entering its fifth year. The 'hurrah-patriotism' of 2022 is now long gone and the mood is bleak. Nikita Tretyakov says there is "nothing left to hope for; all hopes and illusions have been shattered". ⬇️
2/ In comments that illustrate the political dangers which the Putin regime will face when the war ends, Tretyakov – a mobilised paratrooper, military correspondent, and volunteer – writes on his Telegram channel:
3/ "Four years of war is a monstrously long and daunting time. As culture and history have taught us, such an anniversary demands some analysis, conclusions, and a summing up of interim results...
1/ Igor 'Strelkov' Girkin is marking the fourth anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine – after eight years of war in Donbas, which he did much to start – but he isn't celebrating. He sees a "bleak" outlook of mutual exhaustion, caused by poor leadership. ⬇️
2/ Girkin writes from the prison where he is now half-way through a sentence for "inciting extremism" (i.e. criticising the Russian government's mismanagement of the war):
3/ "Today officially marks the fourth anniversary of the start of the Special Military Operation (although according to some sources, it began two days earlier, but was announced to begin on 24 February 2022).
We arrived at this significant date with extremely negative results.