Thread by @emilkastehelmi

The latest Ukrainian counterattack has drawn significant attention. The Ukrainians have claimed to liberate over 400 km².

There’s some sensationalism in the information space, as there seems to be some misunderstanding of what a liberated square kilometer here actually means. 1/

In Jan-Feb 2026, Ukraine conducted counterattacks in eastern Zaporizhzhia & Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. It’s the same area where Russia made a significant amount of their gains in late 2025. The area mostly consists of fields and small villages, without significant cities nearby. 2/

The Ukrainians are executing a localized operation to enhance their tactical positioning, rather than a broad counteroffensive with operational objectives. Politically and in the information space, these successes are vital, given the scarcity of positive news. 3/

The ongoing Ukrainian counterattack appears relatively successful, depending on the point of view. For comparison, Russia advanced roughly 400–500 km² monthly from May 2025 to January 2026. This has usually been called a slow monthly advance. 4/

The recent attacks have likely aimed to take back the Haichur River line. After liberating Ternuvate, Ukraine cleared the nearby villages and pushed toward the river, re-establishing positions on the western bank. The attacks continued east with limited success. 5/

Another axis of attack lies southwest of Pokrovske, where combat has moved from the Vovcha River to the Verbove-Ternove area, creating a vast gray zone. Ukraine holds the initiative, though it's uncertain whether they can consolidate control over the liberated territories. 6/

How much has Ukraine advanced? How much has Russia lost? It isn't straightforward – in this war, assessing control has grown increasingly challenging. What was once a clear frontline is now often a blurred, contested zone, with some villages not securely held by either side. 7/

Frontline troop density is typically low, allowing small groups from both sides to advance relatively deep without actually enabling further operations. Troops can be intermingled in villages or around fields. This is why the value of singular geolocations has decreased. 8/

Media coverage has especially fixated on one metric: the square kilometers Ukraine has reportedly liberated. Tracking km² offers some insight into battlefield shifts and trends, particularly over medium- and long-term periods, but it has limitations and weaknesses too. 9/

Square kilometers don't always reveal an operation's importance. For instance, in the Zaporizhzhia–Dnipropetrovsk area, hundreds of km² can shift without altering the general situation much. Elsewhere, the same change could be far more impactful. 10/

For instance, in the Lyman-Sloviansk direction, it might signal an imminent encirclement threat to Lyman, potentially leading to a loss of the city. This would strengthen Russian control in northern Donbas, which would align with their strategic aims. 11/

A final note: This operation isn't comparable to the 2023 counteroffensive. They differed in scope, environment, force composition, and ambitions. 12/

Our team at @black_birdgroup continues to monitor the situation. Our map can be found here:
scribblemaps.com/maps/view/The-…