1/ Vladimir Putin is said to be concerned about a possible coup by the Russian military following the arrest of former First Deputy Defence Minister Ruslan Tsalikov. Mobile Internet in the centre of Moscow has been turned off for the past week, with no official explanation. ⬇️
2/ Tsalikov's arrest last week was the culmination of a long-running corruption investigation (see thread below). Investigators have reportedly found that the former minister and his family had amassed property worth over 4 billion rubles.
3/ Tsalikov is a close friend and ally of former Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, who was sacked in 2024 after numerous allegations of corruption and mishandling of the war in Ukraine. Shoigu has a long history as a close ally of Putin, but has since fallen out of favour.
4/ Since 5 March 2026, a mysterious shutdown of Internet access in central Moscow has plagued the city's inhabitants. Only certain whitelisted websites are accessible, and restrictions have also affected Wi-Fi in the metro.
5/ Russian mobile network operators insist that they're not the cause of the problem. VimpelCom says it's "due to external restrictions", while T2 says the restrictions are "not on the operator's side". This seems to make it clear that they have been imposed by the government.
6/ There has been no explanation from the Russian government of why the restrictions – which it has not acknowledged – are in place, nor why they have lasted so long. Restrictions have occasionally been imposed during Ukrainian drone attacks, but there have been none recently.
7/ However, the Russian outlet VChK-OGPU says that according to a source they are linked to Tsalikov's arrest: "The restrictions on mobile phone service and internet access in central Moscow and some districts of Moscow suspiciously coincided with the start of investigative…
8/ …actions against Shoigu himself and those closest to him. The attempt to imprison former Defense Minister Tsalikov, a close friend and associate, in Lefortovo was accompanied by some kind of mad scramble at the top. And it ended with Tsalikov never being sent to Lefortovo.
9/ "It was limited to charges and house arrest. The only person next in line after Tsalikov could be Shoigu himself. And he retains considerable influence, both in the highest echelons of power and in the security services and the Ministry of Defence.
10/ "By a 'strange coincidence,' the Lubyanka, the Presidential Administration, the Security Council, Moscow-City, and several Defense Ministry and FSB departments, as well as the locations of Alpha and Vympel security forces…
11/ …and the operational staff of the FSB's Constitutional Order Service, and the residences of security service representatives, were affected by the poor cellular, internet, and VPN service.
12/ "It's impossible to completely cut off cellular service in Moscow, as the entire infrastructure of housing and communal services and other operational services in the capital rely on cellular data.
13/ "Therefore, such restrictions could only be caused by very serious reasons, given that no serious UAV attacks on Moscow were observed during these days."
14/ VChK-OGPU also reports that Putin has not visited any military command posts so far this year, in marked contrast to his frequent visits last year. A source sees another link to a possible security threat:
15/ "This isn't just a conspiracy theory; the Kremlin is genuinely afraid of certain events, and they're not related to Ukraine, but to internal processes in Russia.
16/ "I don't know if they're afraid of a coup, a conspiracy, or something similar, but they're definitely afraid of something serious."
17/ Another source links the lack of visits to Putin getting increasingly tired of the war: "No progress on the front lines, exhausting negotiations, and Putin's own cooling toward the topic of war." /end
1/ Russia simply isn't capable of doing in Ukraine what the US and Israeli air forces are doing in Iran, a prominent Russian warblogger admits. He blames the Russian air force's "organisational backwardness, underdeveloped intelligence, and lack of specialised aviation." ⬇️
2/ Ukraine's aviation situation is starkly different to that of Iran's, despite facing a theoretically more powerful opponent. The Ukrainian Air Force is not only still flying in substantial numbers but has expanded its capabilities with the addition of Western aircraft.
3/ 'Military Informant' discusses why the Russian Aerospace Forces are still unable to achieve air superiority over Ukraine after over four years of full-scale war:
1/ News that the Iranian regime is proving more resilient than expected highlights its unusual governing structure as a 'polydictatorship'. In many ways, it was designed from the ground up to resist regime change. ⬇️
2/ The regime comprises a multi-layered set of elected and unelected institutions that shares power across religious bodies bodies, the armed forces (particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), and economic entities. Each provides a separate and distinct power centre.
3/ They each have their own institutional bases, resources, coercive capacity, and claims to legitimacy — none of which fully controls the others, but which collectively make the regime more resilient to internal and external shocks.
1/ The shutdown of Starlink is reported to be causing a sharp rise in casualties among Russian signalmen and linemen, who are being systematically targeted by Ukrainian drones as they attempt to install alternative communications systems. ⬇️
2/ Pro-Kremlin journalist Andrey Medvedev reports that "in those units where Starlink was operational and then shut down, there was an increase in the number of killed and wounded signalmen and linemen. Why do you think this is?"
3/ "The guys are trying to extend fibre optics to their positions everywhere, while the Ukrainians are herding our signalmen and hitting them with drones. Here's an officer's comment. Not everyone will understand, but...
1/ Ukrainian drone attacks deep in the Russian rear have prompted alarm among Russian warbloggers. They warn that the 'kill zone' behind the front line has expanded far into the rear of the Russian-occupied Donbas region. ⬇️
1/ Iran is using a unique type of loitering, self-targeting surface to air missile to shoot down US MQ-9 Reaper drones. 11 Reapers costing over $330 million have so far been reported destroyed in the war with Iran. ⬇️
2/ The "358" missile, also known by NATO as the SA-67 and in Yemen as the Saqr-1, is a unique type of surface-to-air missile that is launched with a rocket booster and then loiters in a target area using a turbojet engine, scanning with an infrared sensor for airborne targets.
3/ It appears to be capable of several modes, including the ability to attack ground targets as well. The missile is reported to be 2.75 meters long and is armed with a 10 kg proximity warhead, with a total weight of up to 50 kg when fully fueled, and a reported 100 km range.
1/ Fundraising for the Russian army has been declining steeply for some time, leaving soldiers without essential equipment and supplies. A Russian warblogger explains that it's because soldiers are now seen as being recruited from the ranks of Russia's unwanted underclasses. ⬇️
2/ Russia's professional army was decimated in the first months of the war in Ukraine. Losses were replaced by mobilising 300,000 men from September-October 2022 onwards. They were recruited from across society and were widely supported by the Russian public.
3/ The political costs of mobilisation were high, however, so the government turned instead to recruiting the marginalised and disadvantaged. This has included convicts, drug addicts, alcoholics, debtors, and poverty-stricken ethnic minorities from remote regions of Russia.