Giorgi Revishvili Profile picture
Mar 23 13 tweets 2 min read Read on X
Ukraine has pursued a strategy of bringing the war back to Russia, aiming to erode the perception that the full-scale invasion is distant and cost-free for Russian society.

An analysis suggests that strategy is beginning to reshape how the war is felt across Russia. 1/13
The strategy was explicitly articulated by President Volodymyr Zelensky in 2025, as Ukraine significantly expanded its deep-strike campaign inside Russia. 2/13
An internal analysis by the Ukrainian NGO Join Ukraine, shared with the Kyiv Independent, suggests that strategy is beginning to reshape how the war is felt across Russia. 3/13
The organization monitors social media discourse and public reactions across Russian regions and occupied territories, and found that Russians are increasingly confronting the war through casualties, drone attacks, internet blackouts, and economic disruption. 4/13
The regions most directly affected by the war are Russia’s border areas — including Kursk, Bryansk, and Rostov oblasts — as well as occupied Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. 5/13
According to the Join Ukraine analysis, these regions show the highest level of military-related discourse and the sharpest reactions to attacks. These regions also show the most intense and polarized reactions. 6/13
On one hand, there is growing radicalization and calls for escalation — including demands for harsher retaliation, such as strikes with Oreshnik ballistic missiles or even nuclear weapons. 7/13
On the other, there is a growing feeling of fatigue and frustration. Residents criticize authorities for failing to ensure basic security, citing a lack of shelters, ineffective air defenses, and repeated disruptions to daily life. 8/13
Further from the front, the war is still felt strongly across Russia, particularly through casualties and economic strain. 9/13
Losses are disproportionately concentrated in poorer national republics and industrial regions such as Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, and the Urals, amplifying social and regional inequalities. 10/13
Economic impacts—fuel shortages and rising prices—are increasingly linked by residents to the war. At the same time, trust in official narratives is eroding, as government claims of successful air defense often contradict visible damage to infrastructure. 11/13
While fear of repression limits open protest, dissatisfaction is growing and expressed through local grievances, especially in border and industrial regions like Kursk, Rostov, and Voronezh. 12/13
In key industrial hubs, including refinery regions, Ukrainian strikes have made the war more physically and visibly present in everyday life. 13/13

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Giorgi Revishvili

Giorgi Revishvili Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @revishvilig

Mar 23
General Andriy Biletskyi, Commander of Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps:

If current trends continue, by the end of the year units that actively integrate ground robotic systems could reduce the number of infantry required on the front line by up to 30%. 1/10 Image
This year is likely to become a true breakthrough year for ground robotic systems.
The expanded use of UAVs, sensor networks, surveillance systems, and ground robotic platforms can substantially decrease the number of personnel required on the line of contact. 2/10
With sustained technological integration of these systems, it is realistic to reduce infantry presence on the front line by up to 30% in the near term, and potentially up to 80% over time. 3/10
Read 12 tweets
Mar 23
Robert Brovdi, Commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces:

Soldiers are ordered to target [Russian] personnel, rather than armour or other equipment, at least 30% of the time. 1/6 Image
“If a battalion has no infantry left, the Russians don’t disband it but throw desk officers to the front. They are the easiest targets, because they can’t fight.” 2/6
Every mission, whether drone strike or electronic-warfare session, is logged and verified by video, then fed into business-intelligence software that Brovdi repurposed from his days as a grain trader. 3/6
Read 7 tweets
Mar 22
General Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine's Ambassador to the UK:

According to traditional textbooks, the war in Iran should have only two strategies. These are the strategy of defeat and the strategy of attrition. 1/6 Image
With the first strategy, everything is clear, as with “Kyiv in three days”. Probably someone thought that this was also possible in Iran. But if the defending side switches to a strategy of attrition, the attacking side will definitely have big problems. 2/6
Because cheap and highly effective technologies will not only destroy the oil industry but will also destroy the economy of anyone who tries to test Ukraine’s experience in the Middle East. 3/6
Read 8 tweets
Mar 22
Kyrylo Veres, the Commander of Ukraine's 20th Separate Brigade of Unmanned Systems K-2:

Russia recruits roughly 30,000–40,000 soldiers per month. If the Ukrainian side eliminates only 20,000 of them monthly, the enemy still gains a surplus of around 20,000 personnel. 1/12 Image
Over the course of a year, that becomes roughly 200,000 troops—a very large reserve that could be used to launch offensives on multiple fronts. 2/12
If the number of losses consistently exceeds the number of recruits, the Russian army begins to face a manpower deficit. In such conditions, it becomes increasingly difficult to form reserves or rapidly redeploy forces between sectors. 3/12
Read 15 tweets
Mar 18
Ukraine’s Robot Army Is Now Running 7,000 Missions a Month:

The number of operations involving unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs)—ground drones—in Ukraine is steadily increasing. 1/8 Image
Until recently, they were deployed only dozens of times per month. In 2026, that number surpassed 7,000 operations: November — 2,931; December — 5,251; January — 7,495. 2/8
The majority of these operations are logistical. As the kill zone has expanded 10–20 kilometers deep along the front line, the traditional use of armored vehicles or pickup trucks has become complicated—and often impossible. 3/8
Read 8 tweets
Mar 15
General Oleh Apostol, Commander of Ukraine’s Air Assault Forces:

The key to success in the Zaporizhzhia sector was maintaining complete operational silence at every stage. This is an important lesson for the future: battlefield success should not be publicized prematurely. 1/12 Image
When information about operations becomes public too quickly, it can put soldiers at risk. Once information reaches higher levels on the enemy side, a reaction follows. Reserves are redeployed, units are transferred, and reinforcements are brought in. 2/12
During the fighting, Ukrainian forces eliminated two Russian battalion commanders. There is video confirmation as well as intercepted communications confirming this. 3/12
Read 14 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(