Ukraine has pursued a strategy of bringing the war back to Russia, aiming to erode the perception that the full-scale invasion is distant and cost-free for Russian society.
An analysis suggests that strategy is beginning to reshape how the war is felt across Russia. 1/13
The strategy was explicitly articulated by President Volodymyr Zelensky in 2025, as Ukraine significantly expanded its deep-strike campaign inside Russia. 2/13
An internal analysis by the Ukrainian NGO Join Ukraine, shared with the Kyiv Independent, suggests that strategy is beginning to reshape how the war is felt across Russia. 3/13
The organization monitors social media discourse and public reactions across Russian regions and occupied territories, and found that Russians are increasingly confronting the war through casualties, drone attacks, internet blackouts, and economic disruption. 4/13
The regions most directly affected by the war are Russia’s border areas — including Kursk, Bryansk, and Rostov oblasts — as well as occupied Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. 5/13
According to the Join Ukraine analysis, these regions show the highest level of military-related discourse and the sharpest reactions to attacks. These regions also show the most intense and polarized reactions. 6/13
On one hand, there is growing radicalization and calls for escalation — including demands for harsher retaliation, such as strikes with Oreshnik ballistic missiles or even nuclear weapons. 7/13
On the other, there is a growing feeling of fatigue and frustration. Residents criticize authorities for failing to ensure basic security, citing a lack of shelters, ineffective air defenses, and repeated disruptions to daily life. 8/13
Further from the front, the war is still felt strongly across Russia, particularly through casualties and economic strain. 9/13
Losses are disproportionately concentrated in poorer national republics and industrial regions such as Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, and the Urals, amplifying social and regional inequalities. 10/13
Economic impacts—fuel shortages and rising prices—are increasingly linked by residents to the war. At the same time, trust in official narratives is eroding, as government claims of successful air defense often contradict visible damage to infrastructure. 11/13
While fear of repression limits open protest, dissatisfaction is growing and expressed through local grievances, especially in border and industrial regions like Kursk, Rostov, and Voronezh. 12/13
In key industrial hubs, including refinery regions, Ukrainian strikes have made the war more physically and visibly present in everyday life. 13/13
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Robert Brovdi, Commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces:
Soldiers are ordered to target [Russian] personnel, rather than armour or other equipment, at least 30% of the time. 1/6
“If a battalion has no infantry left, the Russians don’t disband it but throw desk officers to the front. They are the easiest targets, because they can’t fight.” 2/6
Every mission, whether drone strike or electronic-warfare session, is logged and verified by video, then fed into business-intelligence software that Brovdi repurposed from his days as a grain trader. 3/6
General Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine's Ambassador to the UK:
According to traditional textbooks, the war in Iran should have only two strategies. These are the strategy of defeat and the strategy of attrition. 1/6
With the first strategy, everything is clear, as with “Kyiv in three days”. Probably someone thought that this was also possible in Iran. But if the defending side switches to a strategy of attrition, the attacking side will definitely have big problems. 2/6
Because cheap and highly effective technologies will not only destroy the oil industry but will also destroy the economy of anyone who tries to test Ukraine’s experience in the Middle East. 3/6
Kyrylo Veres, the Commander of Ukraine's 20th Separate Brigade of Unmanned Systems K-2:
Russia recruits roughly 30,000–40,000 soldiers per month. If the Ukrainian side eliminates only 20,000 of them monthly, the enemy still gains a surplus of around 20,000 personnel. 1/12
Over the course of a year, that becomes roughly 200,000 troops—a very large reserve that could be used to launch offensives on multiple fronts. 2/12
If the number of losses consistently exceeds the number of recruits, the Russian army begins to face a manpower deficit. In such conditions, it becomes increasingly difficult to form reserves or rapidly redeploy forces between sectors. 3/12
Ukraine’s Robot Army Is Now Running 7,000 Missions a Month:
The number of operations involving unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs)—ground drones—in Ukraine is steadily increasing. 1/8
Until recently, they were deployed only dozens of times per month. In 2026, that number surpassed 7,000 operations: November — 2,931; December — 5,251; January — 7,495. 2/8
The majority of these operations are logistical. As the kill zone has expanded 10–20 kilometers deep along the front line, the traditional use of armored vehicles or pickup trucks has become complicated—and often impossible. 3/8
General Oleh Apostol, Commander of Ukraine’s Air Assault Forces:
The key to success in the Zaporizhzhia sector was maintaining complete operational silence at every stage. This is an important lesson for the future: battlefield success should not be publicized prematurely. 1/12
When information about operations becomes public too quickly, it can put soldiers at risk. Once information reaches higher levels on the enemy side, a reaction follows. Reserves are redeployed, units are transferred, and reinforcements are brought in. 2/12
During the fighting, Ukrainian forces eliminated two Russian battalion commanders. There is video confirmation as well as intercepted communications confirming this. 3/12
Fascinating insights from Pavlo Yelizarov, Deputy Commander of Ukraine's Air Force:
Russia currently has sufficient access to components and resources for its military production, including through domestic capacity and supply chains connected to China. 1/15
As a result, external assistance is not necessarily critical for sustaining certain areas of production. One of Russia’s main strengths in small UAV development is its systematic approach. 2/15
While Ukraine tends to rely on creativity and improvisation, Russia builds structured systems. In many cases, systems ultimately outperform improvisation. Creativity alone cannot stop it unless it is combined with speed and adaptability. 3/15