Thread by @ChrisO_wiki

1/ Russian warbloggers are increasingly concluding that the war in Ukraine is stalemated and cannot be won by military means. Two prominent warbloggers have published gloomy commentaries explaining why. ⬇️

2/ 'Fighterbomber', a blogger with links to the Russian Air Force, comments:

"We still have 15% of Donbas left to liberate, and then Donbas will be liberated.

In my opinion, we have three main options."

3/ "The first is to continue the creeping offensive with varying success, regardless of losses, which will be, to put it mildly, very heavy.

Judging by the current slow pace, that [needs] at least five years.

4/ "We can accelerate it somewhat by committing everything we have left of our combat equipment and aircraft to the battle, and if we do this competently and effectively, we can liberate that 15% with roughly the same heavy losses in personnel, but also in equipment.

5/ "Then we can go on the defensive, accumulating resources.

The second option is to go on the defensive yesterday, dig in underground, and begin destroying enemy personnel and other targets until either the enemy runs out of them or we run out of personnel and weapons.

6/ "This option is not limited in time and could approach infinity. At the same time, judging by the trend, the enemy is escalating attacks on our rear, expanding both the number and range of strikes.

7/ "If time approaches infinity, then personnel losses will be the same or even greater than in the first scenario.

The third scenario is a variation of the first two scenarios, using nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

8/ "Here, the risks and our losses are practically impossible to predict, but we must understand that every new day of the Special Military Operation brings the moment when the enemy acquires these weapons of mass destruction closer.

9/ "And it's not a given that they won't immediately use them.

We must understand that all three scenarios may not end as we would like, despite the cost.

10/ "In light of reports about the strategic initiative, new liberated villages populated by grannies, and with the front effectively at a standstill, I can't imagine at what point the inevitable will be accepted,…

11/ …and we will switch from a creeping standoff [sending] pairs [of men] to a mode of maximally preserving our servicemen and civilians, inflicting constant damage on the enemy until they are forced to the negotiating table.

12/ "And we need to continue negotiations based on the actual line of contact. And the fate of that 15% must be decided by diplomatic, rather than military, means.

13/ "We must understand that the enemy's situation is much worse than ours, but they have sufficient resilience and resources to continue fighting for another couple of years, even in their current state. And with increased manpower and weapons support, it's many years.

14/ Of course, we're losing more than Ukraine every day of the war. Ukraine essentially no longer exists. It's completely under external control, with external financing, a devastated industry and agriculture, a dying population, the flight of young people,…

15/ …the elimination of constitutional rights and freedoms, and no prospects for a normal future.

And we still have all of this. Therefore, every day costs us more.

16/ "Perhaps we or the enemy have some cunning plan, a military genius, or a wonder weapon up their sleeve that they're about to unleash, and the battlefield situation will radically change. But since no one has unleashed it in four years, there's doubt such changes will occur.

17/ "Naturally, this is what I see subjectively, based on the current situation and the information I have.

I don't know what things will be like tomorrow, or what they "really are." Maybe things will be much better, or maybe they'll be much... different."

18/ 'Hard Blog Line' agrees, and puts the blame on the effects of an intensive drone war and the incompetence of the Russian General Staff:

"Both sides have blocked each other's offensive actions solely through drones and are in a deadlock."

19/ "To conduct any serious strategic offensive operation capable of breaking through organized defenses and encircling significant enemy forces, it would be necessary to first concentrate at least an advanced strike force in at least moderate proximity to the line of contact.

20/ "Doing this covertly is impossible, given that all of NATO reconnaissance capabilities are at Ukraine's disposal.

21/ "What's left? A low-intensity war of attrition. The problem is that the intensity of these operations would have to be significantly higher to ensure Ukraine's exhaustion in the foreseeable future.

22/ "There's also the North Korean scenario: advancing in large numbers, regardless of losses. If the offensive pace can be sustained, a deep breakthrough is guaranteed, where neither drones nor NATO reconnaissance will be of any help to the enemy.

23/ "But failure promises too many negative consequences, so no one will risk such a scenario. Moreover, for such large-scale operations, the number of personnel must be at least tripled: reserves are needed, flank cover is needed, and advancing units must rotate.

24/ "All that's left is to squabble and wait to see whose forces and resources run out first. This could have been avoided if our General Staff had planned everything properly from the very beginning.

25/ "Although, how could they have planned when all the reports were pure window dressing? This phenomenon didn't originate during the Special Military Operation, but much earlier..." /end

Sources:
🔹 t.me/bomber_fighter…
🔹 t.me/Hard_Blog_Line…