@tochnyi 3. Our verified dataset records 1,530+ kinetic actions in Russia and occupied Ukraine. More than 54% are against air defence.
The entire layered system has been hit. 433 strikes confirmed and with 37.4% on Radars, 26.9% against medium range AD and 15.9% against long range AD.
@tochnyi 4. Ukraine has been targeting not only several types of radar including very critical assets such as the Nebo type with 58 confirmed strikes and 29 against Kasta. This is critical to understand the severity of the challenge Russia is now facing in securing the entire front.
@tochnyi 5. The attrition of launchers has been as well dramatic, because affected all the layers of Russian AD, in particular BUL and TOR systems have seen great pressure over the last few months.
@tochnyi 6. This pressure has been particularly high in Crimea where we identified 100 strikes over the 173 we geolocated and confirmed. This shows a specific intention to apply pressure on the Peninsula and further strengthen the control of the sea and air space.
@tochnyi 7. The most important trend is cumulative loss. The more radars and SAMs Russia loses, the easier the next strike becomes.
The progressive hollowing-out of Russia’s defensive architecture. That is how strikes like Storm Shadow on Kremny El in Bryansk become possible.
End. The lesson for Europe is stark:
Modern air defence can be systematically eroded by a persistent, lower-cost long-range strike campaign. If you only build shields and not swords, you risk losing both.
In modern war, destroying the archer is often cheaper than intercepting the arrows.
I would like to thank all the team at @tochnyi for the support and help and I would like to thanks @Ath3neN0ctu4 for his contribution as well in this article.
I think this work can be of interest for @RUSI_org @cepa @TheStudyofWar @FRS_org @gregbagwell @airpowerassn @WarInstitute @TheGoodISIS @CSIS
@tochnyi @Ath3neN0ctu4 @RUSI_org @cepa @TheStudyofWar @FRS_org @gregbagwell @airpowerassn And to keep yourself updated on our research follow @tochnyi
1/ Ukrainian Summer Offensive: Assault on the russian hone front
At @tochnyi we investigated Ukraine’s June–October 2025 deep-strike campaign, which represented a structured operational shift from tactical interdiction to systemic infrastructure targeting.
1. At this point, I am becoming a broken disk, but this is NOT a country which is preparing for Peace; this is a country preparing for war, with us. At this pace, they will not need 5 or 10 years... this is just ONE YEAR of work. Thanks to @hizzo_jay for working on this.
2. Perm and Iskra plants are places where weapons to kill more Europeans are made right now, while you sleep and while you order your Latte at the bar. This place produces different types of missiles, and this is just after 1 year.
3. Where, in June 2024, there was a forest, in July 2025 we have flling stations and logistics hubs to fill and ship shells, rockets, and other ordnance.
Alabuga plant: No Chain is stronger than its weakest link
New @tochnyi investigation on Shahed drones and the Alabuga plant, first in a mini-series.
If the Shahed is the arrow and the launch sites the bow, today we cover the blacksmith forging the arrow.
1. If you’d like to dive straight into the full investigation, you’ll find the link below. But for those following along here, this thread offers a summary of our main findings.
2. Over the past 5 months, Russia has tripled its use of Shahed-type drones, now averaging 103 launches per day. Ukraine hasn’t had a single day without attacks. In April 2025, Russia launched 2,485 Shaheds. By July, 6,297. That’s a 1,378% increase compared to July 2024.
Putin’s ears within Europe: Uncovering Kaliningrad’s Hidden Antenna Array
Our latest at @tochnyi investigation into Putin's military expansion in Europe focuses on a new intelligence site under construction in Kaliningrad, just 25km from the Polish border. The site was discovered by @hizzo_jay
2.📍 Hidden in the forests of Kaliningrad, just 25 km from Poland’s border, satellites have spotted something strange: a massive, perfectly circular construction.
Unusual geometry. Huge size. Strategic location.
We decided to investigate. 🛰️
Regarding the challenge of defending against the saturation of drones from an adversary, many advocate for the use of solely “cheaper” mass-produced drones.
Despite this seeming like an obvious solution, it is not.
🧵
2/ The logic goes: if the enemy uses swarms of low-cost drones, the best way to respond is by producing more of your own. Quantity vs. quantity.
But this thinking ignores critical tactical, logistical, and strategic realities.
3/ First, not all drone roles are created equal.
Recon, EW, loitering munitions, and decoys all have different tech, data, and operational demands.
Blindly mass-producing “cheap” drones risks saturating the airspace with ineffective assets.
Un thread in italiano è sempre un po’ doloroso, perché mi ricorda che quando lo scrivo è perché vedo qualcosa in Italia che non va. L’aggressione subita da @Ivan_Grieco non è grave solo per il fatto in sé, ma forse è ancora più grave perché, scavando, si comprende come l’informazione in Italia sia totalmente in mano a incompetenti o propagandisti.
Le manifestazioni per la pace sono sempre qualcosa di giusto e sacrosanto. Ricordo bene quando, all’alba dell’invasione dell’Iraq, il mondo intero provò a dire di no. In quel momento c’era tanta voglia di fare del bene e di evitare una guerra inutile. Io, personalmente, sostenevo l’intervento in Afghanistan, ma non quello in Iraq.
Tuttavia, oggi ciò che si vede è una cieca distorsione della bilancia morale: chi manifesta crede di avere tutta la verità in tasca, di avere ragione, e che la piazza appartenga solo a chi la pensa allo stesso modo.
Tutto questo nasce dalla necessità di semplificare e creare polarizzazione, non appartenenza. Perché quando ci si divide in “noi” e “loro”, si perde ogni occasione per riflettere sui dati e sulla complessità della realtà.