Yes, despite all the Xperts on the law of armed conflict, targeting bridges, power plants, oil and gas facilities, airfields, and other dual-use infrastructure like factories, communications nodes, and rail lines that serve both civilian and military needs may be lawful. The law does not decide targets just by calling something civilian infrastructure. It looks at what the object actually does. An object counts as a military objective when by its nature, location, purpose, or use makes an effective contribution to military action and its total or partial destruction, capture, or disabling offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances at the time. 🧵1/6
That is the rule. Infrastructure linked to an enemy's ability to fight can be targeted. A bridge moving troops or supplies, a power plant supporting command and control or weapons production, and oil and gas facilities tied to military operations or logistics can/could qualify. The fact that these things also help civilian life does not make them off limits. Wars have always included objects that serve both sides, and the law takes that into account. 2/6
But being legal is never automatic. Every strike has to meet military necessity, distinction, proportionality, and feasible precautions. Leaders/Commanders decide based on what they know at the time whether the target is really a military objective that gives a definite military advantage. They weigh whether the expected harm to civilians and civilian objects would be excessive compared to that advantage. They also take all feasible steps with the target to minimize civilian harm. These choices happen in real conditions with limited information and get judged on what was known then, not later. 3/6
And yes, for all the predicable whataboutism, the repeated Russian strikes on Ukraine's power grid over the last 4+ years, in my opinion does raise real questions under the law of armed conflict. Not because power facilities can never be hit. They can if they meet the test. But the wide scale, the length of time, timing in conjunction with cold weather, and the pattern look more aimed at creating broad suffering among civilians and forcing political results than at gaining specific military gains. That difference counts. The expected advantage, the actual effects, and proportionality all matter. 4/6
So no Xperts, any strike on infrastructure does not automatically equal a war crime.
War crimes come from actually breaking the rules, such as intentionally attacking civilians or civilian objects, failing to make the required distinction, or causing incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected.
War crimes do not come simply from the type of target hit. Saying every strike on a bridge or power plant is illegal, without checking its actual military role, the advantage it was meant to provide, and the steps taken to limit civilian harm, is not real legal analysis/opinion. It is likely blind hate for political reasons or sheer ignorance. 5/6
For serious people that want to know more. Check the U.S. military Law of War manual:
It is insane how every so called "expert," academic getting 5 minutes of fame, podcaster, or media personality starts their critique or prediction of the war in Iran with regime change. Too bad it is a house of cards built on a lie 🧵
Such as "in all of military history, bombing campaigns have never caused a regime change." "The U.S. will lose the war, be embarrassed, didn't plan for this or that...Iran will win and be stronger...because the operation won't cause regime change."
Fact: In every speech, briefing, and official statement from President Trump, Secretary of Defense Hegseth, Secretary of State Rubio, the Joint Chiefs, and the White House, the objectives of Operation Epic Fury have been:
1. Destroy Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal and production capacity 2. Annihilate its navy 3. Ensure Iran can never obtain a nuclear weapon 4. End the regime’s ability to arm, fund, and direct terrorist proxies
They have never listed “regime change” as an official U.S. objective of the military operation.
What could possibly be the U.S. options in Iran? Most people jump from today to a full-scale ground invasion to seize Tehran, secure nuclear material by force, and destroy a supposed million-man army. That is shallow thinking. 🧵
President Trump has signaled a 10-day pause on energy infrastructure strikes (now extended to April 6). We are days into that timeline.
The real questions are not just what has been done, but what options remain.
It is given that CENTCOM and Israel will continue systematic attacks on Iran’s military system, its navy, missile forces, and military industrial base. Iran entered this war with thousands of ballistic missiles, hundreds of launchers, a massive naval complex...destroying Iran means to project power is a vital part of achieving the strategic goals.
Israel is also simultaneously continuing to target the regime’s ability to rule and oppress the population after the bombs stop falling. Hunting and eliminating political and military leadership. Basij units. Checkpoints. Internal security nodes.
The myth of short wars. By day 4 of the war in Iran, the experts showed up: “Why is this taking so long?” or "The U.S. is failing. Their strategy is not working." 🧵
War does not operate on social media timelines. Here are some limited objective wars/operations:
- Korean War (1950–1953): 3 years (1,125 days)
- Panama (Operation Just Cause, 1989–1990): 41 days
- Bosnia (Deliberate Force + IFOR/SFOR, 1995–2004): 9 years of NATO involvement
- Kosovo (Operation Allied Force, 1999): 78 days (KFOR 1999–present)
- Libya (Operation Unified Protector, 2011): 7 months (220+ days)
- Persian Gulf War (1990–1991): 38-day air campaign followed by a 4-day ground war (100 hours), after 5 months of buildup
- Operation Earnest Will (1987–1988): 14 months escorting tankers through the Strait of Hormuz)
And those are the “fast” ones. Most had overwhelming military advantage, defined objectives, and still required weeks, months, or years to achieve political outcomes.
The ongoing U.S.-Israel war with Iran (now in its fourth week) highlights Carl von Clausewitz's timeless insight: "War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty."
Today, open-source intelligence such as satellite imagery, social media reports, and frequent public statements creates an illusion of clarity. People track key leaders killed, rocket and missile launches, interceptions, reported hits, the number of ships struck in the Strait of Hormuz, and even the number of vessels the pass through it or Iran gets out of it daily.
“Decapitation strikes don’t work,” they say. “The strategy isn’t working,” they say after 5, 10, or 20 days.
Strategic effects are cumulative. Impatience is not analysis.
Let's review just what Israel has stuck in Iran according to @IDF 🧵
Eliminations of senior regime figures:
Supreme leader Ali Khamenei
Esmaeil Khatib: Minister of Intelligence
Ali Larijani: Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (regime’s effective leader at that time).
Gholamreza Soleimani: Commander of the Basij unit (6 years; oversaw repression).
Esmail Ahmadi: Head of the Intelligence Division of the Basij Force + several other senior Basij commanders.
Senior Ministry of Intelligence officials: Sayed Yahya Hamidi (Deputy Minister for ‘Israel Affairs’), Jalal Pour Hossein (Head of Espionage Division).
7 senior Iranian Defense Leadership officials: Ali Shamkhani, Mohammad Pakpour, Saleh Asadi, Mohammad Shirazi, Aziz Nasirzadeh, Hossein Jabal Amelian, Reza Mozaffari-Nia.
Additional Basij/ Internal Security/ IRGC commanders (e.g., in Ilam and Tehran strikes).
Regime Command Centers/Infrastructure, Headquarters, and Basij/Internal Security Sites:
Regional headquarters of the IRGC and the Basij Forces.
Key headquarters of the Basij Forces.
Several Basij unit headquarters (Ilam Province and broader).
Basij base and Basij headquarters (within a large eastern Tehran military compound, alongside IRGC, Quds Force, Internal Security, etc.).
Series of Basij and internal security command centers (Tehran).
Basij Forces entrance posts/posts/checkpoints (over 10 across Tehran; Basij soldiers targeted while guarding, including one at a western Iran Basij Force entrance post - these function as regime checkpoints/enforcement points).
Headquarters of the Iranian terror regime’s Internal Security Forces (Tehran and other provinces, including Alborz).
Central intelligence headquarters of the Ministry of Intelligence (Ilam Province).
Ministry of Intelligence headquarters (Tehran; struck during opening of Operation Roaring Lion).
IRGC's Ground Forces compound/command centers (Tehran and Ahvaz).
Special forces headquarters and other IRGC command centers (multiple provinces).
Port command center and naval operational infrastructure (Caspian Sea).
Central infrastructure for vessel repair/maintenance (Caspian Sea naval strike).
Air defense systems and infrastructure (widespread, including Tabriz and Tehran central base).
What are Israel's choices in Gaza? The insanity of double standards and uninformed analysis about the war in Gaza.🧵 1/21
War is uncertain by its nature. It is human, it is political, and it absolutely uncertain. To say there is only one way for the war in Gaza to end is not connected to the complete history of war. 2/21
To say Israel has achieved its goals and should end the war is not true and often disconnected from reality. To say Israel can’t achieve its goals, is not true and full of double standards. 3/21