In my latest for @nytopinion, I examine what the Iran war reveals about Moscow's ties to Tehran and why Iran remains a valuable, if increasingly vulnerable, partner for Russia.
Moscow has certainly appeared to be a beneficiary of the United States’ miring itself in a war in Iran. Oil prices are up, some sanctions have been waived, and Western attention is fractured. Moscow's coffers are refilling while Ukraine peace talks sit on pause.
Iran has held on for weeks, imposing real costs on the global economy, before a limited ceasefire was announced. For Russia, that endurance matters. But even if Tehran claims victory, it emerges battered, poorer, and more isolated.
If the ceasefire collapses, continued strikes, sanctions, and internal strain could push Iran toward fragmentation. The war that has been Russia's windfall becomes its worst nightmare, almost overnight.
For Moscow, Iran has long been a partner that imposes costs on the U.S. without requiring direct Russian exposure. In that sense, it is close to irreplaceable.
Iran is not Assad. Putin let Syria fall when saving it cost more than it was worth. Iran is a peer, not a client. It has its own revolutionary ideology, its own reach, and a proven ability to choke the global economy. It creates pressure on America in ways that benefit Russia.
As I argue in the piece and my book, Russia-Iran partnership is also far denser than it looks - spanning shared military technology, surveillance tools, repression tactics, and sanctions-evasion networks. If the Islamic Republic falls, all of it unravels. hurstpublishers.com/book/russia-an…
Moscow has never pledged to fight the U.S. for Iran, or vice versa. The aim is mutual endurance, ensuring each can fight longer alone. Both regimes treat dissent as a threat, making repression tools as valuable to share as weapons systems.
Russia is unlikely to intervene overtly without risking escalation with the U.S. Instead, it leans on quieter support aligned with its playbook: ISR and targeting assistance, satellite data, EW support, navigation inputs, and technical exchange on drones and missiles.
Russia can also shape Iran’s reconstitution: helping restore missile production, supplying components, offering technical expertise, and potentially sensitive nuclear-related knowledge transfer short of overt proliferation.
Finally, what binds Moscow and Tehran is a shared grievance toward the U.S.-led order and a belief it is designed to constrain them. Their partnership rests on endurance, adaptation, and mutual enablement, a logic that will outlast this war.
Trump is presenting a two-week ceasefire, conditional on Iran opening the Strait of Hormuz, as effectively agreed and part of a broader deal nearing completion.
That is a strong claim. It should be treated cautiously.
The “workable basis” Trump refers to is Iran’s own 10-point proposal. Iran’s 10-point plan calls for an end to all conflicts in the region, a protocol for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, reconstruction support, and the lifting of sanctions. None of that is minor.
Trump also says “almost all points of past contention” have been agreed. That’s a very expansive claim. If true, it would imply movement on issues that have historically been difficult to bridge. There’s not yet clear external confirmation of that level of convergence.
What stands out after the first month is not a clean story of Iranian collapse or resilience, but an attritional campaign where all sides are achieving some objectives while falling short on others.
Thread on Iranian operations 🧵
From the Iranian side, the core fact is endurance under pressure. After a month of sustained U.S.-Israeli strikes, only a portion of Iran’s missile force can be confidently assessed as destroyed.
The IRGC-AF was built to absorb this kind of campaign. Dispersal, tunneling, and launcher redundancy have enabled continued strikes, but not without cost. Attrition, ISR pressure, and launcher losses are still constraining Iranian operations.
Iran’s nuclear program under Ayatollah Khamenei was never just a technical initiative — it was political, ideological, and tightly controlled by the Supreme Leader. 🧵
Khamenei had ultimate authority on whether Iran engaged internationally, how it advanced enrichment, and how it dealt with the U.S. and nuclear diplomacy. He also had authority over Iran’s past covert efforts at weaponization.
Khamenei’s oft-cited fatwa against nuclear weapons exists, but its strength and scope are contested. At times, he forbade development, stockpiling, and use. Other times, he spoke more narrowly about use, not production — leaving space for reinterpretation.
A lot of technical assessments of Iran’s nuclear program feel rushed. There’s an overreliance on fuel cycle basics and projections built on major unknowns while overlooking domestic factors eg institutional disruption, procurement challenges, and acute paranoia.
The reality is that we simply don’t know enough right now. We don’t know 1) where Iran’s HEU stockpile is; 2) the extent of damage underground or inside the tunnels; 3) what centrifuge parts were salvaged or where they went; 4) if material or equipment was moved. Among others.
Be cautious of assessments that hinge on best-case weaponization timelines. Iran today is not a frictionless actor. There are real bottlenecks: endemic corruption, procurement disruptions, and coordination challenges across military and nuclear institutions etc.
The narrative that Russia has not come to Iran's aid is a bit simplistic. It misconstrues the nature of ties and makes certain assumptions about Russian commitments to Iran that deviate from reality.
Thread:
The 2025 Russia-Iran Strategic Partnership Treaty does not include a mutual defense clause. That was deliberate. Neither side wants to be dragged into the other's wars. In fact, during negotiations, it was Iran, less so Russia, that pushed to avoid this kind of entanglement.
Moscow's recent attempts to de-escalate tensions or mediate are not altruistic. Russia is pursuing its interests, mediation opens a channel to extract concessions from the US. This doesn’t preclude simultaneous support to Iran and Russian policy often runs on parallel tracks.
Decision-makers in Iran are in a moment of crisis akin to Saddam’s invasion in 1980. The top military leadership has been targeted. Numerous civilian casualties. Most importantly, there are likely to be subsequent waves of strikes. 🧵
Iran has largely been restrained in its targeting of Israel, both in October and April — mostly military installations with connections to hostilities. Whereas its missiles have issues with accuracy, Iran is still able to overwhelm Israeli air defenses and target civilian areas.
Israel made a pretty big gambit. I don’t see this as an unequivocal victory for Israel. Iran’s retaliation won’t be soft targets like air bases. Either something far more escalatory like civilian/critical infrastructure in terms of Israel proper or targets abroad.