In my latest for @nytopinion, I examine what the Iran war reveals about Moscow's ties to Tehran and why Iran remains a valuable, if increasingly vulnerable, partner for Russia. Moscow has certainly appeared to be a beneficiary of the United States’ miring itself in a war in Iran. Oil prices are up, some sanctions have been waived, and Western attention is fractured. Moscow's coffers are refilling while Ukraine peace talks sit on pause.

Trump is presenting a two-week ceasefire, conditional on Iran opening the Strait of Hormuz, as effectively agreed and part of a broader deal nearing completion.

That is a strong claim. It should be treated cautiously. The “workable basis” Trump refers to is Iran’s own 10-point proposal. Iran’s 10-point plan calls for an end to all conflicts in the region, a protocol for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, reconstruction support, and the lifting of sanctions. None of that is minor.

What stands out after the first month is not a clean story of Iranian collapse or resilience, but an attritional campaign where all sides are achieving some objectives while falling short on others.

Thread on Iranian operations 🧵 From the Iranian side, the core fact is endurance under pressure. After a month of sustained U.S.-Israeli strikes, only a portion of Iran’s missile force can be confidently assessed as destroyed.

Iran’s nuclear program under Ayatollah Khamenei was never just a technical initiative — it was political, ideological, and tightly controlled by the Supreme Leader. 🧵 Khamenei had ultimate authority on whether Iran engaged internationally, how it advanced enrichment, and how it dealt with the U.S. and nuclear diplomacy. He also had authority over Iran’s past covert efforts at weaponization.

A lot of technical assessments of Iran’s nuclear program feel rushed. There’s an overreliance on fuel cycle basics and projections built on major unknowns while overlooking domestic factors eg institutional disruption, procurement challenges, and acute paranoia. The reality is that we simply don’t know enough right now. We don’t know 1) where Iran’s HEU stockpile is; 2) the extent of damage underground or inside the tunnels; 3) what centrifuge parts were salvaged or where they went; 4) if material or equipment was moved. Among others.

The narrative that Russia has not come to Iran's aid is a bit simplistic. It misconstrues the nature of ties and makes certain assumptions about Russian commitments to Iran that deviate from reality.

Thread: The 2025 Russia-Iran Strategic Partnership Treaty does not include a mutual defense clause. That was deliberate. Neither side wants to be dragged into the other's wars. In fact, during negotiations, it was Iran, less so Russia, that pushed to avoid this kind of entanglement.

Decision-makers in Iran are in a moment of crisis akin to Saddam’s invasion in 1980. The top military leadership has been targeted. Numerous civilian casualties. Most importantly, there are likely to be subsequent waves of strikes. 🧵 Iran has largely been restrained in its targeting of Israel, both in October and April — mostly military installations with connections to hostilities. Whereas its missiles have issues with accuracy, Iran is still able to overwhelm Israeli air defenses and target civilian areas.

Earlier today US and Iranian officials began indirect nuclear talks in Muscat, Oman—the first high-level engagement since the withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018. Talks will reconvene next week on 19 April.

Thread on what a successful agreement could include: After 4 rounds of indirect discussions, Iranian FM Abbas Araghchi and U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff briefly met face-to-face.

Witkoff described the talks as a “positive & constructive conversation” while Araghchi called them “constructive and promising.”

Russia-Iran Strategic Partnership Treaty Thread Preamble, predictably invokes the desire "to promote an objective process of forming a new just and sustainable multipolar world order" and emphasizes political, economic, military, cultural-humanitarian, and scientific-technical cooperation

A few months before Assad’s fall, it seemed pretty clear - despite inability to deter Israel - that the IRGC Aerospace Force was becoming more powerful than the IRGC Quds Force. Partly due to Hajizadeh vs Qaani’s profiles and the setbacks to the axis of resistance.

https://twitter.com/glcarlstrom/status/1867428892065358029

Irans adv air defenses took a big hit in Oct. Now they appear to be deploying older and shorter range systems like the Tor-M1 or the Khordad to sites - if anyone has information on the Bavar 373’s performance in October, please lmk I have not had good answers on this.

https://twitter.com/benreuter_imint/status/1866856217265811946

Thread on Shoigu’s visit to Tehran: It looks like the meeting is a follow up to the Ahmadian’s invitation in May - it is unclear when the meeting was organized and if this is all a coincidence. Implications are pretty clear if it was organized over the past few days but if it was planned before, Shoigu’s decision to travel to Iran in the current climate (and not reschedule) is another indication of strengthening Russia-Iran ties amid deteriorating Russia-Israel ties.

Rolling thread on the leaked documents about Russia, Iran, and the drone factory in Alabuga The documents presented here have not been verified or confirmed by any official sources. While some contents align with existing reports about Russia's collaboration with Iran, certain elements in the documents raise questions.

RIA Novosti claims that Ukraine is preparing a "provocation" with a "dirty bomb" aka the use of a low-yield nuclear weapon in Ukraine, article suggests this information is coming from officials in numerous countries including Ukraine ria.ru/20221023/provo… The purpose of the provocation is to accuse Russia of using nuclear weapons to undermine international support for Moscow and to remove Russia from the UNSC

Peskov: The Kremlin does not know what Biden meant when he said that Putin cannot remain in power, Biden speech suggests that he is the victim of his own delusions

https://twitter.com/ru_rbc/status/1507803767219097601

Peskov: there are other parts of Biden's speech that were worse about Russia. In regards to isolating Russia, the US does not understand that the world is not limited to the US and Europe.

Thread on Russian civilian nuclear cooperation with Iran, Russia’s role in the JCPOA, and the technical aspects of the deal in relation to Russia
1/ Russia was anticipated to support the restoration of the JCPOA by:
- converting centrifuges at Fordow to produce stable isotopes
- providing fuel for the TRR
- exporting the excess stockpiles of enriched uranium (potentially spent fuel)

2/

Iran’s relationship with Russia has been a significant factor in its failure to realize its so-called “historic interests in Central Asia” but the states in the region haven’t been particularly receptive to Iranian influence

https://twitter.com/ksadjadpour/status/1500152623697207303

Central Asia has never really been a focus of Iranian foreign policy, Iran tried to establish a presence in the region with Velayati traveling there in 1989 but soon realized it’s limitations. Uzbekistan was particularly averse to Iranian presence, and Iran’s support for

Russian has demanded U.S. guarantees that Western sanctions imposed on Russia over Ukraine would not damage its cooperation with Iran. This seems to indicate that the compartmentalization of the JCPOA and Ukraine is increasingly being untenable /1 Russia’s nuclear cooperation with Iran had been subjected to sanctions before, especially during the Trump Administration. But Russia has historically used Iran as a bargaining chip w/ the US to elicit reciprocity on issues like WTO, 1–2-3 nuclear agreement etc /2

I’ve been following Russian efforts to reduce its reliance on SWIFT and the USD in the context of Russia-Iran relations for awhile now. Little progress has been made despite numerous statements about cooperation on de-dollarization. 1/ In 2014, the Central Bank of Russia launched its own system for the transmission of financial messages (SPFS) in an attempt to mitigate the fall-out over a potential Russian disconnection from SWIFT. 2/