Russia has entered a critical stage of the Kostiantynivka campaign, concentrating forces from several army groupings in what appears to be one of its priority operational sectors. The immediate objective is to seize Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka, which would open the southern and southeastern approaches to the larger Sloviansk-Kramatorsk defensive agglomeration. To support this effort, Russian command has reinforced the sector with units from multiple formations — including elements drawn from AG Centre and AG Dniepr to supplement AG South own 8th Army and 3rd AC — indicating both the importance of the objective and the difficulty of achieving it with local forces alone.
The current offensive is developing along several converging axes. From the south, Russian troops advancing from Berestok pushed through an overgrown ravine to reach the southwestern outskirts of Ivanivka, while simultaneously massing infantry in Berestok itself in preparation for a larger infiltration into western Kostiantynivka via the T-0504 road corridor.
On the southwestern axis, Russian assault groups have been fighting for over two weeks along the Yablonivka–Stepanivka line, attempting to push through toward Dovha Balka, though so far only a tenuous foothold in the southern part of Stepanivka has been established. Further south, assaults continue near Pleshchiivka and Ivanopillia, likely intended to push Ukrainian defenders northward and secure the flanks of the main attack.
From the southeast and east, forces advancing from Stupochky, Predtechyne, and the Dacha area have achieved limited penetration into the outskirts of the city, where heavy fighting is reported near the railway station and residential streets including Kyivska and Odeska.
Separately, elements of the 150th and 20th MRDivs are pressing toward Druzhkivka directly along the Sofiivka–Raiiske and Rusyn Yar axes on the western flank. These movements suggest an attempt to compress Ukrainian defenses from multiple directions rather than rely on a single frontal breakthrough.
Despite these efforts, Russian progress remains tactical rather than operational. They have gained footholds on the outskirts and in contested gray zones, but there is still no confirmed breakthrough into the central urban area. Ukrainian defenders continue to hold important blocking positions south and east of the city, while maintaining a broader defensive line that prevents rapid encirclement. The Russian advance appears slow, methodical, and costly, relying on repeated infantry assaults supported by artillery and localized armored thrusts.
A major factor shaping the battle is the continued Ukrainian presence around Chasiv Yar. Russian 70th MRDiv attempts to break out along the railway toward Verolubivka and the Stinka–Nikolaivka–Krasne–Podolske line have so far failed, leaving the Ukrainian pocket intact. As long as Ukrainian forces retain positions there, Russian units of the 3rd AC pushing toward Kostiantynivka from the southeast remain exposed to possible flank counterattacks. This forces Russian command to divert part of its forces northward from Stupochky to secure its own lines instead of committing everything directly against Kostiantynivka. In effect, fighting around Chasiv Yar continues to influence the Kostiantynivka battle even without a dramatic frontline shift.
Operationally, time is becoming an important variable. Russia likely intended faster progress during the winter-spring period in preparation for a broader 2026 summer campaign toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. The slower-than-expected pace means every additional week spent storming Kostiantynivka reduces the chances of transitioning quickly into a larger offensive. Attrition of assault infantry, armored vehicles, artillery ammunition, and experienced junior leadership could become more damaging than the limited territorial gains justify.
Looking forward, several scenarios are possible. If Ukraine sustains its current defense, Russia may become locked in a prolonged urban battle that drains combat power and delays wider operations. If Russia captures Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka would come under immediate pressure and southern routes toward Kramatorsk would become more vulnerable. However, even a Russian victory in the city would not automatically create a breakthrough, as further advances would require fresh reserves, logistical support, and the ability to overcome successive Ukrainian defensive belts.
Overall, the battle for Kostiantynivka is becoming more than a local engagement. It is increasingly a test of whether Russia can convert massed assaults and numerical pressure into meaningful operational momentum, or whether Ukrainian resistance can force another costly culmination before the next planned phase of the war.
Russian forces are trying to resume offensive momentum toward Huliaipole, while simultaneously stabilizing the situation on the Novоoleksandrivka axis after Ukrainian counterattacks.
On the Huliaipole axis, Russian troops achieved limited tactical gains south of the sector, advancing toward Verkhna Tersa and intensifying pressure along multiple directions. However, their progress remains inconsistent and slowed, especially due to Ukrainian resistance around key defensive areas like the Huliaichur river line and settlements forming defensive "triangles".
On the Novоoleksandrivka axis, the situation is more unstable. Ukrainian forces are actively counterattacking, trying to expand their positions and threaten Russian flanks—particularly aiming to disrupt Russian operations by pushing toward Uspenivka–Temyrivka. These actions have forced Russian units to focus on holding ground rather than advancing.
Overall, the battlefield is highly fragmented, with frequent close-range fighting, infiltration by small infantry groups, and "mixed" frontlines. Russian forces are currently struggling to regain strong offensive tempo, while Ukrainian forces are successfully slowing advances and applying pressure on vulnerable sectors.
Russian command is expected to maintain its main focus on the Huliaipole axis, continuing attempts to break through toward the Orikhiv defensive area from the east and southeast. Reinforcements and reserves will likely be directed primarily to this sector to restore offensive momentum.
At the same time, on the Novоoleksandrivka axis, Russian forces will likely continue a defensive-stabilization role, relying on limited forces and localized counterattacks to contain Ukrainian pressure rather than launching major offensives.
The key variable is Ukrainian action: if Ukrainian forces manage to break through toward Uspenivka–Temyrivka, this could threaten Russian flank cohesion and force them to divert forces from the main Huliaipole offensive, slowing or even halting it.
However, if Ukrainian counterattacks remain limited, Russian forces will likely sustain gradual pressure on Huliaipole, aiming for incremental gains rather than rapid breakthroughs. The overall trajectory suggests continued attritional fighting, with the initiative depending on whether Ukraine can scale its counteroffensive efforts on the northern flank.
The Season is open, and there have been many valuable threads and articles covering individual fronts, both recent and historical. Before diving into the details, it is worth stepping back to examine the broader operational picture.
Russia is currently operating five Army Groups along the front line, with an additional Northern Screening Group whose primary purpose is border raiding, harassment of AFU positions, and fixing Ukrainian forces in place.
AGs act separately but will be forced to cooperate.
The major objective of Russia's 2026 offensive campaign should be assessed as Kramatorsk. The prerequisites for this operation are nearly complete. The secondary objective is Zaporizhzhia, an axis that has been partially disrupted by AFU counter-operations. The third objective is border consolidation — expanding and formalizing the buffer zone into Ukrainian territory.
Three Russian Army Groups are expected to converge on the Kramatorsk operation, Two at Zaporizhzhia, and whatever Skirmish Army will do.
Look at the battlefield as a system of crumple zones - areas deliberately designed to fail under pressure while absorbing as much damage as possible, still protecting the vital nodes behind them.
Ditches and earthworks define the overall pattern of this system, but the actual defense relies on a constellation of strongpoints of varying size. These positions are meant to hold for as long as conditions allow and to be abandoned when necessary. Their value lies not in permanence, but in the time, attrition, and disruption they impose on the attacker.
Such a system is inherently imperfect. It may fail for many reasons: manpower shortages, command-and-control friction, logistics constraints, or degraded operational awareness. These risks are not exceptions- they are expected variables under current conditions. The design accepts failure at the tactical level in order to preserve operational coherence and prevent strategic collapse.
GSUA
Russians made 5976! assaults at 229 settlements - 59 settlements werent mentioned since October, 36 were mentioned for the first time;
extended by 531km2: capturing 468km2, gray out 62km2.
One of the most attack Intensive months led to mediocre results in exchange of 31190 ivanZ in infantry friendly conditions.
Attack distribution by directions.
Undefined share has significantly increased, as well as Toretsk.
Novopavlivka spilled on Huliaipole.
Kharkiv activities - decreased.
Race to Zaporizhzhia
Russian Army Group East is slowly advancing through the fields of the southern front, with the defensive nodes of Orikhiv and Huliaipole standing between them and the main battle. The poor road network and mostly flat terrain shape every movement on this axis
The Zaporizhzhia front is built around two rivers: the Konka and the Haichur.
Along the Konka lies a chain of settlements forming a dense rural agglomeration. The valley is similar to the Kryvyi Torets corridor, it forms a natural defensive arc with exceptionally strong cover
In contrast, the settlements along the Haichur are small and scattered, which makes the Haichur sector the only area truly suitable for a breakthrough. Still, both river lines are surrounded by relatively large settlements, and this is what creates the current defensive grid.