Some long-discussed/planned changes that I am now starting to implement on the Oryx loss list for the war in Ukraine:
Equipment that has, over time, turned into cheap consumables, and its documented losses became gradually more detached from real losses, will stop being added, and around the end of April or early May will be removed.
This will affect the following equipment:
all recon UAVs (UCAVs are staying)
all UGVs
some smaller vehicles currently listed under the "trucks" category, like Ulan ATVs
The equipment that will be delisted has, over time, turned into consumables - being produced and lost in vast quantities - making it both far less common that their losses are documented
and if somehow we were able to document them, the loss list would be completely overrun by tens of thousands of drones (with numbers only going higher).
For the truck category, it will be a relatively small change, since heavy cargo transport vehicles will be kept, and only some smaller vehicles, whose purpose is primarily to move people (like Ulan ATVs, UAZ-469, etc.) will be removed.
For those interested, our colleagues at @WarSpotting are still listing these equipment losses for the Russian side.
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Russia is just using much fewer AFVs than during earlier parts of the war, now either using light infantry or ATVs, civilian cars, etc. which is equipment we dont add to the list.
Ukraine is still using IMVs/MRAPs/APCs to transport troops - those vehicles are being lost, but they protect the crews, and so the result is losing equipment instead of people.
Ukraine has received around 15 000 MRAPs + IMVs + APCs from the West, so they can afford to do this.
/thread/
Since the start of the Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Oryx team (with help from our colleagues at @WarSpotting and many independent volunteers) has documented 35 579 equipment losses on both sides of the war.
Here are some interesting data for the 4th anniversary of the start of the war
Splits by equipment type for both sides, and splits by status
Detailed split of major Russian tanks/AFV/IFV platform losses:
There is an ongoing debate about the current size of the Russian AFV fleet, losses it has taken, new production level storage+reactivation, etc.
Here is my take on the topic
notes:
this is just my take on the "middle case " - so I am going for what is IMO the most plausible interpretation of the data, not hyper-optimistic/pessimistic interpretation of the data that some folks use.
I rounded the numbers slightly to make it easier to read
At the start of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia had approximately (incl. marines + VDV + LDPR forces):
3000 tanks + 7200 in storage
3500 BMP-1/2s + 7100 in storage
650 BMP-3s
2500 BTR-80/82s +3600 older BTRs in storage
1000 BMDs + 600 in storage
3500 MT-LBs +4200 in storage
An interesting and long thread. While I agree with some parts, I disagree with others (hunting infantry is IMO necessary due to the very sparse infantry coverage of the FLOT)
IMO, the root cause of many current problems with drone use are the relative lack of resources and splitting of drone units among many organizations - with the resulting lack of any standardization and coordination.
So, the following should happen:
1. Magyar is saying that USF is now 2% of UA military and that he needs to tripple that - he should get the relevant resources (people and funding) ASAP.
(USF should become a real branch of the Ukrainian military, not just on paper)
1. The author is apparently making a judgement over a weapon system purely based on his own limited experience - with no references to any other sources, data, or analysis. That is an increasibly small (and rather falwed) sample size for judging a type of weapon systems.
3. Based on the description of authors experience it didnt appear that the unit he served in was particulary capable, skilled, or well-equipped in the use of combat drones.
/long thread/ While I dont think attack helicopters (AHs) are dead, IMO Chieftan is in this video way overestimating their viability on a modern peer and near-peer conventional battlefield
He starts with the "It can do thing that nothing else can" argument, but without acknowledging that the amount of things that attack helicopters can do that other assets or combinations of assets are unable to do has shrunk a lot in recent times.
The Polish order for 96 AH-64s is repeatedly brought up as an argument for AHs being just fine, but that order appears to be an outlier and subject of uncertainties that could see it scaled down or cancelled.