On the surface, this looks like a standard economic story. But in Russia, this is a major departure from the norm.
The country has been through far worse without public acknowledgement from the top. So when criticism appears, it usually serves a political function.
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It appears Putin is pressuring his government before September's Duma elections. Elite infighting and controlled instability are normal in election years and can be expected now.
We may see a government reshuffle, as has been done before to reset public opinion.
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Putin's ratings are struggling right now, to the extent that even state-run polls are showing a noticeable drop in presidential approval.
When official pollsters publish that kind of decline, it's a signal that the information is being used within the system itself.
What we're seeing is part of a broader internal struggle between the civilian-political administration and the security services, with the primary battleground being control over internet access.
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Until recently, online policy was handled by the political bloc in the Presidential Administration, which avoided harsh restrictions before elections to limit public backlash.
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Now, that control has shifted. The FSB has taken a more direct role, including blocking messaging platforms and restricting communications tools in a bid to contain opposition activity.
Heavy-handed restrictions risk alienating voters, especially in an already strained economic environment. For the political managers, that's a problem.
The response has been subtle but telling. Systemic "opposition" parties have been allowed to criticise the restrictions, and even to campaign on platforms that are officially blocked.
This indicates that not everyone within the system agrees with the approach taken by the security services, and opens the door for public dissatisfaction to be redirected in a way that is usually not permitted.
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Put all of this together, and a pattern emerges. Economic criticism, Putin's falling ratings, and disputes over internet control are not separate issues. They are interconnected pieces of an internal power struggle.
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The key question now is whether this pressure results in another government reshuffle, or whether it escalates into something bigger. Either way, the next few months are unlikely to be quiet.
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For deeper analysis on what's happening inside the Russian system — including the parts that don't make it into Western media — subscribe to my free substack:
Those were the closing lines of a note left by Nina Litvinova, 80, before she stepped out of a window in Moscow.
🧵Read her story
Nina Litvinova was born in Moscow in 1945 into one of the most consequential Soviet families. Her grandfather Maxim Litvinov ran Stalin's foreign ministry in the 1930s and served as ambassador to Washington during the war. He was Jewish and an open anti-fascist.
[2/16]
Stalin pushed him out in 1939 to clear the way for the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. After the war, when Litvinov warned American journalists that Moscow would soon turn on the West, Stalin recalled him.
He died in 1951 with a loaded revolver by his bed — an "insurance policy" against the secret police.
His "fortress" is cracking and half his decrees are now secret — so Russians can't see how badly the regime is failing.
Here's what he's hiding 👇 [1/11]
There have been no precedents to this blackout in modern history. In 2023, Putin set a record: 49.5% of presidential decrees were secret. Even last year, almost 45% of his orders remain hidden from public view. Half of the Russian government's actions are now officially "invisible."
[2/11]
What gets classified tells you what they fear. Examples:
➜ The "Cannibal Battalions": Secret decrees likely mask the mass pardoning of murderers and rapists sent to the front. The state calls them heroes but keeps the paperwork hidden because the public would revolt.
Imagine this: A major disaster hits your country. People are dying, cities are burning, the environment is ruined. You look to your national leader for a plan, but they've nowhere to be found.
Sounds unlikely? In Putin's Russia, it's an everyday reality. In 26 years in power, he has vanished every time the nation is in pain. [1/16]
Right now, in Russia's Tuapse, it's literally raining oil. After drone strikes, black soot covers the city, animals are dying, and a 10,000 sq m slick is spreading in the Black Sea. And the president is radio silent.
[2/16]
Residents are choking on benzene levels three times the limit and desperately asking, "Where is Putin?" Well, while Tuapse faces an ecological disaster he is busy renaming his alma mater after Dzerzhinsky (the Cheka founder) and meeting the President of the Seychelles.
The West keeps making the same fundamental mistake about Russia.
I’ve spent a decade in the system, ten years in six different Russian prisons, and if there’s one thing I’ve learned, it’s that switching the "Tsar" won't fix a thing.
Here is why the "Good Tsar" myth is a trap, and what actually needs to happen. 🧵 [1/12]
There is a prevailing hope in DC and Brussels that if we just replace the current man in the Kremlin with a "liberal" leader, everything will click into place.
I’m telling you: It won’t. [2/12]
I once conducted a small "social experiment."
I met with four high-ranking, qualified American politicians and asked them: "Imagine you wake up tomorrow as the President of Russia. It’s a massive, diverse territory controlled by a rigid center. To maintain power, the center must strip 60% of resources from the regions and then redistribute them.
Viktor Orban, one of Moscow’s most dependable EU allies, is out. This result carries massive implications for Russia’s ability to project power and disruption across Europe.
Here is why Moscow is panicking. 🧵 [1/14]
Putin’s EU Veto: The End of Strategic Obstruction
For years, Orban turned Hungary into a pressure point inside the EU. Because of the bloc's need for unanimity, Budapest could, and often did, slow or block decisions on any issue, be it sanctions, funding, or military support. [2/14]
The Cost of Obstruction.
Orbán’s track record of blocking aid to Ukraine is staggering:
2022: Blocked an €18bn aid package.
2023: Stalled crucial payments through the European Peace Facility.
2024: Obstructed a €90bn long-term support plan for Kyiv. [3/14]