1/ Russian drone developers are complaining that because of bureaucratic restrictions, they are having to use firecrackers as the warheads on interceptor drones, or rely solely on kinetic methods instead of explosive warheads. ⬇️
2/ The Russian warblogger 'UAV Developer' shows a photo of two firecrackers and asks:
"Do you know what this is?
It's the warhead of an interceptor drone."
3/ "While those Ukrainian drones are hitting a house in Yekaterinburg, smashing a landing craft in Crimea with shrapnel, and killing a dozen civilians along the way, the developers of interceptor drones are trying to somehow circumvent the restrictions of the mad printer…
4/ …[i.e. the State Duma] by inventing air defence systems out of shit and sticks.
One solution is to install a FIRECRACKER on board!
Because you can't put anything else on board. Not even a fucking 50-gram block of TNT.
Because it's peacetime and nothing's happening.
5/ "Because you can't use IEDs behind the line of contact.
Because it's dangerous. Therefore, the Yolka and similar drones are "kinetic" weapons (they poke their snouts at something in the hopes of knocking it over or triggering a self-detonation).
6/ "With limited effectiveness, to put it mildly.
But enemy drones have highly effective warheads and can shoot down up to 70% of Geran [drones].
7/ "Is there another example in world history of citizens defending their country despite the government's efforts and prohibitions?
I'm just curious."
8/ The Yolka drone mentioned above is a kinetic interceptor which has severe operational limitations, as the thread linked below highlights.
9/ Alex Kartavykh is furious at the way that bureaucracy is hampering drone development, and helpfully provides a flowchart illustrating how workflow operates in the Russian civil service:
10/ "We have one problem, globally. And it's not a lack of money, people, or brains. It's INTERDEPARTMENTAL IMPOTENCE. Where each respected agency vigilantly guards its feudal and bureaucratic privileges and takes no more than the bare minimum.
11/ "That's why NO ONE IS PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE for most of what happens in the country, because it's located at the intersection of departments and services. At these intersections, there are standard gaps, still unresolved in the fifth year of the Special Military Operation.
12/ "Everything gets stuck and stalls there. INTERDEPARTMENTAL MEETINGS are convened. At them, everyone grumbles about everything good and everything bad, jerks off to each other, and the money goes in the cup.
13/ "Like in the old meme:
Sit and shut up, or they'll make you work. When the shit hits the fan, that's when you'll start making a move.
14/ "We all pretend we don't know shit, it's not me and it's not my ass, we thought it was supposed to be that way, no one reported it to us, etc.
And it usually works.
15/ "Incidentally, Telegram has occasionally solved this problem through media coverage. The crap would hit the fan, and everyone involved would suddenly stop being stupid and heroically solve the problem. It's a shame Telegram got banned, of course.
16/ "So now, perhaps, our domestic bureaucracy needs to invent a nanotechnology called PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. Appoint these very same personal accountability officers (not scapegoats, but straight from the top of respected agencies), give them deadlines and KPIs.
17/ "And then BEAT THEM WITH A STICK when they still can't agree on anything. In other words, we need to shift logic from bureaucratic (where "sit and don't talk") to feudal (where "either in the crosses or in the bushes"). There's a war going on, dumbass.
18/ "Tuapse is burning, Ust-Luga is being fucked. What firecrackers, are you kidding me?" /end
1/ Could Dmitri Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council, be lying about the current level of recruitment to the Russian army? This appalling and unprecedented scenario is considered by Russian warbloggers, who smell a rat in his claims of success. ⬇️
2/ 'Artjockey' has spotted something odd about recent claims made by Medvedev, and suspects statistical cheating:
"The day before yesterday, Medvedev announced that the contract recruitment plan was being met, and that talk of mobilisation was an enemy plot."
3/ "He backed up his statement with statistics:
▪️ During the first 6 months [of 2026], “about” 200 thousand people and 16 thousand volunteers signed contracts;
▪️ Of these, 40,000 joined the unmanned systems forces.
1/ A massive new mobilisation in Russia this fall is increasingly being forecast by Russian warbloggers. They are, however, cautious about this prospect given the strains on the Russian economy and the chaos that accompanied the 2022 mobilisation. ⬇️
2/ 'DsHRG Rusich' comments:
3/ "We've already been mobilising (partially) since 2020. Another mass recruitment will most likely indeed happen, and it will probably happen after the Duma elections in September. Various crazy bans, internet restrictions, etc. are being prepared for this, among other things.
1/ With rumours of a new mobilisation in the fall sweeping the Russian blogosphere, one warblogger wonders: what's the point? He points out that the land that Russia has seized is essentially worthless, having been destroyed, depopulated, and strewn with mines. ⬇️
2/ Roman Alekhin probably isn't doing himself any favours (he's already been declared a 'foreign agent' by the Kremlin), but he is at least willing to go where other warbloggers haven't been willing, and question the purpose of continuing the war:
3/ "[Analyses] lead to one conclusion that could prevent a crisis or mitigate its impact: ending the conflict.
At the same time, depending on the conditions, ending the conflict could lead to different consequences.
1/ Russian online marketplaces are reportedly trying to discourage their sellers offering non-lethal military equipment, for which Ukraine has targeted them. According to one such seller, fees of as much as 60% are now being charged on such equipment by the marketplaces. ⬇️
2/ The 'Forge of Mordor' channel, which makes and sells equipment to soldiers, comments:
3/ "Everyone feels sorry for Wildberries, but in reality, they're doing the following:
- Banning the sale of weapon modifications (or rather, imposing an additional fine)
- Multiple increases in commissions for everything war-related.
1/ Another Wildberries warehouse is on fire, this time in Sarapul, after a Ukrainian drone strike. As the ongoing massacre of Wildberries facilities continues, Russian warbloggers are becoming steadily more irate about air defence failures. ⬇️
2/ 'Combat Reserve' is furious, pointing to the lack of willingness among commanders and officials to take responsibility (a long-running problem; see the thread below).
1/ Russia's mobile fire teams (MOGs), which are the backbone of its defences against Ukrainian drones, are poorly paid and lack the benefits given to soldiers. Despite the dangers – MOGs have been attacked – their members do not get the benefits or pay that soldiers receive. ⬇️
2/ The authorities in Krasnodar Krai have announced that they will form mobile fire teams from employees of critical infrastructure and enterprises in Kuban to protect these facilities.
3/ Workers will be able to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defence, and a monthly salary of 50,000 rubles [$627] will be provided. Fire team members are guaranteed not to be deployed to Ukraine (though how iron-clad this guarantee really is remains to be seen).