1/ After spending years demanding a full mobilisation, Igor 'Strelkov' Girkin has come to the realisation that it would now be pointless: Ukraine's swarms of drones are capable of destroying "any number of infantry", and Russia doesn't even have enough weapons to arm them. ⬇️
2/ A reader of his Telegram channel asks:
"Question: there's increasing talk of possible mobilisation—do you think the government will take such a step? And is mobilisation necessary under the current circumstances?"
To which Girkin replies:
3/ "Mobilisation was needed in the spring of 2022, the spring of 2023, the spring of 2024, and perhaps even the spring of 2025. Now, mobilisation is catastrophically late. Currently, mobilisation, as perceived by the majority of the population, will yield no results.
4/ "What we need now is to mobilise the military economy. The time when we could defeat, trample, and drive the enemy into the ground with masses of infantry is, unfortunately, over. It existed in '22, '23, and '24. It's doubtful in '25, and it simply doesn't exist in '26.
5/ "We are currently waging a war of drones, capable of destroying any number of infantry deployed to battle on any front, no matter how broad.
6/ "The enemy has established such a production of drones and missiles in Europe and in so-called Ukraine itself that it is now capable of holding the front almost entirely with them, which is precisely what is happening.
7/ "This means that large masses of people and equipment will be destroyed without achieving any success. Time has been lost.
8/ "Therefore, mobilisation is, of course, necessary if we are to win at all, but not so much and not only mobilising people for the army, but mobilising people for the military industry, science, and production.
9/ "And only then, over time (not now, not tomorrow, and not the day after), will we achieve a military economy capable of competing with and winning the confrontation with the military economies of Europe and so-called Ukraine.
10/ "This kind of mobilisation is necessary if, I emphasise again, we want to win, and this desire has been absent since the very beginning of the Special Military Operation Although what the Kremlin actually wants is completely unclear.
11/ "[Presidential spokesman] Peskov's statement that Russia is only a few kilometers away from achieving a peaceful settlement in Donbas is, forgive me, a lie and a bluff. Well, which, strictly speaking, is nothing new for this person and the department he represents.
12/ "Even if we manage to overcome those few kilometers separating Russian forward positions from Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, and other cities of the Donetsk People's Republic, the war will not end at all, not even in the slightest.
13/ "Moreover, the enemy intends to wage it and has sufficient forces to do so. Therefore, whether it's a few kilometers, or even a few dozen kilometers, the war must be waged to win, and not to advance a few kilometers, strewing them with the corpses of our soldiers.
14/ "Right now, you can mobilise as many people as you want to the front, but they won't be able to turn the tide of the war. That moment has passed. I've been calling for mobilisation for four years.
15/ "Now I no longer call for the kind of mobilisation I spoke of earlier, because it's pointless. We, our economy, don't even have enough weapons to arm them." /end
1/ Could Dmitri Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council, be lying about the current level of recruitment to the Russian army? This appalling and unprecedented scenario is considered by Russian warbloggers, who smell a rat in his claims of success. ⬇️
2/ 'Artjockey' has spotted something odd about recent claims made by Medvedev, and suspects statistical cheating:
"The day before yesterday, Medvedev announced that the contract recruitment plan was being met, and that talk of mobilisation was an enemy plot."
3/ "He backed up his statement with statistics:
▪️ During the first 6 months [of 2026], “about” 200 thousand people and 16 thousand volunteers signed contracts;
▪️ Of these, 40,000 joined the unmanned systems forces.
1/ A massive new mobilisation in Russia this fall is increasingly being forecast by Russian warbloggers. They are, however, cautious about this prospect given the strains on the Russian economy and the chaos that accompanied the 2022 mobilisation. ⬇️
2/ 'DsHRG Rusich' comments:
3/ "We've already been mobilising (partially) since 2020. Another mass recruitment will most likely indeed happen, and it will probably happen after the Duma elections in September. Various crazy bans, internet restrictions, etc. are being prepared for this, among other things.
1/ With rumours of a new mobilisation in the fall sweeping the Russian blogosphere, one warblogger wonders: what's the point? He points out that the land that Russia has seized is essentially worthless, having been destroyed, depopulated, and strewn with mines. ⬇️
2/ Roman Alekhin probably isn't doing himself any favours (he's already been declared a 'foreign agent' by the Kremlin), but he is at least willing to go where other warbloggers haven't been willing, and question the purpose of continuing the war:
3/ "[Analyses] lead to one conclusion that could prevent a crisis or mitigate its impact: ending the conflict.
At the same time, depending on the conditions, ending the conflict could lead to different consequences.
1/ Russian online marketplaces are reportedly trying to discourage their sellers offering non-lethal military equipment, for which Ukraine has targeted them. According to one such seller, fees of as much as 60% are now being charged on such equipment by the marketplaces. ⬇️
2/ The 'Forge of Mordor' channel, which makes and sells equipment to soldiers, comments:
3/ "Everyone feels sorry for Wildberries, but in reality, they're doing the following:
- Banning the sale of weapon modifications (or rather, imposing an additional fine)
- Multiple increases in commissions for everything war-related.
1/ Another Wildberries warehouse is on fire, this time in Sarapul, after a Ukrainian drone strike. As the ongoing massacre of Wildberries facilities continues, Russian warbloggers are becoming steadily more irate about air defence failures. ⬇️
2/ 'Combat Reserve' is furious, pointing to the lack of willingness among commanders and officials to take responsibility (a long-running problem; see the thread below).
1/ Russia's mobile fire teams (MOGs), which are the backbone of its defences against Ukrainian drones, are poorly paid and lack the benefits given to soldiers. Despite the dangers – MOGs have been attacked – their members do not get the benefits or pay that soldiers receive. ⬇️
2/ The authorities in Krasnodar Krai have announced that they will form mobile fire teams from employees of critical infrastructure and enterprises in Kuban to protect these facilities.
3/ Workers will be able to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defence, and a monthly salary of 50,000 rubles [$627] will be provided. Fire team members are guaranteed not to be deployed to Ukraine (though how iron-clad this guarantee really is remains to be seen).