I got tired of the Moody's K-shaped debate.
Still, it's worth repeating some additional, somewhat technical, but important issues.
0. Moody's approach essentially amounts to saying:
Share of Consumption done by top 10%
= Consumption of top 10% divided by Total Personal Consumption Expenditures
= (Disposable income of top 10% - Savings of top 10%) divided by (Total disposable income - Total savings).
To do this, you need:
- to define the top 10% of *what*
- good estimates of the amount of disposable income received by the top 10%, and the share of savings they do *out of that concept of disposable income*. Unfortunately, they have neither.
1. To find out the disposable income of the top 10%, Moody's starts from the BEA's total *personal disposable income* ($23 trillion: post-tax, inclusive of c. $1T owner-imputed rent and $2T in employer insurance/pension/Social Security contributions, excl. of realized K gains).
They then multiply it by the observed share of the *SCF's concept of total income* (pre-tax; exclusive of owner-imputed rent or employer contributions; incl. of realized K gains) accruing to the top 10% in the latest Survey of Consumer Finances.
This is plain wrong:
a. pre-tax income is more concentrated than post-tax (taxes are progressive!)
b. realized K gains are highly concentrated at the top (they are very lumpy and asset ownership is concentrated!)
c. both owner-imputed rent and employer contributions are an equalizing force for the distribution of BEA-style disposable income.
So this methodology yields highly inflated shares of BEA disposable income for the top 10% (about 50% instead of the BEA's own calculation of 34-35%).
NB: Moody's corrected their methodology since March 2026 to at least use a post-federal tax correction after many people, including me, pointed out this.
2. Moody's approach for allocating savings by disposable income groups amounts to then allocating the very tiny amount of BEA personal savings (e.g. 4% of disposable personal income in Q4-2025) across these groups. Note that even if they assumed that *all* personal savings were done by the top 10%, they would find a lower bound of 50-4=46% of consumption done by the top 10%, still above even the share of disposable income computed by the BEA for this top decile.
However, this concept of savings is completely inconsistent with the use of the SCF concept of income. Even abstracting from the tax part, the appropriate to use savings rates as a share of "SCF-style" income would be substantially higher at the top than personal savings rates as a share of "BEA-style" disposable cash income, because:
a. savings rates out of capital gains are much higher than out of disposable cash income
b. savings rates out of owner-imputed rent, employer-paid benefits, and imputed financial services are all zero in the BEA (pushing "BEA savings rates" down), but these are not part of the cash income SCF measure.
3. In practice, Moody's has no way of properly allocating the BEA-style savings. So they allocate BEA personal savings roughly in proportion to the top 10%'s SCF wealth share.
For Q42025, that would be about 68% of the 4% of personal savings. That's how they get 48% of consumption done by the top (0.5-0.68*0.04)/(1-0.32*0.04), a tiny adjustment to what is basically just the income share.
To summarize, you cannot have your cake and eat it.
It's fine to define income *SCF-style*, including highly concentrated, mostly saved items (like realized capital gains) and excluding more evenly distributed, entirely consumed items (like owner-occupied rent or employer health contributions). Then you can get highly concentrated incomes, but you need to allow for much higher savings rates at the top (in addition to much higher taxes).
Or you can also define income *BEA-style*, and you can get the really low overall personal savings rate out of personal disposable income (c.4%) that leads consumption concentration to essentially be income concentration. But then you need to acknowledge the much less concentrated distribution of BEA-style personal disposable income and the substantially lower top 10% share.
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- US and EU actually have the same GDP/hour worked!
- actually there's a 20% gap
- obviously I meant Western EU, they are the only ones you can compare to the US
- ah
[one week later]
- US and EU are growing at the same pace!
- But Western EU is stagnating?
- I said EU!
Here is my own view in a few tweets, if that’s of interest to anyone.
There is an obvious and growing GDP/capita gap (of the order of 80%) between US and core Western Europe when measured in dollars. It matters for international trade, tourism, military, projecting power, etc.
That gap is reduced by half, to 40%, but not eliminated, when adjusting for domestic purchasing power parities, due largely - but not solely - to to the lower cost of labor-intensive services in (poorer) Western Europe, so that the real income gap is only about 40%.
First, why does it *feel* wrong?
A. the top 10% get about 50% of *pre-tax* income
B. they get 30 to 37% of disposable income after tax&transfers (depending on source) 3. and we know the rich have a *higher* savings rate, so consume a *lesser share* of their income (US, China)
Taken together, these facts mean that the top 10% cannot be 50% of consumption. They do not even receive 40% of disposable income, and with consumption-income ratios *decreasing* in income, must account for < than 40% of consumption.
La note dit: *2 milliards* d'impôts en + sur le top 1% impliquerait une 📉 de la VA de *0.027%*.
Ca a l'air peu, non? Gabriel peut crier victoire?
Mais... ils obtiennent cela en multipliant 3 chiffres, selon la methodologie AxBxC de Jakobsen, Kleven, Munoz (😍) & Landais:
A: effet d'1% de + d'impôt sur *revenus* du K sur 📈taux de migration: 0.23%
B: effet du départ de dirigeant sur VA de sa boîte: -21.3%
C: part des boîtes détenues par top 1%: 20.9%
Comme 2mds=2.6 point d'impot en + sur revenu du top 1%:
Effet=2.6*0.0023*0.213*0.209*100=0.027%
🧵sur la taxe Z:
1. y a-t-il une logique aux justifications par la “régressivité” du système: NON. 2. quelle forme de capital est la plus fortement ciblée: les investissements innovants, risqués, et de long-terme 3. des estimations de recettes 2 à 10 fois trop hautes. (1/n)
On lit sur la fameuse "pénurie de logements en location", tout un tas d'explications: manque de transitions des primo-accedants, Airbnb, taux d'interet, "speculation", que sais-je.
Une hypothèse moins souvent évoquée et un peu provocatrice: les loyers sont trop faibles.
Depuis 25 ans, les loyers du secteur libre en France n'ont pas du tout reflété la hausse des prix de l'immobilier, conduisant à une baisse substantielle du rendement locatif courant.
Pendant un temps, la faiblesse du rendement courant était compensée par:
- taux d'intérêt faibles (faible coût du crédit ou opportunités alternatives pour bailleurs)
- anticipations de hausse des prix (jusqu'au années 2010)
- revalorisation des loyers au moins = à l'inflation