Clément Molin Profile picture
May 31 • 19 tweets • 6 min read • Read on X
Did Nikol Pashinyan save Armenia 🇦🇲 from disappearing?

One week before historic parliamentary elections in which he leads the polls, the outgoing prime minister defends his record.

Russian 🇷🇺 interference in the country has been increasing recently.

🧵THREAD🧵1/19 ⬇️ Image
In 2018, a popular uprising erupted in Armenia after President Serzh Sargsyan circumvented the constitution to secure his re-election as prime minister.

Riding the wave of the Velvet Revolution, Nikol Pashinyan arrived with a promise: to reduce corruption and the influence of the oligarchs.Image
The country's independence in 1991 came amidst pogroms and war with Azerbaijan. Backed by Moscow, Yerevan and the Nagorno-Karabakh separatists won the war and established the separatist Republic of Artsakh.

This republic encompassed the territories of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the surrounding areas, historically home to approximately one million Azerbaijanis and Kurds, who were expelled and forced to live in overcrowded Baku for years. Azerbaijan was humiliated.Image
Presidents Robert Kocharyan (1998-2008) and Serge Sarkisian (2008-2018), both supported by Moscow, strengthened the Armenian oligarchy, while 700,000 to 1.3 million Armenians emigrated due to a lack of economic prospects.
These oligarchs have woven a network that extends into the political sphere. Here are the main ones and their positions:

🔹G. Tsaroukyan: Cement, casinos, gas | Opportunistic opponent | Pro-Russian
🔹S. Karapetyan: Armenian electricity, real estate | Financier of the former regime | Pawn of the Kremlin
🔹S. Aleksanyan: Imports, supermarkets | Allied with Pashinyan | Pragmatic (Business first)
🔹R. Vardanyan: Former banker, former Karabakh minister | Opponent (detained in Baku) | Independent / Abandoned by Moscow
🔹Former regime (Hayrapetyan/Bagdasarov): Oil, tobacco | Deposed and prosecuted | Pro-Russian (exiled in Moscow)
Between 1993 and 2020, Armenia stagnated, power was indirectly controlled by oligarchs who became increasingly self-serving, and the country neither developed nor built much, particularly in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan developed rapidly, thanks to Caspian gas and its geopolitical position. The country grew wealthy, its population exploded, and its army was strengthened by Israel and Turkey.Image
In 2020, the Armenian army and the separatists were humiliated during the 44-day war. Azerbaijani forces seized Shusha, and Pashinyan was forced to cede control of the Nagorno-Karabakh territories to Baku, in a show of support from Moscow. Image
This defeat is not Pashinyan's fault. 5,000 young Armenians lost their lives fighting a superior Azerbaijani army.

The blame should rightfully be placed on the previous leaders who did nothing to strengthen the army and develop the country. At the end of November, Pashinyan withdrew the bulk of the nearly encircled Armenian army, leaving the separatists alone.
Azerbaijan attacked because Moscow did nothing, choosing instead to punish the revolution and Pashinyan's pro-Western shift.

Russian peacekeepers are deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh, but do not intervene, both during the blockade and until the ethnic cleansing at the end of 2023. Image
Meanwhile, Pashinyan was being pressured domestically by nationalists and the Church to reignite the war.

Yet, all signs indicate that Armenia would have been crushed, particularly with the Azerbaijani offensive on the border in September 2022. Image
Armenia was completely surrounded. On both sides, by Azerbaijan; to the west and east, to the west by Turkiye, which supported Baku; to the north, by a passive Georgia; and to the south, by a pariah Iran.

Furthermore, Armenia had no foreign military support at the time, as most states refused to support what they considered the occupation of territory internationally recognized by Yerevan.Image
Pashinyan may have abandoned Nagorno-Karabakh, but he saved Armenia from annihilation.

His numerous negotiation efforts are slowly beginning to bear fruit, allowing for the redrawing of the border (Armenia occupies approximately 80 km² of Azerbaijani border territory) and Azerbaijan slightly more than 200 km².
Furthermore, between 2018 and 2026, Armenia's GDP more than doubled, boosted by the arrival of young Russians fleeing the mobilization at the end of 2022. The country is developing faster than ever and is gradually emerging from poverty.

Yerevan has a key role to play, as a pivotal point in the Caucasus, on the North-South and East-West trade routes.
Since 2023, Armenia has found two powerful allies: India and France, which have significantly increased arms sales, enabling the army to strengthen itself and regain its deterrent role.

Relations with Turkey have improved considerably, and détente with Azerbaijan has slowly begun.
But Pashinyan also steered the country in a new political direction. The country is now a candidate for the European Union 🇪🇺, moving closer to Europe and further away from Russia, while also making progress in press freedom and the fight against corruption. Image
This record, which he is defending in the upcoming elections, faces a largely divided opposition, which, if he fails to secure a majority, could complicate his work.

Russian interference is increasing in the country, even though the intelligence services have already thwarted some attempts.Image
Image
Fearing that the victory of the Civil Contract party candidate would definitively seal Yerevan's rapprochement with the West, Russia implemented extensive disinformation campaigns in favor of pro-Russian Armenian candidates.
Since Armenians are not allowed to vote from abroad, Moscow could organize the transport of tens of thousands of Armenians living in Russia to vote and influence the election.

Online disinformation campaigns have also intensified in recent weeks to discredit Nikol Pashinyan's government ahead of the elections, which aim to renew the 101 seats in the National Assembly.
Next weekend's elections are primarily about the opposition between a liberal, pro-European and pro-peace project and a more conservative, religious, pro-Russian project that favors confrontation with Azerbaijan. Image

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More from @clement_molin

Jun 18
Ukraine 🇺🇦 has now targeted around 500 russian 🇷🇺 trucks and vehicles during the last 48 days.

Mid-range strikes continue to expand across occupied territories, on roads, bridges and rear base. This continues to slow down russian offensive.

🧵THREAD🧵1/13 ⬇️
From tomorrow, I will be off for more than 1 week, which means there won't be any new map/airstrike/fortification/mid-range strikes update, apart from some small tweets.

I will however continue to follow the overall trends.
In total, I have 270 geolocated strikes on trucks and vehicles since january, most of those are from May to June.

The key Rostov-Crimea road remains the priority target, but roads in Donetsk, Luhansk and Kherson oblast have also been largely targeted. Image
Read 13 tweets
Jun 15
La guerre en Ukraine 🇺🇦/🇷🇺 a désormais dépassé la durée de la Première Guerre mondiale et pourrait encore durer plusieurs années.

Voici ce qu’il faut savoir en juin 2026 de ce conflit généralisé aux portes de l’Europe 🇪🇺 qui n'en finit plus.

🧵THREAD🧵1/10 ⬇️ Image
Quel est l’objectif de guerre de la Russie, pays agresseur ?

Les objectifs de guerre de la Fédération de Russie ont beaucoup évolué depuis quatre ans. Outre les déclarations officielles, le principal objectif russe est resté territorial et politique. Moscou cherchait, le 24 février, à vassaliser l’Ukraine tout en annexant une large région, la « Novorossia », entre Kharkiv, le Donbass et Odessa. Cet objectif a largement évolué, notamment après l’échec des offensives sur Kyiv, Kharkiv et Odessa.

Aujourd’hui, l’objectif territorial principal reste l’occupation de toute la région du Donbass, en particulier sa capitale de facto, Kramatorsk. Il est très probable que l’armée russe dispose de deux objectifs territoriaux secondaires : l’occupation complète des deux autres oblasts annexés, Kherson (ce qui est quasi impossible à l’heure actuelle) et Zaporijjia, et l’harmonisation de la ligne de front sur la rivière Oskil dans l’oblast de Kharkiv.

L’objectif politique initial — redonner à la Russie sa puissance d’antan, l’ancrer dans l’Eurasie, retrouver les populations, les industries, les mines et l’accès à la mer des deux voisins slaves (l’Ukraine et la Biélorussie) — reste inchangé. Sans l’Ukraine, la Russie est condamnée à être une puissance secondaire et plus largement asiatique, sa dimension d’empire s’effaçant avec la montée en parallèle de la démographie non slave.

Les autres objectifs qui ont pu jouer un rôle auparavant sont caduques aujourd’hui : la démilitarisation de l’Ukraine semble impossible, quatre ans de guerre d’attrition n’ayant pas conduit à un effondrement ukrainien. La dénazification, étendard pour parler de l’effacement du nationalisme ukrainien, est également un échec. Les nationalistes ukrainiens sont plus forts et décomplexés que jamais, représentant près de 100 000 hommes dans l’armée ukrainienne. Les figures antirusses controversées d’Europe centrale et orientale ont par ailleurs été réhabilitées. Empêcher l’OTAN et l’UE de s’étendre à l’Est était aussi un mirage. Bien que la considération eût été réelle, la Suède et la Finlande ont rejoint l’Alliance, tandis que la Moldavie, le Caucase du Sud, les Balkans occidentaux et l’Ukraine ont accéléré leur rapprochement avec l’Europe, tous brandissant la menace russe.

L’objectif russe est donc désormais d’installer la confrontation dans la durée, jusqu’à un effondrement hypothétique de l’aide à l’Ukraine (qui semble compromise par la dernière aide de l’UE), l’essoufflement de la population ukrainienne (une considération bien réelle mais qui n’impactera probablement pas la situation au front) ou une victoire à la Pyrrhus, que ce soit la prise du Donbass suivie d’un cessez-le-feu ou une capitulation de l’Ukraine comme la Finlande en 1940.Image
Quel est l’objectif de l’Ukraine, pays agressé ?

L’objectif de Kyiv a lui aussi beaucoup évolué. L’armée ukrainienne a été surprise par l’ampleur de l’offensive du 24 février, qui lui a fait perdre des territoires stratégiques, comme le sud du pays. L’objectif initial de survivre en tant qu’État a été largement assuré par les victoires à Kyiv, Kharkiv et Mykolaïv en 2022. Le second objectif, retrouver les frontières d’avant-guerre, a échoué en 2023 après l’échec des offensives ukrainiennes. Depuis cette date, les Ukrainiens ont pour objectif de tenir dans la durée, jusqu’à un essoufflement ou un retrait hypothétique des Russes.

Kyiv refuse de se retirer des territoires sous son contrôle, mais a déjà accepté l’idée de concessions territoriales, de manière non officielle, sur la Crimée, le sud et l’est du pays. Pour Kyiv, il est hors de question de capituler et de céder des territoires sans combat à Moscou, d’autant que les garanties de bonne foi de la Russie ont historiquement montré qu’elles n’étaient pas tenues. Dès lors, l’Ukraine a développé ses propres moyens pour que chaque km2 de territoire conquis coûte plus cher à Moscou, tout en essayant de toucher au maximum l’économie russe. Une contre-offensive hypothétique reste possible, mais il est encore tôt pour savoir si les Ukrainiens ont les moyens de la réaliser.Image
Read 10 tweets
Jun 14
For months, Ukraine 🇺🇦 has been conducting a series of deep infiltrations on the Velika Novosilka front.

Some of Russia’s 2025 gains have already been reversed, with the February counter-attack expanding to a 40-kilometer front.

🧵THREAD🧵1/12 ⬇️ Image
As a reminder, in February, the Ukrainian army conducted a discreet offensive for several weeks, clearing infiltrated areas, securing Pokrovsk'e and infiltrating areas that were previously under Russian control. Image
This counter-attack notably secured Ternuvat and prevented the use of Uspenivka to launch assaults on the Zaporizhzhia front.

This significantly slowed the Russian advance, reducing its length from 42 km to 25 km (west of Hulialpole). Image
Read 12 tweets
Jun 13
The Ukrainian 🇺🇦 blocus of Crimea is starting 🇷🇺

After they repeatedly hit bridges connecting Crimea and occupied Kherson oblast, the Ukrainians started implementing a blocus of the peninsula.

Last night, trucks and a pontoon bridge were hit.

🧵THREAD🧵1/15 ⬇️ Image
Last night, the Code 9.2, Phalanx and the davinci units launched multiple strikes against targets in and around the key roads leading to Crimea.
As you can see on the map, only few bridges are connecting Crimea to mainland Ukraine. 6 of them have been reportedly hit including the main ones :

🔸Henichesk bridge
🔸Chonhar road bridge
🔸Chonhar rail bridge
🔸Armyansk bridge (on canal)
🔸Stavky and Myrne bridges (?) on canal Image
Read 15 tweets
Jun 11
Last night, multiple Ukrainian 🇺🇦 units hit the bridges leading to Crimea, further isolating the peninsula from the land bridge to Russia 🇷🇺

At the same time, strike campaign continues on multiple key roads, with over 375 vehicles and trucks hit since early May.

🧵THREAD🧵1/13 ⬇️Image
Crimea is connected with southern occupied Ukraine by multiple key bridges.

The one in Chonhar was hit few days ago by multiple drones, which forced the russians to put up a pontoon bridge for their road traffic.
At least 3 bridges have been recently hit. The one in Henichesk, the ones in Armyansk and in Stavky.

As we can see on the video, these strikes are putting holes in the middle of those key bridges. Any consolidation attempt will probably be hit. Image
Image
Read 13 tweets
Jun 7
Ukraine 🇺🇦 continues its massive mid-range strike campaign against russian 🇷🇺 logistics.

Since early May, more than 290 russian trucks and vehicles have been hit. I have now mapped 210 strikes since january.

🧵THREAD🧵1/14 ⬇️ Image
The strike campaign is guided by multiple units, using a large veriety of drones.

The backbone of it are the FP-1/2 strikes on key logistics hubs, mainly oil/fuel depots, trains, gas stations, electric substations and rear bases.

Those strikes are often guided with AI. Image
The latest video recently published showcased some strikes around Melitopol (few missed) with Hornet drones.

Interestlingly, everything is not blurred, which helps understanding how they are using those drones.
Read 16 tweets

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