The leadership appears confident that it can hold out against Trump's pressure, actively intervene in support of its ally Hezbollah, and press for cash up-front without torpedoing talks.
In other words, Tehran isn't feeling the pressure either (and likely won't for some time).
Upshot: a deal is still possible, but with both sides apparently dug-in on their positions, and the relevant pressures (regime security on the Iranian side; economic/energy market on the US side) at manageable levels, barring a creative solution, an extended deadlock looks more likely for the time being.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
I think we are generally sleeping on the fact that China ramped imports up by 1-2 million bpd for over a year, and then slashed them by 6 million bpd in a few months, all through direct market interventions.
If the closure of the strait of Hormuz is the biggest deliberate market manipulation in history, what has happened with Chinese imports ranks as No. 2.
"Manipulation" might seem like a strong word, but consider what China is doing.
For months, demand was being kept inflated by Chinese stock-building. There was no market incentive for this, beyond Chinese interest in building reserves when prices were (generally) low. The result was a floor under prices.
Now consider: in respone to the closure of the strait of Hormuz, China has dramatically scaled back crude imports. Setting aside the surplus inputs (1m bpd), the 4+ million bpd deficit is being met through a number of factors (reduced runs, calling on inventories, depressed consumption).
But the net effect is a shrinking of the Hormuz impact: there's still a deficit on the global market, but it's smaller than it was before China cut.
"Why is the US about to bomb Iran?" misses the mark, imo.
Iran is deeply wounded. Trump watched it take a pummeling last June. He bombed it once without suffering serious repercussions.
The better question: What are the downsides to bombing it again now?
The US is assembling a huge force. Defenses around the region are significantly reinforced. Iran, meanwhile, has its missiles and drones but not much else. It cannot hit the US. It can try to hit bases, ships, and Israel. Not enough of a risk to deter Trump.
There is oil. But look what the admin has done lately. Allowing Ukraine to bomb Novorossisyk. Sanctions on major Russian companies. Seizing Venezuelan tankers. Kidnapping Maduro.
Last June, and the last three months, suggests there's a lot the US can get away with without spiking Brent.
Cutting through the noise: key to this crisis is not what the US does--US action will be kept to Iran--but how Iran responds.
Assessing risk of regional war depends on assessing how Iran manages its response.
What (if anything) could push Iran into escalating the conflict?
Iran has offensive capabilities. But it is also vulnerable to offensive action. It can respond to attacks, but the posture of US/Israel/Gulf states makes any attack of limited utility.
Rolling the dice on Hormuz triggers a much broader retaliation. It would be near suicidal.
Iran's problem since True Promise I (or Soleimani, really) has been a loss of credibility re: deterrence.
It has shown again and again that it will absorb significant hits and retaliate in a measured, calibrated way.
Will it continue that streak if the US attacks now?
Evidence is fragmentary and anecdotal, but in the postwar environment, security forces inside Iran appear to have shifted their focus toward suppressing/monitoring political dissent, while de-emphasizing enforcement of social laws.
Hijab enforcement has ebbed (though it has not disappeared). Social clubs that feature co-ed activities, dancing and public alcohol consumption have become more common. There are reports of authorities closing such establishments, but that speaks to their growing popularity.
At the same time, speech is being more vigorously repressed. Political arrests are up, as are executions. Pro-reform media appears to be coming under stricter observation. The threat of foreign (esp. Israeli) subversion is being deployed more frequently.
The US has bombed Fordow. It has very likely used enough force to significantly damage, if not destroy, the enrichment facility.
We likely won't know for quite some time. It's possible we may never know, as that will be a big part of Iran's response. 1/
Iran is sure to respond to this attack. To do nothing would be a colossal blow to the regime's credibility. There will be a short-term response.
But the bigger response, the more significant one, is likely to play out on the nuclear file. 2/
Trump wants this to be the end. And perhaps it is--for him.
If the US dodges a large-scale escalation, Trump can claim to have destroyed Iran's nuclear program. He will claim a historic win. He'll end his term with this feather in his cap.
The longer the war continues, the closer Israel may get to its goals. But similarly, Iran may be pushed to undertake more escalatory action. Both risk dragging in the US--though a degree of US involvement is likely inevitable, especially in terms of Israel's defense.