Timothy Snyder: The memory war is far more comfortable for Polish politicians than the real one.
They get to say: we're right, we're innocent. I know the history. But you start with what's happening now, not memory. Skip that, and you start from a falsehood.
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Snyder: Treat Ukrainians as partners and allies — even when they make mistakes.
Remember that every day they lose people in this war, partly so that Poland can keep living normally.
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Snyder: Judging Zelenskyy's decision to name a unit after UPA without the context of nearly four and a half years of war would be a mistake.
This is the longest war of this century, longer than World War I — it stirs emotions the West struggles to understand.
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Snyder: Ukrainians now think of UPA only through its third phase — fighting the Red Army from 1945.
Poles remember the first phase: 1943, when UPA murdered tens of thousands of Poles in Volhynia. That's the mistake — forgetting the rest of the story.
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Snyder: Saying Ukrainians now owe Poles something is terrible. They fight and lose people every day, partly so Poland can keep living normally.
Poles killed thousands of Ukrainians too — pacified villages, closed churches, stayed silent during the Great Famine.
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Snyder: On the battlefield Russia is losing. In Warsaw and Kyiv, Russia wins the memory war.
Ukraine thinks UPA references provoke Moscow. The opposite, Moscow celebrates it. Poland forgets Ukraine should always be its ally. Both sides do exactly what Moscow wants.6/
Snyder: In Ukraine, anti-Polish sentiment barely exists. In Poland, anti-Ukrainian emotions keep growing, waiting for an excuse to surface.
Poland trusts the US and NATO too much. Your situation depends more on Ukrainians than Americans and Americans aren't fighting this war.7/
Snyder: Poland trusts the US too much. When Ukrainians err, Poles attack publicly. When Americans err constantly, nobody reacts that way.
Poland treats Ukrainians as younger brothers, Americans as the older brother who's right even when he isn't.
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Snyder: Ukrainians make mistakes — so do Americans, so do Germans.
If Poland has real geopolitics, its leaders stay consistent: treat Ukrainians as partners and allies, always, even when they err. That's the dimension missing from Poland's reaction.
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Snyder: Dmowski's school assumes Russian imperialism isn't the primary problem. That's simply a mistake today.
Russian imperialism is the primary problem — Poland has nothing comparable. Acting on emotion alone can become Russia's game. Raison d'état can't be forgotten.
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Snyder: For decades Poles told the West it didn't understand Russia. Now Poles commit that same sin.
If Ukraine loses, Poland couldn't fight a Russia that controls all Ukrainian resources. Not supporting Ukraine means asking for the end of Polish sovereignty.
Ukraine’s 20-somethings are reshaping its war machine and displacing a Soviet-era old guard in defense.
A Defense Ministry staffer in her early 20s found Denmark had earmarked the wrong shells for Ukraine and secured 15,000 long-range rounds, NYT. 1/
The staffer works under Oleksii Antoniuk, 24, deputy head of the ministry’s cooperation department.
Oleksii: “If not for her, this wouldn’t have happened.”
Young Ukrainians under 30 are gradually displacing a Soviet-era old guard in defense. 2/
The shift runs through Ukraine’s war machine.
Twentysomething engineers design drones, young entrepreneurs turn prototypes into production lines, and recent graduates at the Defense Ministry cut red tape to speed weapons to the front. 3/
Applebaum: Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 partly as a direct challenge to NATO and the United States.
Moscow wanted to prove there was no Western alliance, that Ukraine was not a real country, and that Europe and America would not come to its defense. 1/
Applebaum: Russia wanted to show that it alone was the sovereign power in Eastern Europe and would decide what happened there.
Instead, it was surprised: the United States and a united Europe pulled together and proved that a democratic world still exists. 2/
Applebaum: Negotiations will become possible only when Russia decides to stop fighting and accepts that it cannot achieve its main goal—the destruction of Ukraine as a nation.
Russia has not reached that point. Putin has never withdrawn that objective. 3/
Applebaum: The war with Iran was clearly a war of choice. Israel had proposed this kind of action to previous US presidents, and they declined.
They understood the immediate danger to international shipping and especially to the oil and gas industries. 1/
Applebaum: Trump now appears to regret the war, or at least has no interest in continuing it.
He is seeking an agreement that could resemble — or even be slightly worse than — the Obama-era deal, while the claim that Iran was about to get a bomb does not add up. 2/
Applebaum: Trump failed to account for Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz or retaliating against Gulf states, and then expressed surprise.
Yet anyone who had studied a war with Iran over the past two decades had already identified both risks as obvious possibilities. 3/
Applebaum: Trump’s relationship with Erdoğan grows out of his business dealings in Turkey.
He invested there, believes those investments went well, and his family company still has interests there — or could. He sees the world in personal, transactional terms. 1/
Applebaum: Trump does not think like a traditional American president representing US interests, the Western alliance, or the democratic world.
He asks what is good for him personally. He likes Erdoğan, and that is the simplest way to understand their closeness. 2/
Applebaum: Trump states his personal view and assumes that it therefore becomes the policy of the United States.
But the American system is more complicated than the president’s preferences: Congress may still restrain the weapons sales he wants to make to Turkey. 3X