[Thread]🧵| The Arabs of the Maghrib al-Aqsā and the Marinid holy war in Andalusia:
❝In 1272, following the death of Nasrid founder Mohammed al-Shaykh, his son Mohammed al-Faqîh fulfilled his father's wish by sending Andalusian sheikhs to invite the Marinid ruler Abu Yusuf Ya’qub to aid Muslim Spain against Christian advances. Already the unchallenged master of the Far Maghreb after capturing Sijilmasa and defeating Yaghmurasan, Abu Yusuf eagerly responded, first dispatching his son with 5,000 Marinid and Arab cavalry in 1272, then crossing the Strait himself the following year with a larger force.(1/6)
Fighting in Spain was the dearest desire of the Maghreb dynasties, perpetuating the pious and glorious tradition of the Almoravids and Almohads. In their eyes, Andalusia was not only “the field of martyrdom and the gate to eternal happiness” but also the extension of their empire, where their own people were already numerous and powerful; it served as the outlet where the unemployed and turbulent forces of the kingdom would be lost, a place of exile for members of the royal family and potential claimants whom the sultan found prudent to remove—among these princes descended from Abd el-Ḥaqq were recruited the leaders of the Volunteers of the Faith. Christian Spain likewise had its “lost children”, the Almogavars, who watched the border and sometimes pushed hazardous raids through Islamic lands. (2/6)
The composite armies included Marinid regulars, Asian Aṛzâz mercenaries, Ceuta crossbowmen, a black guard, Berber contingents, Andalusian locals, exiled “Volunteers of the Faith” (often Marinid princes), and—occupying a place of honor—the Hilalian Arabs, whose mounted warriors, though fewer than the Marinids, were crucial in every major operation; not entire tribes crossed, but selected fighters, with non-mounted Arabs typically remaining behind to protect camps and ensure tribal subsistence. (3/6)
Each corps had its marked place in the troops, its rank at the time of crossing the strait and in the forward march, and its role in military operations, in the raid as in the battle. When the call to arms assembled the Arab and Berber combatants in the camp near the coast, embarkation began from the port of Qasr el-Jawaz where the governor of Ceuta had gathered the boats; the Arabs were summoned from the first hour and crossed among the first convoys, followed by the Berber tribes, then the volunteers from the Maghreb, while the regular troops, Aṛzâz, corps of crossbowmen, and black guard crossed after the tribes and volunteers; the sultan and the great officers of his court embarked on the last ship. The concentration was made near Tarifa or Algeciras. (4/6)
A campaign plan was decided with the Arab chiefs consulted as always, but the prince attached the greatest importance to the advice of the Andalusians, better acquainted with the enemy's habits, the resources of the country, and the tactics of holy war. Battles opened with public prayer and single combats in which Arabs frequently challenged Christian knights without response (per Ibn al-Athir), followed by volleys from crossbowmen and Aṛzâz archers to disorder the foe, then repeated combined charges by Marinid and Arab cavalry to break and pursue the enemy mercilessly, with no quarter given and muezzins sometimes calling prayer from piles of severed heads. In these encounters, which historians transform into heroic slaughters, and in pillaging expeditions, the Arabs played a defined role, especially their cavalry. (5/6)
Although a notable part of the Hilalian combatants were not mounted, it is their horsemen who find employment here, often associated with Marinid cavalry and mentioned immediately after them in the chronicles. There were also Arab-led expeditions, such as the Khlot under Mohelhel b. Yahya investing Jerez in 1285 or the Sofyan attacking citadels and guarding camps. Apart from expeditionary forces, other Arabs with families held garrisons in Andalusia since Almohad times (noted by al-Marrakushi around 1224). Virtually all major Hilalian branches participated; they shared generously in spoils, cash, prestigious posts, dining invitations with Marinid leaders, and poetic praise. In a qasida by Abu Faris al-Meknasi for the 1285 campaign, he extolled the valor of the Sofyan (especially Banû Jermoun), 'Asem (led by heroic ‘Iyad), Khlot and allied families, Zobayr (ancestors of Hilal b. Hamidân), Banû Jabir under Yusuf b. Qaytoun, and Athbej who “carry around the cup of death and make the enemies empty it”—thus affirming the Arabs’ integral, honored, and celebrated role alongside the Marinids in the Andalusian jihad.❞ (6/6)
📗: The Arabs in Berberia, page 355 and following, Georges Marçais (1876-1962)
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
🧵l The Rehamna, a Banu Maʿqil Dhawi Ḥassān tribe; from pillars of the Makhzen to the revolt of 1861–62:
Beginning in the 18th century, the Rehamna controlled a vast zone stretching between the Oum Rabia and the Atlas, where their pastoral economy depended heavily on transhumance secured through protection contracts. In the pre-colonial Haouz, this system allowed the Arab Rehamna to offer protection to neighboring High Atlas Berber tribes such as the Ghighaya, Mesfiwa, and Gundafa, who in return granted them access to grazing lands. Through these arrangements, the Rehamna extended their authority far beyond their own territory, acting not only as allies but also as patrons of the surrounding tribes.
Their political and military role was central to the Moroccan state, with contemporary sources citing that the Rehamna were capable of replacing all the troops of the royal army. Under Sultan Sidi Mohammed b. Abdallah, Mohamed b. Imran Rehmani was appointed vizier and khalīfa of Marrakech for his warrior qualities. He was also the commander of the Sharifian armies that liberated present-day El Jadida from Portuguese occupation in 1769. x.com/aotach0/status…
[Thread]🧵l Sultan Abdelaziz's collaboration with France and the Makhzen mehalla defeat in Chaouia led tribal resistance, 'Ulama revoking bay'ah:
In late October 1907, Mulay Abdelaziz organized the mehalla of Ibn al-Baghdadi into the Chaouia.
It counted around 3,900 infantry and 625 cavalry, with three French cannons and many machine guns.
Two officers (from the French military mission) accompanied the force.
These officers, in fact, played the role of correspondence between the sultanic mehalla and the leadership of the French forces in Casablanca.
[Thread]🧵l ʿAbd al-Muʾmin's transformation of the Almohad Caliphate into a hereditary monarchy through the marginalization of the founding Berber tribes and the strategic integration of Arab allies:
❝Having the support of all the Almohad tribes loyal to the Tawḥīd was not enough; he also needed to win the adherence of other elements upon which to sustain himself. The effects of his alliance with the Arabs were immediate, and their utilization yielded results far more profitable than the Caliph could've expected. The first measure in which he counted on their help was related to the continuity of the Mu'minid dynasty. Before returning to Ifrīqiya, the Arab chiefs promised him loyalty and support, and the practical way of demonstrating this was by helping him proclaim his son, Muḥammad, as his successor. (1/6)
The imperialist policy of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin manifested itself in appointing one of his sons as heir and distributing the provinces of the empire among his other sons, thereby ensuring the survival of this new Mu'minid dynasty—even at the cost of going against the fundamental tenets of Almohad doctrine. (2/6)
The response from the most important sectors of the Empire regarding this appointment was immediate. However, the Caliph did not hesitate to crush the reaction of Ibn Tūmart's clan with the death of Ibn Yaṣlāten, a very important figure and close relative of the Mahdi who could have jeopardized ʿAbd al-Muʾmin's interests by vying for power. Nor did he stop before the reaction of the Ait Amghar, who rose up against the appointment of Muhammad as successor; he ordered them executed. (3/6)
[Thread]🧵l Tribal Affiliation, Alliances, and Clientage among Arabs:
From the pre-Islamic era, tribal belonging was obtained through kinship, walāʾ (clientage), adoption, or slavery. The bond that dominated everything was patrilineal descent—only the father transmits nasab. Tribal names expressed origin through a founding ancestor, real or symbolic, in formulas like Banū Fulan (“sons of Fulan”). The group bond is blood from the father, while the alliance bond is contractual honor and protection.
The tribe was a legal and political body, not only a family: it protected life, property, governed vengeance and blood-money. Without tribal belonging, a person became an outcast, exposed without protection. The original founder of the tribe was always defined by Arab genealogical imagination as a free, noble, and “pure Arab man”, to separate him conceptually from slaves or clients, even if clients later gained full belonging socially.
According to the testimony of several authors, the great Berber tribes of medieval Maghreb, such as the Sanhaja (Iznagen) or Zenata (Iznaten), possessed different Berber dialects so far removed from each other that they were not mutually intelligible.
From antiquity, Roman historians, notably based on the testimony of Ammianus Marcellinus, official historian of the Roman emperors, highlighted this diversity of languages and dialects among the Berber tribes of Africa (Sanhaja, Zenata, Masmouda and others).