In 2014, 300 scientists warned Anthony Fauci would start a global pandemic.
Following the high-profile escape of three bugs from U.S. labs, these 300 scientists sent a letter to President Obama, urging him to shut down Anthony Fauci's gain-of-function research.
Obama issued a moratorium and shut down 18 of the worst projects by Anthony Fauci. In the end, he really didn't shut them down. Instead, Obama moved the research offshore to places like Ukraine, the former Soviet State of Georgia, and the Wuhan Institute of Virology in Wuhan, China.
Now, it is widely accepted that COVID-19 originated from that very lab in Wuhan, China.
Those 300 scientists were right about Fauci…
But the big question is, why are people like him so obsessed with creating dangerous pathogens in the first place? 🧵
Following the high-profile escape of three bugs from U.S. labs, these 300 scientists sent a letter to President Obama, urging him to shut down Anthony Fauci's gain-of-function research.
Obama issued a moratorium and shut down 18 of the worst projects by Anthony Fauci. In the end, he really didn't shut them down. Instead, Obama moved the research offshore to places like Ukraine, the former Soviet State of Georgia, and the Wuhan Institute of Virology in Wuhan, China.
Now, it is widely accepted that COVID-19 originated from that very lab in Wuhan, China.
Those 300 scientists were right about Fauci…
But the big question is, why are people like him so obsessed with creating dangerous pathogens in the first place? 🧵
Bioweapons research is always sold with the same simple promise:
We have to make pathogens more dangerous so we can learn how to stop them.
Honestly, that sounds insane when stated plainly.
But somehow this logic has funded a massive industry for decades, and the safety record is far worse than most people realize.
We have to make pathogens more dangerous so we can learn how to stop them.
Honestly, that sounds insane when stated plainly.
But somehow this logic has funded a massive industry for decades, and the safety record is far worse than most people realize.
The public hears “pandemic preparedness” and imagines top scientists working tirelessly to prevent the next disaster.
But it’s not that simple.
The deeper problem is that this research often involves collecting dangerous pathogens, modifying them, storing them, passing them through animals, testing their behavior, and hoping the lab never makes a mistake.
And there are a lot of mistakes that can be made.
But it’s not that simple.
The deeper problem is that this research often involves collecting dangerous pathogens, modifying them, storing them, passing them through animals, testing their behavior, and hoping the lab never makes a mistake.
And there are a lot of mistakes that can be made.
Language matters.
“Gain-of-function” sounds sterile, technical, and harmless.
But in practice, it can mean giving a pathogen new abilities, such as making it more transmissible, more dangerous, or better able to evade natural defenses.
That’s not ordinary science. It’s civilization-level risk.
And it sounds more like something from a movie that doesn’t have a happy ending than simply “science.”
“Gain-of-function” sounds sterile, technical, and harmless.
But in practice, it can mean giving a pathogen new abilities, such as making it more transmissible, more dangerous, or better able to evade natural defenses.
That’s not ordinary science. It’s civilization-level risk.
And it sounds more like something from a movie that doesn’t have a happy ending than simply “science.”
This information comes from the work of medical researcher @MidwesternDoc. For all the sources and details, read the full report below.
midwesterndoctor.com/p/why-the-biow…
midwesterndoctor.com/p/why-the-biow…
The modern bioweapons problem traces back to a giant loophole.
The Biological Weapons Convention was supposed to outlaw biological weapons. But it allowed research to continue for “prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.”
Once that exception existed, almost anything could be justified as defense to fit the loophole.
How convenient.
The Biological Weapons Convention was supposed to outlaw biological weapons. But it allowed research to continue for “prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.”
Once that exception existed, almost anything could be justified as defense to fit the loophole.
How convenient.
That loophole created the perfect excuse.
A lab could study dangerous pathogens and say it was preparing for a future attack.
A researcher could make a virus more dangerous and say it was necessary to understand the threat.
A government could fund the work and call it protection.
The public was left trusting the very same institutions creating the risk.
A lab could study dangerous pathogens and say it was preparing for a future attack.
A researcher could make a virus more dangerous and say it was necessary to understand the threat.
A government could fund the work and call it protection.
The public was left trusting the very same institutions creating the risk.
After WWII, the US absorbed scientists from defeated regimes, including people involved in horrifying biological research.
Over time, genetic engineering made the field even more dangerous because scientists were no longer limited to finding pathogens in nature.
They could now alter them.
And that changed everything.
Over time, genetic engineering made the field even more dangerous because scientists were no longer limited to finding pathogens in nature.
They could now alter them.
And that changed everything.
@MidwesternDoc The full breakdown from @MidwesternDoc shows why “gain-of-function” may be one of the most misleading phrases in science. The public hears “preparedness.” The experiment often means making a pathogen more dangerous and hoping the lab never slips.
midwesterndoctor.com/p/why-the-biow…
midwesterndoctor.com/p/why-the-biow…
The history isn’t reassuring.
In 1950, the US Navy reportedly sprayed bacteria across the San Francisco Bay Area to study how a biological agent might spread through a population center.
The bacteria were considered harmless at the time. But it wasn’t harmless.
People got sick.
And the organism? It later became endemic in the area.
In 1950, the US Navy reportedly sprayed bacteria across the San Francisco Bay Area to study how a biological agent might spread through a population center.
The bacteria were considered harmless at the time. But it wasn’t harmless.
People got sick.
And the organism? It later became endemic in the area.
Unfortunately, that wasn’t an isolated episode.
A Senate hearing later found that between 1949 and 1969, the US military had conducted 80 open-air biological tests using bacteria believed at the time to be harmless.
The phrase “believed to be harmless” has done a lot of damage.
More than we know.
A Senate hearing later found that between 1949 and 1969, the US military had conducted 80 open-air biological tests using bacteria believed at the time to be harmless.
The phrase “believed to be harmless” has done a lot of damage.
More than we know.
Then came the lab leaks.
In 1966, a less dangerous smallpox strain reportedly escaped from an English lab, infecting one person who went on to infect 65 more.
In 1978, another smallpox leak from the same lab killed someone working above it.
In 1971, weaponized smallpox escaped a Soviet lab and killed three.
In 1977, H1N1 suddenly reappeared and swept across the world.
Scientists later traced the outbreak to a likely escape of a preserved or reconstituted flu virus from a laboratory freezer in the Soviet Union or China.
Old pathogens can become new outbreaks when labs mishandle them.
In 1966, a less dangerous smallpox strain reportedly escaped from an English lab, infecting one person who went on to infect 65 more.
In 1978, another smallpox leak from the same lab killed someone working above it.
In 1971, weaponized smallpox escaped a Soviet lab and killed three.
In 1977, H1N1 suddenly reappeared and swept across the world.
Scientists later traced the outbreak to a likely escape of a preserved or reconstituted flu virus from a laboratory freezer in the Soviet Union or China.
Old pathogens can become new outbreaks when labs mishandle them.
In 1979, weaponized anthrax spores were accidentally released from a Soviet military facility.
At least 68 civilians died, and the full death toll remains unknown.
Why? Because the government covered it up.
Then, in 2001, anthrax letters killed 5 Americans and sickened 17 more.
The strain was tied to the world of high-security bioweapons labs.
At least 68 civilians died, and the full death toll remains unknown.
Why? Because the government covered it up.
Then, in 2001, anthrax letters killed 5 Americans and sickened 17 more.
The strain was tied to the world of high-security bioweapons labs.
SARS led to another warning.
After SARS emerged in 2002, multiple SARS lab leaks occurred in different countries, some causing broader outbreaks.
That should have forced a global rethink.
Instead, coronaviruses became one of the most heavily manipulated families of viruses, partly because they are relatively easy to modify.
After SARS emerged in 2002, multiple SARS lab leaks occurred in different countries, some causing broader outbreaks.
That should have forced a global rethink.
Instead, coronaviruses became one of the most heavily manipulated families of viruses, partly because they are relatively easy to modify.
@MidwesternDoc This report from @MidwesternDoc pulls together the part almost nobody wants to discuss: lab leaks were openly debated before COVID. Then COVID happened, and suddenly questioning the most consequential leak possibility became forbidden. Why?
midwesterndoctor.com/p/why-the-biow…
midwesterndoctor.com/p/why-the-biow…
@MidwesternDoc The numbers are worse than the anecdotes.
A review of papers published between 2000 and 2021 identified 309 documented lab-acquired infections, 16 lab escapes, and several deaths.
And that’s not a perfect count of the problem.
It is only what made it into the literature.
A review of papers published between 2000 and 2021 identified 309 documented lab-acquired infections, 16 lab escapes, and several deaths.
And that’s not a perfect count of the problem.
It is only what made it into the literature.
The Cambridge Working Group put the scale in even sharper terms.
In 2014, it estimated that potentially dangerous lab leaks occurred, on average, twice per week in the US alone.
By 2018, that estimate had reportedly risen to four times per week.
Four times per week.
Makes you wonder, doesn’t it?
In 2014, it estimated that potentially dangerous lab leaks occurred, on average, twice per week in the US alone.
By 2018, that estimate had reportedly risen to four times per week.
Four times per week.
Makes you wonder, doesn’t it?
@MidwesternDoc Before COVID, many scientists openly warned that gain-of-function work could trigger exactly the kind of disaster it was supposed to prevent.
Obama paused federal funding for certain gain-of-function research in 2014.
The risk was never imaginary.
Obama paused federal funding for certain gain-of-function research in 2014.
The risk was never imaginary.
Then COVID happened.
The outbreak appeared very near the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where coronavirus research had been conducted for years.
There had already been warnings about safety problems.
There had already been concern over gain-of-function work.
Yet the lab-leak question was treated as forbidden, not because it was impossible, but because the implications were enormous.
The outbreak appeared very near the Wuhan Institute of Virology, where coronavirus research had been conducted for years.
There had already been warnings about safety problems.
There had already been concern over gain-of-function work.
Yet the lab-leak question was treated as forbidden, not because it was impossible, but because the implications were enormous.
If dangerous pathogen research helped create the very pandemic it was supposed to prevent, then the entire pandemic-preparedness industry deserves a public audit.
Not a quiet internal review.
Not a media cleanup operation.
A real audit of funding, labs, grants, safety incidents, conflicts, and coverups.
Not a quiet internal review.
Not a media cleanup operation.
A real audit of funding, labs, grants, safety incidents, conflicts, and coverups.
The industry’s defense is always the same.
We need this research because the next deadly virus could jump from animals to humans.
But that argument creates a permanent blank check.
Scientists can travel into remote caves, collect rare viruses, bring them into labs, modify them, and say the danger comes from nature.
Even when the lab becomes the danger.
We need this research because the next deadly virus could jump from animals to humans.
But that argument creates a permanent blank check.
Scientists can travel into remote caves, collect rare viruses, bring them into labs, modify them, and say the danger comes from nature.
Even when the lab becomes the danger.
@MidwesternDoc The scariest part isn’t one lab accident. It’s the business model. Fear creates funding, funding creates institutions, and institutions rarely solve the problem that keeps them alive.
We need to break the cycle.
midwesterndoctor.com/p/why-the-biow…
We need to break the cycle.
midwesterndoctor.com/p/why-the-biow…
The bioweapons industry survives because the incentive structure is backward.
If the threat grows, funding grows.
If fear grows, authority grows.
If the public believes the next pandemic is always around the corner, governments can justify more labs, more surveillance, more grants, more emergency powers, and more countermeasures.
The machine feeds on the threat.
If the threat grows, funding grows.
If fear grows, authority grows.
If the public believes the next pandemic is always around the corner, governments can justify more labs, more surveillance, more grants, more emergency powers, and more countermeasures.
The machine feeds on the threat.
A real pandemic-preparedness system would prioritize boring things that work: lab transparency, strict safety enforcement, independent inspections, early treatment protocols, repurposed drugs, honest risk communication, and liability for reckless research.
Instead, the system keeps asking for more money to study the next “threat.”
Instead, the system keeps asking for more money to study the next “threat.”
@MidwesternDoc If a research industry repeatedly leaks dangerous pathogens, hides behind “peaceful” language, blocks scrutiny, and then asks for more funding after every disaster, is it really protecting society?
Or has society been funding the danger it was told to fear?
Or has society been funding the danger it was told to fear?
@MidwesternDoc Thanks for reading! This information was based on a report originally published by @MidwesternDoc.
Key details were streamlined and editorialized for clarity and impact.
Read the original report here:
midwesterndoctor.com/p/why-the-biow…
Key details were streamlined and editorialized for clarity and impact.
Read the original report here:
midwesterndoctor.com/p/why-the-biow…
@MidwesternDoc For a deeper dive into what modern medicine has overlooked—or intentionally buried—check out these other eye-opening reports by A Midwestern Doctor:
The Truth About SSRI Antidepressants
midwesterndoctor.com/p/the-truth-ab…
The Truth About SSRI Antidepressants
midwesterndoctor.com/p/the-truth-ab…
@MidwesternDoc The Hidden Dangers of Hospital Births & How to Protect Your Family
midwesterndoctor.com/p/the-hidden-d…
midwesterndoctor.com/p/the-hidden-d…
@MidwesternDoc While you’re at it, give @MidwesternDoc a follow.
No one brings more research, clinical insight, or historical context when it comes to exposing the health myths we’ve all been fed.
This is easily one of the most valuable accounts you’ll ever follow.
--> @MidwesternDoc
No one brings more research, clinical insight, or historical context when it comes to exposing the health myths we’ve all been fed.
This is easily one of the most valuable accounts you’ll ever follow.
--> @MidwesternDoc
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