An article published yesterday in +972 Magazine on the “June 26 Movement” titled “‘Freedom, dignity, and a future’: Why Gazans are planning a mass mobilization” unfortunately elides the genealogy of the movement and whitewashes its exponents, who have been advocating for violent insurrection against Gazan police and civil servants for several months.
The +972 article initially correctly observing that the “June 26 Movement” shared much with the 2019 “We Want to Live” protests, but the author ignores that the leader of the latter, the Palestinian lawyer Mahmoud al-Natour, was an advocate of the ISIS-linked Abu Shabab gang, at whose campsite he lived during 2024. Not only that, but, through Joseph Braude’s “Center for Peace Communication”—which is closely associated with the UAE and which helped create the “Jusoor News” platform—al-Natour has functioned as a media vessel to encourage Arabic and Middle Eastern countries to normalize with “Israel,” lauding the Abraham Accords. After years of advocating for anti-resistance violent actions and whitewashing the collaborator militias, Natour eventually left Gaza for Italy. Fox News, Bari Weiss’ Free Press, and Joseph Braude’s “Peaced Off” pro-normalization podcast have given him and the militias positive coverage. Figures close to Natour who are also based in Europe—and, incidentally, hold positions within Fatah and the PA leadership—now lead the “June 26 Movement,” which is the same network’s brainchild.
Contra what the author of this +972 article claims, the “June 26 Movement” was not peaceful in its conception. Its proponents, from the beginning, advocated attacking the resistance, police stations, and Hamas officials with knives and weapons. Figures like Ramzy Herzallah have close ties to Ghassan al-Dahini, who now heads the Abu Shabab Gang and formerly was an operative within Jaysh al-Islam (the self-proclaimed Al Qaeda representative in Gaza). Al-Dahini helped Herzallah leave Gaza. The “June 26 Movement” was not co-opted by such figures, as the article claims—they are interwoven into the plexus of its foundation. It is not a coincidence that Bezalel Smotrich and former Shin Bet director Avi Dichter have encouraged the “movement.”
The +972 article characterizes one of the movement’s early advocates, Amjad Abu Kush, as a “Gazan activist and vocal Hamas critic.” Kush, based in Belgium, is a much more pernicious figure. He has participated in several European cultural exchange programs that advocate for economic normalization between “Israel” and Arab countries and the widening of the Abraham Accords, such as the Arab Council for Regional Integration. It was recently revealed that Kush received funding from Zionist organizations. Kush is also a Jusoor News contributor. A Belgian investigation in December 2022 found that his own media platform that he founded in 2020 received a grant from a European organization linked to Dutch intelligence.
The article also claims that Abdul Ati, another prominent and inaugural “June 26 Movement” supporter is a mere “Hamas critic” and “activist.” Abdul Ati is based in Egypt. He frequently appears in the UAE-bolstered Jusoor News and other Zionist media, advocating for normalization. He has repeatedly called for violence against Gazan police since the beginning of his digital activism. He has gone as far as advocating for knife attacks on Hamas officials. Just a few days ago, Ati published the names of Gazan police officials, facilitating their targeting by the “Israeli” military. Abdul Ati has lionized the Abu Shabab militia using his website, “al-Muwatin,” where he presented the collaborator gangs and the “New Rafah” post as a model for post-Hamas governance and the Board of Peace “New Gaza” program.
The following Gazan clans, tribal bodies, mukhtars, and lijal al-Silah/reconciliation committees have denounced the "June 26 Movement": the National Gathering of Palestinian Tribes, Clans, and Families; the Qatatwa Tribe Youth Council; the al-Buheisi family; the Bakr family (through Mukhtar Abu Fadi Bakr); the Dughmush family (through Mukhtar Azmi Daghmash); the Helles family (through Mukhtar Rashad Helles); representatives of the Qatatwa tribe; Abu Ahmad al-Fajm (as a notable of the families of Khan Yunis); the mukhtars and senior notables of Gaza's families and clans collectively; and numerous local reconciliation figures (Lijan al-Islah) and tribal/community leaders acting under the umbrella of Gaza's families and clans.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ultra Palestine (2019, 16 March) ‘We Want to Live’: Details of Three Violent Days. Available at: ultrapal.ultrasawt.comحراك-بدنا-نعيش-تفاصيل-ثلاثة-أيام-عنيفة (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Independent Arabia (2019, 18 March) ‘We Want to Live’ in Gaza: How the Movement Emerged and Why Hamas Security Forces Responded with Violence. Available at: independentarabia.com/node/13221(Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Al-Quds al-Arabi (2019, 19 March) ‘We Want to Live’ Movement Continues in the Gaza Strip Despite Violent Repression. Available at: alquds.co.ukحراك-بدنا-نعيش-يتواصل-في-قطاع-غزة-رغم-ا/ (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Al Jazeera (2019, 20 March) ‘Why Did the Movement of the Poor in Gaza Fail?’. Available at: aljazeera.net/blogs/2019/3/2…لماذا-فشل-حراك-الفقراء-في-غزة (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights (2019, 5 August) Internal Security Apparatus in Gaza Governorate Detains Lawyer Moumen al-Natour. Available at: mezan.org/post/29118(Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Journalist Support Committee (2021, 24 May) Journalist Support Committee Report on the Losses Sustained by Journalists and Media Institutions During the Aggression on the Gaza Strip. Available at: journalistsupport.net/article.php?id… (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Al-Watan (2024, 19 November) ‘The Occupation Punishes Those Who Refuse Displacement with “Massacres”’. Available at: al-watan.com/article/150239/عربي-ودولي/الاحتلال-يعاقب-رافضي-النزوح-بالمجازر (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Al-Muwatin (2026, 6 February) ‘Yedioth Warns of “The Turning of the Gun Barrels”: Will Abu Shabab’s Militia Turn Its Weapons Against Israel?’. Available at: almwatin.comيديعوت-تحذر-من-انقلاب-الفوهات-هل-يرتد(Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Abdel-Ati, A.H. (2026, 14 February) ‘Kan: Abu Shabab Militia Leader Ghassan al-Dahini Reveals...’. Telegram. Available at: t.me/s/abedalati/11… (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Al-Muwatin (2026, 14 February) ‘Hebrew Channel: March Is the Decisive Month for Hamas’ Weapons... Rafah Is the Starting Point’. Available at: almwatin.comقناة-عبرية-مارس-شهر-الحسم-في-سلاح-حماس (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Abdel-Ati, A.H. (2026, 14 February) ‘Hebrew Channel: March Is the Decisive Month for Hamas’ Weapons... Rafah Is the Starting Point’. Telegram. Available at: t.me/s/abedalati?be… (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Palestinian Press Network (2026, 22 April) ‘Abdul Hamid Abdel-Ati Incites Against the Restoration of the Judicial System in Gaza’. Available at: palps.net/?p=17400(Acces…: 25 June 2026).
Pursuing the Fifth Column (2026, 5 May) ‘“10 Shekels and Photograph Your Tent Clean”: The So-Called Abdel-Ati Sparks Controversy with a New Farce’. Available at: tabour5.com/10-شيكل-وصوّر-خيمتك-نظيفة-المدعو-عبد/ (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Al-Muwatin (2026, 9 May) ‘Abdul Hamid Abdel-Ati: The Story of a Journalist Who Faced Crises in the Field’. Available at: almwatin.comعبد-الحميد-عبد-العاطي-حكاية-إعلامي-واج (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Pursuing the Fifth Column (2026, 12 May) ‘Abdul Hamid Abdel-Ati and the “Opening the Roads” Play: Shameful Lies Exposed by Citizens, Who Demand That He Stop His Campaigns of Theft and Exploitation’. Available at: tabour5.comعبد-الحميد-عبد-العاطي-ومسرحية-فتح-الشو/ (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Palestinian Press Network (2026, 18 May) ‘Abdul Hamid Abdel-Ati: A Dirty Israeli Card for Bringing Down the People of Gaza’. Available at: palps.net/?p=18256 (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Pursuing the Fifth Column (2026, 4 June) ‘How the “Avichay Network” and Its Mouthpieces Are Waging a Campaign to Demonize Relief Institutions and Sever Gaza’s Lifeline’. Available at: tabour5.comكيف-تقود-شبكة-أفيخاي-وأبواقها-حرب-شيط/ (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Palestinian Press Network (2026, 8 June) ‘Abdul Hamid Abdel-Ati: An Extra in the “Media Prostitution” of the Avichay Network’. Available at: palps.net/?p=18762 (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Pursuing the Fifth Column (2026, 11 June) ‘The Helles Family Denounces Calls for Incitement and Chaos’. Available at: tabour5.comعائلة-حلس-تستنكر-دعوات-التحريض-والفوض/(Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Pursuing the Fifth Column (2026, 11 June) ‘Abdul Hamid Abdel-Ati Plants Lies About Calls for Killing Among the People of Gaza, Activists Respond’. Available at: tabour5.comعبد-الحميد-عبد-العاطي-يدسُّ-الأكاذيب-ح/ (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Palestinian Press Network (2026, 12 June) ‘Abdul Hamid Abdel-Ati’s Early Retreat from the Foreign-Funded “Rodent Revolution”’. Available at: palps.net/?p=18893 (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Palestinian Press Network (2026, 22 June) ‘Abdul Hamid Abdel-Ati and His Close Involvement in Implementing the Occupation’s Plans in Gaza’. Available at: palps.net/?p=8056 (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Pursuing the Fifth Column (2026, 22 June) ‘Palestinian Clans and Families in Gaza Expel the Advocates of Strife and Disavow the “June 26 Movement”’. Available at: tabour5.comالعشائر-والعائلات-الفلسطينية-في-غزة-ت/ (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Pursuing the Fifth Column (2026, 22 June) ‘The al-Buheisi Family Rejects Calls to Demonstrate and the Fitna of the “Movement” in Gaza and Calls on Its Members Not to Be Dragged Along or Support It’. Available at: tabour5.comعائلة-البحيصي-ترفض-دعوات-التظاهر-وفتن/(Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Palestinian Press Network (2026, 22 June) ‘After Claiming to Withdraw, Abdul Hamid Abdel-Ati Continues His “Dirty” Role and the June 26 Movement’. Available at: palps.net/?p=19137 (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Pursuing the Fifth Column (2026, 22 June) ‘Abdul Hamid Abdel-Ati Attacks the People of Gaza and Incites the Targeting of Those Who Reject Calls for Internal Fighting and Demonstrations’. Available at: tabour5.comعبد-الحميد-عبد-العاطي-يهاجم-أهل-غزة-ويح/ (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Pursuing the Fifth Column (2026, 23 June) ‘Bloodshed Advocate Abdul Hamid Abdel-Ati Calls for the Killing of Anyone Who Rejects Internal Fighting and Threatens: “I Will Publish the Names of Police Personnel”’. Available at: tabour5.comسفّاك-الدماء-عبد-الحميد-عبد-العاطي-يدع/ (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Palestinian Press Network (2026, 24 June) ‘The Leaders of the Subversive Movement in Gaza Lack Both Family and Popular Cover’. Available at: palps.net/?p=19204 (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Pursuing the Fifth Column (2026, 24 June) ‘Gaza Families Announce Their Rejection of Calls for Strife: “The Strip Will Not Be a Place for the Plans of the Avichay Network and Its Aides”’. Available at: tabour5.comعائلات-غزة-تعلن-موقفها-الرافض-لدعوات-ا/ (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Pursuing the Fifth Column (2026, 24 June) ‘Bassem Osman, the Fugitive, Attacks Gaza’s Mukhtars and Clans After They Reject Calls for the “Suspicious Movement”’. Available at: tabour5.comالهارب-باسم-عثمان-يُهاجم-مخاتير-وعشائ/ (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
Shehada, M. (2026, 25 June) ‘Freedom, Dignity, and a Future’: Why Gazans Are Planning a Mass Mobilization. +972 Magazine. Available at: 972mag.com/gaza-june-26-p… (Accessed: 25 June 2026).
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Finkelstein is not the go-to in the established scholarship. He is not even considered a serious scholar within Palestine Studies. I work specifically on the resistance, and if that interests you here is a reading list:
Scholarship on Hamas:
Top Tier Scholarship:
- Ghassan Du‘ar, “Harb al-Ayyam al-Sab‘ah: ’Usud Hamas” [The Seven Day War: The Lions of Hamas] (Amman: Filisteen Almuslima, 1993).
- Ghassan Du‘ar, “Imad-Aql-'usturati-aljihad-w-almuqawima.” [Imad Aql, legend of jihad and resistance] (London, Filastin al-Muslimah, 1994).
-Ghassan Du‘ar, "The Engineer: The Martyr Yahya Ayyash, Symbol of Jihad and Leader of the Resistance in Palestine” (London: London, Filastin al-Muslimah, 1997).
—Jawad al-Hamad and Iyyad al-Barghouthi (eds.), Dirasah fi al-Fikr al-Siyasi li Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah: Hamas: 1987–1996 (A Study on the Political Thought of the Islamic Resistance Movement: Hamas: 1987–1996) (Amman: MESC, 1997).
- Khaled Hroub, “Hamas: Political Thought and Practice” (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000).
-Jeroen Gunning, “Re-thinking Western constructs of Islamism: pluralism, democracy and the theory and praxis of the Islamic movement in the Gaza Strip”, Doctoral thesis, Durham University (Durham, England: 2000).
- Jeroen Gunning, “Hamas in Politics” (London: Hurst, 2009).
-Basim al-Zubaidi, Hamas wa al-Hhukum: Dukhul al-Nizam am al-Tamarrud ‘alayh (Hamas and Power: Entering the System or Rebelling Against It) (Ramallah: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 2010).
-Ibrahim Ghosheh, “The Red Minaret: Memoirs of Ibrahim Ghusheh (Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre, 2013).
-Sara Roy, “Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist Social Sector” (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2011)
Yezid Sayigh, "We Serve the People: Hamas Policing in Gaza" (Waltham, MA: Brandeis, 2011).
- Mohsen Mohammad Saleh (Ed.), “Islamic Resistance Movement-Hamas: Studies of Thought and Experience” (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2017).
- Björn Brenner, “Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance” (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017).
-Ghassan Du‘ar, "Qawāʿid al-Shuyūkh: Muqāwamat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn ḍidd al-Mashrūʿ al-Ṣuhyūnī, 1968–1970” (The Shuyukh Camps: The Resistance of the Muslim Brothers Against the Zionist Project, 1968–1970) (Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre, 2018).
- Abdalhakim Aziz Hanaini, Manhajiyyat Harakat Hamas fi al-‘Alaqat al-Kharijiyyah: Suria Namuzajan 2000-2015 (Hamas’ Foreign Policy: Syria as a Case Study 2000-2015) (Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre, 2018).
- Tareq Baconi, “Hamas Contained” (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018). [note: Baconi’s book is oft criticized for the title, which prognosticates containment, belied by Tufan al-Aqsa; but this does not play much of a role in the book itself, which is worth reading for his use of myriad archives. Specifically, Baconi consults: the Gaza City archives, working through the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut's archive of news publications in the Al- Watha’iq al-Arabiyeh; the al- Zaytouna Centre in Beirut, which published Al-Watha’iq al-Filastiniyyah from 2005–11; and the Al-Resalah’s Gaza City archive.]
-Daud Abdullah, “Engaging the World: The Making of Hamas’ Foreign Policy” (Johannesburg: Afro-Middle East Centre, 2020).
- Erik Skare, “A History of Palestinian Islamic Jihad” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).
Ahmed Qasem Hussein, “The Evolution of the Military Action of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades: How Hamas Established its Army in Gaza,” Al-Muntaqa, Vol.1, No.2, September/October 2021, pp. 78-97.
- Qossay Hamed, “The Constant and the Variable in the Ideology of Hamas (2006-2018)”, PhD Dissertation for Political Science, Université de Bordeaux, 2021.
- Leila Seurat, “The Foreign Policy of Hamas” (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2022).
-Jean-François Legrain, “Hamas According to Hamas: A Reading of its Document of General Principles” in Shahram Akbarzadeh (Ed.), “Routledge Handbook of Political Islam”, 2nd Ed., Oxfordshire, Routledge, 2022, pp. 79-90.
-Yahya al-Sanea, "Tarikh Harakat Hamas, Alnash'a Waltatawur" [The History of Hamas Movement, Emergence and Development] (Al-Raya for Research and Studies, 2022).
- Paola Caridi, “Hamas: from Resistance to Regime” (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2023, updated edition).
-Tarek Hamoud, “Socializing Hamas: Evaluating the Structural Political Developments in the Islamic Palestinian Resistance Movement as a Ruling Authority Between 2006-2017”, University of Exeter Doctoral Thesis, 2023.
- Basem Ezbidi, "Not Rebel Governance? Hamas’s Rule" in Ibrahim Fraihat and Abdalhadi Alijla (Eds.), Rebel Governance in the Middle East (Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore), pp. 281-318.
-Talha Ismail Duman, “Beyond Sectarianism: Hezbollah and the Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood’s Evolving Alliance in the Context of the Al-Aqsa Flood”, Sakarya Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 51, No.1, (2025), pp. 36-53.
Lesser Tier Scholarship
Avraham Sela and Shaul Mishal, "The Palestinian Hamas" (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000)
· - Note: contains a number of historical mistakes, pointed out by Khaled Hroub, "Mishal and Sela: The Palestinian Hamas and Schoch: The Islamic Movement", Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Summer 2001) palestine-studies.org/en/node/40973
Zaki Chehab, "Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement" (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007).
· - Note: although the text draws from numerous important first-hand accounts conducted by Chebab, it also draws on many zionist intelligence reports.
Beverley Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell, Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement (London: Polity, 2010).
· - Note: relies on myriad zionist partisan journalists.
Tariq Mukhimer, "Hamas Rule in Gaza: Human Rights under Constraint" (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
· - In its attempt to hew towards a putatively objective framework, it elides the political backing of the PA/Fatah-attempted coup against Hamas in 2006-7; however, there are important details/interviews included, making it worth consulting.
Ibrahim Natil, “Hamas Transformation: Opportunities and Challenges” (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015).
· - Note: self-published and lacking in scholarly oversight but less biased than numerous academic texts; however, Sayigh’s book covers much of the same terrain; also note that this is a witness account of Hamas’ governance, written from a first-hand perspective.
Tristan Dunning, “Hamas, jihad and popular legitimacy: reinterpreting resistance in Palestine” (New York: Routledge, 2016).
· - The analytic framework is the sole novel facet
Martin Kear, "Hamas and Palestine: The Contested Road to Statehood" (New York: Routledge, 2018).
· - Interesting from an international relations framework but contains little in the way of first-hand accounts/historical findings.
Beverley Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell, "Hamas: The Quest for Power" (London: Polity Press, 2024).
· - Note: like the 2010 antecedent version, this relies on myriad zionist partisan journalists.
Netanel Flamer, “The Hamas Intelligence War” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024)
Daniel Sobelman, "Axis of Resistance Asymmetric Deterrence and Rules of the Game in Contemporary Middle East Conflicts" (Albany, SUNY Press, 2025), p. 128
⁃zionist source but illuminating review of Operation Guardian of the Walls/Sword of Jerusalem
Poor Quality Scholarship that Amounts to Propaganda:
Dennis Ross (Int.), Matthew Levitt, “Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad” (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).
-relies exclusively on Neoconservative think tank reports, CIA reports and white papers in favor of regime change, and Zionist think tanks/political figures/non-profits; contextualizes
Reflecting on the motivation for Tufan al-Aqsa, Hamas political bureau member Husam Badran—who had been a commander for al-Qassam Brigades in the West Bank, spent 14 years in the occupation’s prisons (where he was a cellmate and close friend of Sinwar), and would later
form the Hamas Office of National Relations (HONR)—remarked that:
“We are not seeking improved living conditions-we are not a minority living within another state.
We want our political rights. And, therefore, I tell you that October 7 is fundamentally because of this idea."
This is a telling remarks, which betrays the occupation’s misunderstanding of the effect of the ceasefire agreements that followed the May 2021 war, termed “Operation Guardian of the Walls” by the occupation and “Sword of Jerusalem” by al-Qassam and Saraya al-Quds.
*On the zionist occupation’s prisons as a meeting ground for various Palestinian factions: a short thread*
(image from Tarek Hamoud, “Evaluating the Structural Political Developments in the Islamic Palestinian Resistance Movement as a Ruling Authority Between 2006-2017”, 2023)
In its earliest stages, the zionist occupation’s prisons served as a crucial setting for fostering interaction between Hamas and other Palestinian factions. The origins of Hamas’s concept of national partnership are generally believed to have emerged within zionist prisons during
the late 1980s and early 1990s, while the shifts triggered by the Oslo Accords may have acted as a catalyst that transformed this idea into practical political cooperation with other Palestinian forces. In an interview on 22 October 2020 with Tarek Hamoud, Saleh al-Arouri stated
@DougLain @JacktheFate @ccutrone1970 @compactmag_ To claim that Hamas took Gaza by force and has held it by force is historically inaccurate. Hamas prevented the PA, trained by Keith Dayton and bolstered by Condoleezza Rice, from exacting a coup. Hamas has not repressed the PFLP or socialist organizations, which do enjoy a base
@DougLain @JacktheFate @ccutrone1970 @compactmag_ and do not “tail” Hamas. In fact, Hamas and PFLP, DFLP, and other socialist organizations have enjoyed good relations, despite some debates and disagreements, since George Habash, secretary general of the PFLP, spoke with notable enthusiasm about Hamas in the publication
@DougLain @JacktheFate @ccutrone1970 @compactmag_ “Filastin al-Muslima” (March 1990, p. 12), in which he remarked:
“From the ideological position of total confrontation, I welcome Hamas joining the swell of total resistance to the Zionist enemy. Whoever is familiar with that (Islamic) movement—its slogans, its priorities, and
THE PRE-HISTORY OF HAMAS' AL-QASSAM BRIGADES FORMATION: A SHORT THREAD ON THE FORMATION OF “THE PALESTINIAN MUJAHIDUN" & AL-MAJD
(photo from the First Intifada, graffiti reading "Against Conferences for the Sale of Our Land", Musa Allush Collection)
In 1985, Sheikh Yassin was released after 11 months in prison, due to a prisoner exchange between the zionist entity and Ahmed Jibril’s PFLP-General Command. After his release, Yassin went back to work; in 1985, he helped set up a new armed organization called al-Majd (Glory), an
acronym for Munazamat al-Jihaf wa al-Da’wa (The Organization of Holy War and Preaching). According to Khaled Hroub’s “Hamas: Political Thought and Practice” (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 2000), Majd was founded in 1983 and had been charged with “the task of liquidating
*On Hamas’ Unique Nationalist-Islamic Code of Conduct, its Approach to Education During the First Intifada, and the PA’s Repressive Response Thereafter*
During the years 1987 - 1993, Hamas differed from the PLO-affiliated Unified National Leadership of the Intifada on the
subject of declaring general strikes affecting schools; while the latter insisted on the participation of all students in the general strike, leading to the closing down of schools, Hamas exempted educational establishments from general strikes and called on students to attend
classes. In its Periodic statement no. 45 of 21 July 1989, Hamas appealed to students to attend classes; the statement's heading read: “Read, in the name of thy God, the Creator. Learning and studying are a sacred right that we safeguard. No one outdoes us in this regard.”