Thread by @clement_molin

Since early May, Ukraine 🇺🇦 targeted nearly 800 Russian 🇷🇺 trucks and vehicles on key logistical roads.

This strike campaign continue to be scaling, with strikes on railway infrastructure, bridges and the isolation of Crimea.

🧵THREAD🧵1/17 ⬇️

Here is the video of the ~784 trucks and vehicles hit by the Ukrainians (mainly videos from the drones, since we can't always tell the difference with ground footage).

Strikes target military trucks, fuel trucks, cargo trucks, cars, buses and trucks closer to the frontline.

In total, I counted 784 trucks and vehicles hit by Ukrainian drones since early May.

🔹The per day average since May is 13
🔹May average is 7 (214 trucks)
🔹June average is 19 (570 trucks)
🔸Last 10 days average is 29 (295)

https://x.com/sternenko/status/2068970314042658823?s=20

This count depends on the videos published by the Ukrainian side. We had in May around 3 videos per day, we now have 3 videos a day at least.

Magyar Birds/UAS, 1st Azov Corp, 3rd SSO, Code 9.2, Spartan NGU, 3rd Corps, SBU, GUR... are publishing the biggest number of videos.

In total, since the year started, I have gathered 345 geolocations of trucks and vehicles hit across occupied Ukraine.

My main sources are : @AndrewPerpetua/@UAControlMap (maps), @moklasen @neonhandrail @99Dominik_ @MikiValbuena @RoadtoMars9 @klinger66 and others for geolocation

Satellite images from @GarbuzYe and @cyber_boroshno show multiple bridges hit by the Ukrainians (especially in Crimea), forcing Russian forces to put pontoon bridges.

All bridges leading to Crimea have been hit, most of those cannot be used.

Additionnaly, key railway link from Crimea to mainland southern Ukraine has been cut with strikes on 3 bridges.

Other bridges have been targeted on the strategic Rostov-Melitopol road.

Last week, multiple strikes hit trucks crossing the pontoon bridges in Chonhar, which shows that hitting the bridges had some impacts.

On key highways, forcing large trucks into smaller roads makes their targeting easier and complicate all the road logistics.

The Rostov-Crimea "Novorrosia" land bridge remains the most heavily targeted road. There is no other alternative road and trucks and vehicles continue to be hit, especially around Melitopol and Mariupol.

Alternative roads are often targeted as well. Fuel trucks are the piority.

There is now a real fuel penury for both occupied territories, but also for frontline units.

To counter this, russian troops are escorting fuel convoys with canon-air defense. This strategy has already seen its limits, with barely any video of successful defense but multiple videos of targeting of these air-defense trucks.

The main solution remains drone air-defense, with Rubikon center targeting everyday drones. But this is not enough, only a small portion of drone are downed on predictable roads.

With the arrival of long range FPV drones, no counter solution had been found yet.

The last few days, Kherson oblast has been more and more isolated by Ukrainian strikes. Many trucks are hit daily on the secondary route going through Chaplynka.

The Donetsk-Mariupol road, continue to be hit regularly, as well as all key roads leading to Donetsk. One can understand that we have only ~15/20% of all the 784 hits geolocated, so the map gives only a snapshot of the real situation.

Here is a zoom for the central part of Donbas. Luhansk-Donetsk road is highly targeted.

Remember as well that I count here only mid-range strikes, so around 20km from the frontline.

Thus, these kind of geolocations closer to frontline by @AndrewPerpetua (some logistic roads on the kill zone) are not counted.

If I talked about road logistics, we shouldn't forget that other strikes continue.

-> Rail/Ferry logistics
-> Oil/Gas/Electricity infrastructure
-> Rear bases and depots
-> Training ground/Ammunition depots

All those strikes complicate the logistical situation.

Analysis :

The increase in deep-strike operations is a reality the Russian army cannot counter. The progression —seeing 7, then 9, and finally 29 trucks or vehicles hit daily over the course of a month — demonstrates that despite having time to adapt and implement defensive measures, the Russian army continues to fall behind.

Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics have effectively frozen the southern front, marking the initial results of this strategy. The Russian offensive at Huliaipole has slowed, and Russian forces are being slowly pushed back along the entire front between the Dnipro River and Novopavlivka. Roads, bridges, and even open fields are under constant surveillance. Russian air defense systems and radars continue to be targeted, particularly in Crimea. The peninsula is becoming increasingly isolated, facing widespread fuel shortages, the near-closure of the land bridge to Russia, and the destruction of most ferries. Currently, only military airfields (as any air bridge appears highly dangerous) and the Crimean Bridge (vulnerable given recent strikes on Kerch) provide a lifeline for the peninsula.

The Russian army is attempting to counter these strikes through three measures. The first involves providing air defense escorts for strategic convoys—a strategy that has proven ineffective, as Ukrainian drones are fast, small, and often silent. Interceptor drones offer a potential solution, yet they remain insufficient; the number of operational teams is too low to cover such a vast territory (especially given the need to protect Russia itself and the front line). Consequently, Russia is attempting to mount a similar campaign within Ukraine—with varying degrees of success—a topic I will revisit in the coming days. Medium-range strikes are carried out predominantly by Geran drones (whereas BM35s, Molniyahs, and fiber-optic FPVs often fail to reach long distances due to connectivity issues); these Gerans are far larger and more expensive than the myriad Ukrainian drones that compete among themselves. This strike campaign—targeting service stations, truck depots, and electrical substations, among other sites—comes at the expense of deep-strike operations and bears absolutely no comparison to the Ukrainian strike campaign.

Given the ongoing Ukrainian strike campaign, one should expect a more pronounced regaining of the initiative on specific fronts during the summer and autumn, aimed at exploiting breaches caused by Russian logistical failures. In the long run, the introduction of long-range FPV drones (capable of a 50km range with perfect video quality) spells disaster for Moscow. These drones are extremely low-cost, can be mass-produced in the tens of thousands, are rarely jammed (thanks to a "mothership" drone ensuring connectivity), and will be able to stealthily strike logistical assets located tens of kilometers behind the front line. The Russians, meanwhile, remain stuck relying on fiber-optic cables...

I will continue to update key numbers around the Ukrainian Mid-range strike campaign, with the new videos, datas and geolocations in the next few days.

Thank you for following, I will continue to catch up this week, with other subjects (frontline, fortifications...)

Per week and now per day *