Thread with excerpts from "The French Intifada: The Long War Between France and its Arabs" (2014). This book, by a leftist (participant in communes) author, portrays race riots by Arab immigrants to France as simply one more episode in a centuries-long war between the two.
Both the French Left and Right framed the 2005 riots as part of the long French tradition of revolt. But they were wrong; the protestors were mostly Arabs rioting against France itself, not against "the bosses" or "the state."
The rioters (remember, Arab immigrants and their descendants) see themselves as soldiers in a long war against France, Europe, and even civilization itself. Recall that the author is on their side.
Arabs and Africans in France tend to be Anglophiles, who like England, the English language, and Anglophone culture (rap music and football). Presumably the Anglo model of racial privileges is more attractive than the French model of assimilation.
After the brutal on-camera murder (by an Algerian) of an 8 year old French Jewish girl, Miriam Monsonego, the Algerians in France tended to support the killer. Their view: "France is our enemy," we live here because "France is easy" (ie, they give us free money).
To stop Algerian football clubs from serving as an anticolonial rallying point, the French administration mandated at least three Europeans in all clubs. This is analogous to 'anti-discrimination' statutes, requiring a certain number of women, blacks, etc, in the US today.
The Algerian War of independence was incredibly brutal, full of torture and massacres on both sides, often by people who had lived and worked civilly with each other for decades.
As is often the case, the French government underestimated the magnitude of the immigration wave from newly-independent Algeria; they guessed 100K would leave in the first year and got 1.35 million - not counting the Algerians, who quickly followed their former overlords.
Newly-independent Algeria was a cause celebre of the worldwide Left, which saw it as a beacon of hope and freedom for the postcolonial world. It quickly became a bloody disaster wracked by civil war and massacres, worse than under the French.
Independent Algeria being a shithole with a collapsing economy but booming population, Algerians quickly began demanding visas to France, emigration being the major hope for opportunity. The 'ultra-violent' civil wars made this worse.
The Algerian civil war of the 1990s included such charming episodes as a group of shouting men hacking up a village with axes, throwing babies in ovens, mutilating corpses.
In 1998, the multiracial French football team won the World Cup for the first time. This was treated by the French press as a moment of reconciliation for France and Algeria and triumph for multiculturalism, but the Algerians themselves did not see it that way.
"In today's Algiers, the French may have left, but France is still the enemy. Yet it also represents the Promised Land... the visits by Chirac (in 2003) and then Sarkozy (in 2007) were met by crowds chanting, 'Give us our visas!'"
1950s Morocco was very popular among English-speaking writers for the easily-available drugs and freely available gay sex, being much less morally uptight than America.
Moroccans perpetrated the Madrid train bombings in 2004.
The process of radicalization in the Moroccan diaspora often begins with smoking weed and bonding over shared grudges, like getting rejected by a girl because she was a 'racist'.
Moroccans see all of Spain as rightful Muslim soil and do not distinguish between Spanish 'occupiers' and Jews.
Average Muslim terrorist in Europe: very long string of petty crimes, always let out with a slap on the wrist, married a Spanish junky for citizenship.
The view of young Moroccans towards France: we hate the French, and also "France must help us!"
The prison population of France is thought to be 70% Muslim.
Muslim prisoners are not like imprisoned European ethnic cliques; they behave like an army and constantly threaten the guards.
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'The Unknown Warriors' (2006) is a collection of WWII veteran's views on modern Britain gathered via newspaper ad. So what did WWII veterans think of the 2006 UK? They hated it; 134 responses were negative vs only 6 positive (plus 31 N/A and 13 neutral). Excerpts below.
The below is typical (from a D-Day veteran): "I am absolutely disgusted with the way things are turning out... and sometimes wonder if it was worth all the suffering of a war."
"I have many, many misgivings on how matters have turned out. Problems seem to be resolved, by more and more legislation, instead of action at the source... What many veterans abhor, is the acceptance of homosexuality as the norm."
Employers hiring people and then training them in the specific skills they require has declined as a hiring model for decades, in favor of a hiring market where employers look for people who already have those skills.
In the training/internal labor markets model, a company struggling to find specific skills will train promising entry-level employees. In the hiring market model, they can raise wages or otherwise improve conditions. In both, they can also substitute technology for labor.
Neither a hiring market nor training model for matching jobs to seekers is compatible with "skill shortages" as a concept, which implicitly assumes skills are fixed and once people with those skills run out employers can do nothing (except through immigration or schooling).
"Fire and Blood: A History of Mexico" (TR Fehrenbach, 1973/1995) thread of threads. Mesoamerican civilization was horrifying and very backwards by Old World standards, but unique.
Excerpts from TR Fehrenbach's "Fire and Blood: A History of Mexico" (1995). The PRI had massively expanded higher education. These universities were entirely 'free'/self-governing and became locuses of left-wing organizing.
In 1968, security forces fired upon a massive student demonstration/riot against the Olympic Games.
By 1970 Mexico had made enormous progress; the national income increased sixfold while the death rate dropped by half. But Mexico was still struggling with foreign-exchange; the govt pursued import-substitution to improve balance-of-payments.
Thread with excerpts from the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) section of TR Fehrenbach's "Fire and Blood: A History of Mexico" (1995). Calles created the PNR in 1929 to institutionalize the govt and Revolution, creating a Mexican party-state.
The Calles/Obregon governments were corrupt, but never succumbed to paranoia; there was no equivalent to the Soviet or Chinese liquidations of class enemies, the press was free, and the average Mexican had nothing to fear from the govt (Red Terror against the Church aside).
Roughly 19M acres were redistributed through 1933; most land remained with latifundios. But the new latifundios were not like the old ones, they were commercial enterprises rather than social systems. The clerics, army, and latifundistas were all tamed by Calles/Obregon.
Thread with excerpts from TR Fehrenbach's "Fire and Blood: A History of Mexico" (1995), on post-Revolutionary Mexico. To justify land reform, the revolutionaries revived the principle that expropriation was justifiable if the national interests demanded it.
The Constitutionalists defeated the Villistas in battle and assassinated the leader of the last revolutionary faction, Zapata, by treachery.
Carranza, the erstwhile leader of the victorious Constitutionalists, dug his own grave by trying to promote someone other than Obregon to the presidency after him; he was forced to flee the capital, run down, and murdered.